

MCCMOS Circular

Marine Civil Affairs Operations



Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School (MCCMOS)

U.S. Marine Corps

October 2019

This circular supports the academic curricula of all MCCMOS Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations Programs of Instruction

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Throughout this circular, masculine nouns and pronouns are used for the sake of simplicity. Except where otherwise noted, these nouns and pronouns apply to either gender

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30 October 2019

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School (MCCMOS) Circular *Marine Civil Affairs Operations*, is designed to clarify the role of CA forces in the execution of CAO, and in support of CMO, with regard to the missions, employment, support requirements, capabilities, and limitations of these forces.

The overall purpose of this circular is to support MCCMOS programs of instruction with a more complete reference until such time that an update to MCRP 3-03A.1 (CA TTPs) is approved by Training and Education Command and/or the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration.

Recommendations for improvements to this pamphlet are encouraged from commands and individuals. The enclosed User Suggestion Form can be reproduced and forwarded to:

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Reviewed and approved this date.



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CHAPTER 1

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES

If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.

— B. H. Liddell Hart

1000. Overview

Modern military activities are complex, as is the battlespace in which they are conducted. The idea of a two-dimensional battlespace devoid of actors other than opposing peer/near peer military forces is false. In the 21st century, militaries must work within an all-domain battlespace that embraces not just the physical, but the cognitive aspects of the operating environment. This environment is shared by a multitude of civil actors engaged in the full spectrum of human activity. The need to deconflict and coordinate military and civilian activity within the same space is essential to the success of military operations and minimizing and/or mitigating disruption to civilian activities. As such, military decision-makers must understand and consider the civil dimension of the battlespace during the planning and conduct of all types of operations.

MAGTF forces conduct civil-military operations (CMO) to coordinate civil and military activities, minimize civil-military friction, mitigate threats from the civil component, maximize support for operations, and meet the commander's legal obligations and moral responsibilities to the civilian populations within the operational environment. CMO are an inherent command responsibility. They encompass the actions MAGTF commanders take to establish and maintain relations with civil authorities, the general population, and other organizations. As a part of unified action, MAGTF commanders are responsible for the organization and centralized direction of CMO in their battlespace.

In the past, wars were fought mainly on battlefields, but by the end of the 20th century a fundamental shift has occurred - civilians have moved to centre stage in the theatre of war. This fundamental shift in the character of war is illustrated by a stark statistic: in World War I, nine soldiers were killed for every civilian life lost.

In today's wars, it is estimated that 10 civilians die for every soldier or fighter killed in battle.

The above quote, from the 2009 *People on War Report* published by the International Committee of the Red Cross, illustrates some of the complexity of modern conflict. Urbanization, population shifts and the blurring boundary between lawful and unlawful combatants, criminals, and innocent civilians adds greater challenges for the commander. Across the competition continuum, Marine Corps commanders must determine how best to discriminate and engage with the civilian populace to accomplish their missions. This circular provides a doctrinal basis for the conduct of civil affairs operations (CAO) and associated civil affairs activities.

1001. Terms and Definitions

a. Civil Affairs

Civil affairs (CA) are designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations.

b. Civil Affairs Activities

Civil Affairs Activities (CAA) are activities specifically planned, executed and assessed by CA forces, that support the commander to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), unified action partners, and interagency organizations/partners.

c. Civil Affairs Operations

CAO are actions planned, coordinated, and executed by CA forces, assessed to enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment. CAO are designed to work with friendly networks and engage neutral networks to help achieve the commander's objectives. Engaging with IPI, interagency partners, NGOs, and international organizations creates a better shared understanding of the OE, informs USG decision makers, and influences informal networks towards US national interests.

d. Civil-Military Cooperation

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is: (1) A joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors (NATO Agreed). (2) The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-government organizations and agencies (Australian Defence Force).

e. Civil-Military Interaction

CMO are activities of a commander performed by designated military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation.

f. Civil-Military Operations

CMO are activities of a commander performed by designated military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation.

g. United Nations Civil-Military Coordination

United Nations Civil-Military Coordination is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. Civil-military coordination is a function mandated to the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs under international agreements at the UN.

Variants in these definitions are due to differences in force structure, treaty and/or coalition

arrangements, agendas and/or mission. The commonality across these definitions emphasizes the importance of optimizing the civil-military interface in order to support policy and mission objectives. Marine forces utilize CMO as the primary term used to describe interaction between civil actors and military forces.

1002. The Role of Civil Affairs

CA forces are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to plan and conduct CMO and CAO across the competition continuum, engaging the civil component (IPI, unified action partners, other civil entities, and interagency partners) to support the MAGTF's CMO concept. See Appendix B for more information on the roles and authorities for CAO.

The mission of Marine Corps CA is to inform, influence and shape the cognitive civil environment through targeted and integrated civil reconnaissance and civil engagements to achieve MAGTF objectives. CA engages and influences unified action partners and IPI, conducts Military Government, enables CMO, and provides civil considerations expertise through the planning and execution of MAGTF operations.

CA forces contribute to perception management in the cognitive dimension by informing, influencing, shaping, gaining and maintaining access to the civil environment through targeted and integrated civil reconnaissance and civil engagements to achieve MAGTF objectives.

1003. Civil Affairs Marines

CA Marines are specifically trained to assess the civil environment, identify civil considerations, and integrate them throughout the planning process and tactical execution. CA Marines have graduated from the 0530/0531/0532 military occupational specialties (MOS) qualifying courses; CMO planners/chiefs have graduated from the 0535/39 MOS qualifying courses from Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School (MCCMOS).

CA Marines are planners and executors. As CMO planners, they consider the impact of the civil component on military operations and vice versa. They ensure that the MAGTF staff integrates CMO throughout the MCPP as part of the MAGTF single-battle concept. As executors, they

reconnoiter by conducting assessments and gathering information in the field, make stability activity nominations, and assist and advise with reconstructive or developmental projects in support of a whole of government application of power. They also coordinate with a wide variety of civil and military organizations, engage key leaders, and provide advice to subordinate military commanders or civilian authorities. Throughout the AO, they coordinate local labor efforts, locate and manage civilian resources, gather and manage critical civil information, identify key facilities and protected targets, disseminate information to the civil population, and assist in the MAGTF's conduct of Populace and Resources Control measures which is especially important during major combat operations.

a. Civil Affairs Noncommissioned Officer (0531)

A Civil Affairs Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) performs various duties involving planning, coordinating, and conducting CMO. They conduct research analysis and execution of civil affairs area studies, area assessments, and CMO estimates. CA NCOs inform, influence, shape, and gain access to the cognitive civil environment through targeted and integrated civil reconnaissance and civil engagements. This is a free secondary MOS for enlisted Marines of any occupational field.

b. Civil Affairs Specialist (0532)

A Civil Affairs Specialist performs various duties in both combat and non-combat environments involving the integration, planning, and conduct of CAO and CMO in support of MAGTF Operations. CA Specialists inform, influence, shape and gain access to the cognitive civil environment through targeted and integrated civil reconnaissance and civil engagements. This primary MOS is only applicable to the reserve component.

c. CMO Chief (0539)

A CMO Chief assists in the planning, coordinating, and assessment of CAO and CMO. These Staff Noncommissioned Officers assist in advising MAGTF commanders and their staff sections on the conduct of CMO as well as in understanding and shaping civil conditions to support MAGTF operations. CMO Chiefs assist with integrating CMO into MCPP across the

competition continuum. CMO Chiefs assist in the development of green cell products as well as coordinate, plan and assist in the developing an Annex G supporting a MAGTF or joint task force (JTF) operation plan or operations order. This is a career progression MOS for CA staff noncommissioned officers.

d. Civil Affairs Officer (0530)

A Civil Affairs Officer assists the MAGTF commander to plan, coordinate, and conduct civil affairs operations and civil-military operations. They help ensure the civil implications of all MAGTF missions are considered throughout the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP). Civil Affairs Officers interface between the MAGTF commander and a wide variety of civilian populations, agencies, and organizations. This is a free secondary MOS for Marines officers of any occupational field.

e. CMO Planner (0535)

A CMO Planner plans, coordinates, and assesses CMO and CAO. These officers advise MAGTF commanders and their staff sections on the conduct of CMO and CAO as well as in understanding and shaping civil conditions to support MAGTF operations. CMO Planners integrate CMO into MCP across the competition continuum. CMO Planners develop Green Cell products and coordinate, plan and develop an Annex G supporting a MAGTF or JTF Operation Plan or Operations Order. This is a career progression MOS for CA officers.

As CMO planners, special staff members, or as members of a civil affairs team or civil affairs detachment, CA Marines are the commander's principal advisors on CMO. They support the MAGTF commander's need to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO across the competition continuum. They assist the commander in understanding and visualizing the civil component of the operating environment.

1004. Civil Affairs Units and Billets

Marine Corps CA is designed to support operational or tactical level MAGTFs in all domains and across the multi-functional areas.

- MEU or battalion = CA team. Attached CA teams are task organized based on specific MEU requirements. A CA team typically has five Marines: two officers and three enlisted.
- MEB, MEF Information Group (MIG), or regimental landing team (RLT) = CA detachment. Three CA teams (one per battalion-sized major subordinate element) and a CA headquarters element made up of a staff of five Marines and one Navy Industrial Hygiene Officer which augments the GCE RLT S-3 CMO staff element and MEB G-9 CMO staff element. However, CA detachments can be attached to any combat element (air, ground, logistics) of the MAGTF per mission requirements.
- MEF = Civil Affairs Group (CAG) becomes a force provider with CAG commander and CA augments assigned to MEF G-9 CMO element. The CAG commander will not normally retain command and control of CA detachments but will be the assistant chief of staff G-9. CA detachments and/or teams may attach to any combat element of the MAGTF per mission requirements.

a. Active Component Civil Affairs

On 12 February 2019, after a review of the General Officer Force Optimization Review Group, the Commandant of the Marine Corps approved the reorganization of the active component CA force in the following manner:

- Each Marine Forces Command (except Marine Special Operations Command) receives a CA officer or a CA officer and enlisted.
- Each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) receives two 0530s and two 0531s. III MEF would receive a small detachment (three 0530s and three 0531s).
- Each MEF Information Group receives two 0530s and one 0531.
- Each Marine Expeditionary Unit retains one 0531.
- The Marine Corps Information Operations Center receives a small detachment of five 0530s and seven 0531s.
- The supporting establishment, to include the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and subordinates (MCCMOS), Marine Corps Systems Command, and

CAG inspectors and instructors, will receive the remaining 0530s and 0531s.

b. Civil Affairs Group

Reserve CA Forces are organized into three Civil Affairs Groups (CAG). The mission of the CAG is to support the MAGTF commander with specially trained and organized personnel in order to facilitate the planning, coordination, and execution of CMO and to conduct limited CAO.

Located at Camp Pendleton, CA, 1st CAG normally supports I MEF and 3D CAG, out of Great Lakes, IL, supports III MEF. Fourth CAG, located in Hialeah, FL supports Marine Forces South, U.S. Southern Command, and II MEF.

The CAG is comprised of a group headquarters (HQ), three CA detachments, and a G-9 CMO staff section. The group HQ is organized into a command sections, staff sections, and communications, motor transport, and public health sections. The group HQ and the G-9 provide the nucleus of CA staff support to the MEF command element and command and control of subordinate CA elements not attached to subordinate MEF elements.

c. MAGTF G-9 Staff

Each MEF Headquarters rates active component CMO planners on staff. The commander may assign one of them to stand up or function as the G-9 officer to support the day-to-day CMO planning and staff requirements or until such time as the reserve component forces can augment the MEF headquarters. Once established, the G-9 conducts an initial assessment to determine the CA force augmentation requirements for the MAGTF. The section will coordinate with other staff sections of the MAGTF by participating at various boards, working groups, and the operational planning team as required. Typically, at the MEF level, a G-9 watch officer will be established within the combat operations center. The G-9 will send liaison officers (LNOs) to higher commands and external organizations.

The G-9 considers the impact of civilians on MAGTF operations, the impact of operations on public order and safety, the potential for HA and disaster relief requirements, support to civil

authorities, and protection of culturally significant sites and critical infrastructure. It ensures that civil considerations are effectively integrated into each course of action (COA) considered by the commander. The MAGTF G-9 plans, coordinates, and provides staff oversight of CMO through direct coordination with the supported unit's operations officer. The supported unit's operations officer plans and oversees the execution of the overall operations effort. The MAGTF G-9 coordinates staff planning and oversight of the following:

- Assigned and attached Marine Corps and Army CA forces.
- All aspects of the relationship between the MAGTF and external nonmilitary agencies that may be operating within the AO (NGOs, international organizations, USG agencies, and foreign government agencies).
- Preparation of Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) to the operation order (OPORD). Assist with Annex P (Host Nation Support) and Annex V (Interagency Coordination) as necessary.
- Coordination, synchronization, and integration of civil-military plans, programs, and policies with national and combatant command strategic objectives.
- Prioritization and management of projects supporting CMO:
 - Key leader engagements.
 - Implementation of populace and resources control (PRC) measures.
 - Coordination of CMO with higher and adjacent commands, as well as major subordinate elements of the MEF.
 - Establishment and running a Civil Military operations center (CMOC).
 - Civil information management (CIM).
 - Conduct assessments.

CHAPTER 2

CIVIL AFFAIRS CORE COMPETENCIES AND FUNCTIONS

Effectively expanding the competitive space requires combined actions with the U.S. interagency to employ all dimensions of national power. We will assist the efforts of the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Homeland Security, Commerce, USAID, as well as the Intelligence Community, law enforcement, and others to identify and build partnerships to address areas of economic, technological, and informational vulnerabilities.

-2018 National Defense Strategy

2000. Overview

CA core competencies and functions are executed within the scope of CAO. The intent of CAO is to set conditions for the mitigation or defeat of threats to civil society, to enhance stability, and to assist in the establishment or enhancement of local government capabilities to deter or defeat future civil threats. CA functions are structured under each competency, organizing tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) into executable capabilities that frame the mission and purpose of the assigned CA elements to achieve the desired effects. CA forces have three core competencies that focus on the civil component.

Civil Affairs Activities:

- Civil reconnaissance
- Civil engagement
- Civil information management
- Civil-military operations center
- CMO planning

Military Government Operations:

- Transitional military authority
- Support to civil administration

Civil Affairs Supported Activities:

- Foreign assistance
- Foreign humanitarian assistance
- Populace and resources control
- Civil-military engagement

Nested within the core competencies are the Marine Corps CMO mission essential tasks. These mission essential tasks are primary tasks that Marine Corps forces must be fully capable of planning, supporting, executing, or transitioning through, independently or in collaboration with outside elements to mitigate or defeat civil threats. The mission essential CMO tasks are:

- Facilitate populace and resources control
- Facilitate foreign humanitarian assistance
- Facilitate nation assistance (the term nation assistance has been replaced with foreign assistance to complement NATO standards)
- Manage civil information
- Facilitate support to civil administration

2001. Civil Affairs Activities

CA activities are specifically planned, executed and assessed by CA forces to provide unique capabilities to the commander. They consist of the following functions:

a. Civil Reconnaissance

Civil reconnaissance is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment. Civil reconnaissance focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented at the tactical level by using civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). CA Marines, or other forces can conduct civil reconnaissance, as required. Examples of other units and assets that can be utilized to conduct civil reconnaissance are infantry, engineers, medical providers, military police, and unmanned aircraft systems. Civil reconnaissance is conducted by tactical CA teams based on the established civil information collection plan to support the higher unit's mission and

begins prior to deployment.

The heart of collection occurs through the daily interaction between MAGTF forces and the myriad of civilians in the battlespace. Specifically, the capture of these contacts, local attitudes, and data points of baseline activities as well as abnormalities. Every Marine who encounters the civilian elements within the battlespace is a potential sensor of civil information. CAO and CMO planners integrate civil reconnaissance into the overall supported commander's OPLAN, enhancing the development of the common operating picture (COP).

Potential sources of civil information that a coordinated civil reconnaissance plan considers include:

- Observations of maneuver forces during the conduct of operations
- Debriefings to forces involved programs such as medical, dental, and veterinary civil action programs
- Debriefings to Marines involved in daily convoy operations
- Ongoing ASCOPE assessments of the battlespace that identify trends in measures of effectiveness
- CA interaction with IPI spheres of influence, including:
 - Local government officials
 - Religious leaders
 - Tribal or clan leaders
- The information from and interaction with the local population or the lack thereof at a CMOC

b. Civil Engagement

Civil engagement is a function as well as a tactical task for CA. Civil engagement consists of the planned and targeted activities through which CA forces deliberately focus on the interaction with the IPI, unified action partners and other civil entities. CA forces conduct civil engagement to positively promote and influence the relationship between military forces and the civil component. This enhances the commander's understanding of the civil component and legitimizes the MAGTF's mission. Civil engagement may occur in person or by other means of

communication. The purpose of civil engagement, as a function, is to:

- Inform or seek information
- Facilitate operations
- Coordinate efforts
- Collaborate with the civil component
- De-conflict operations between the civil populace and military
- Resolve conflict
- Mitigate the impact of military operations on IPI
- Influence actions by civil entities
- Develop civil considerations

CA forces have training in the fundamentals of negotiation and mediation techniques, as well as critical thinking skills to identify cultural nuances, divergent world views, biases, prejudices, and stereotypes. These unique skills allow them to better establish and maintain relationships and communications channels with various civil entities, facilitate coordination and integration, facilitate information flow, harmonize efforts, and promote mission legitimacy. CA forces understand that relationships and coordination between various civil entities can enhance or enable successful mission accomplishment. The outcomes from civil engagements flow into the information gathering process of CIM, which adds to the understanding of civil considerations and ultimately become inputs to the commander's COP.

c. Civil Information Management

CA forces provide the commander with expertise on the civil component of the operational environment. The CIM process is continuous, occurs across the competition continuum, and develops timely and accurate civil component information critical to the commander's understanding, planning, and decision making.

CIM is a CA process whereby civil information is gathered, analyzed, and entered into a central database. It is fused with the supported MAGTF and joint intelligence organizations, other USG departments and agencies, interagency partners, international organizations (IO), non-governmental organizations (NGO), and the private sector to ensure the timely availability of

information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of both raw and analyzed civil information to the unified action partners. CIM is conducted in six steps that generate situational understanding:

- Planning
- Collection
- Consolidation
- Analysis
- Production
- Sharing

Civil considerations are developed from data with relation to ASCOPE within the commander's operational environment. The management of civil information is the fusion of analyzed data into the COP to benefit the supported commander, DOD, interagency, IO, NGO, and IPI situational dominance.

CIM is not solely a task of a CA unit's CIM cell. Every CA element has a role within CIM. CA forces should also actively incorporate the supported unit's intelligence and maneuver elements into the civil information collection requirements to enhance the COP and the civil intelligence and intelligence preparation of the battlespace processes.

CIM enhances situational awareness and facilitates understanding for all elements in the operational environment, allowing those elements to achieve decision superiority. While every CA Marine has the ability to conduct basic analysis of civil information, trained CMO Planners' and Chiefs' analyses of that civil information provides better inform situational understanding.

d. Civil-Military Operations Center

CA Marines are capable of setting up a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). A CMOC is a central location for entities (government and nongovernment) involved in stability activities. It is also a place to gather and coordinate the population's grievances and conduct information operations. The CMOC serves as one of the primary coordination interfaces for US forces with IPI, unified action partners and the interagency. A CMOC is tailored to the specific tasks

associated with the mission and augmented by assets (for example: engineering, medical, transportation) available to the supported commander and unified action partners. The CMOC facilitates continuous coordination among the key participants with regard to CAO and in support of the commander's CMO concept in order to manage civil information, analyze civil considerations, and develop civil inputs to the COP.

The CMOC is a function that can be performed by all CA Marines. However, it is important to note and clarify that unlike the US Army, Marine CA units are not organized by table of organization and equipment to provide the supported commander the manpower and equipment to staff a continuous CMOC. Although a CMOC can be very rudimentary and intermittent, a robust and sustained CMOC requires support. Typically, a CA detachment can form the nucleus of the CMOC. A CMOC benefits from over the horizon and non-traditional communications capabilities to most effectively conduct interagency collaborative planning and coordination, integrate nonmilitary stakeholders to synchronize and harmonize operations, and coordinate plans and operations with the civil component of the operational environment. It is also noteworthy that many NGOs may not directly participate in a CMOC in order to maintain a perception of impartiality.

e. Civil-Military Operations Planning

CMO planners and CA staff provide a dedicated planning capability and are nested within the tables of organization of the MAGTF. The G-9/S-9, as a primary staff officer, is responsible for the planning, integration and assessment of civil considerations into MCPP. The key to successful G-9/S-9 staff support is ensuring the civil component within the operating environment is factored into current and future planning and is subsequently captured in branches and sequels based on the anticipated or realized outcomes of current operations. The G-9/S-9 is designated to provide the commander with actionable civil information that will increase the commander's awareness and understanding of the civil component, ensure efficient use of finite resources, and harmonize the efforts of unified action partners, IPI, and interagency within the operational environment.

CMO planners can be requested to supplement Marine staffs to facilitate and manage CAO in support of the commander's CMO concept. In a MAGTF without an assigned G/S-9 or a

battalion level where there is not a dedicated S-9 position, the CA detachment commander or team leader might be required to perform the duties of the CA staff officer. It is critical that CA officers and noncommissioned officers understand the MCPP and can incorporate civil data and information into planning processes.

2002. Military Government Operations

According to DoDD 2000.13, CAO includes activities that establish civil security, provide support to governance, provide essential services, support economic development and infrastructure, and establish civil control for civilian populations in occupied or liberated areas until such control can be returned to civilian or non-US military authority.

Military government is established when, through the course of military operations, the replacement or sustainment of civil authority is required to maintain stability and governance. Military government supports the US instruments of national power abroad by executing governance tasks mandated by US policy and international law. The objective of a military government is to establish civil control and stability in support of the USG stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The end state of which is a reconstructed indigenous government that emulates governing policies that are consistent with US interests.

When force is necessary and a territory is occupied, the occupying force imposes military authority in accordance with the law of land warfare. Military authority is asserted through the imposition of military government. Once an interim civilian government is established, military authority is exerted to support civil administration, whether that civil administration is imposed by the occupying power or is inherently indigenous. Military government operations include the following functions:

a. Transitional Military Authority

Civil administration in occupied territory encompasses the establishment of a transitional military government authority, as directed by Secretary of Defense, to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the populace of a territory that US forces have taken from an enemy by force. Transitional military authority exercises the functions of civil administration

in the absence of a legitimate civil authority and until such time as a civil government can be established. Within its capabilities, the occupying force must maintain an orderly government in the occupied territory and must have, as its ultimate goal, the creation of a legitimate and effective civilian government. During transitional military authority, the following terms apply:

- **Military Governor.** A military governor is the military commander or other designated person who, in an occupied territory, exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the laws of war and to any directive received from the commander's government or superior.
- **Military Government Ordinance.** A military government ordinance is an enactment on the authority of a military governor promulgating laws or rules regulating the occupied territory under such control.
- **Governance.** Governance is a requirement for obtaining a stable population-centric operational environment. Transitional military authority enables commanders to achieve civil control and stability and to enable civil security. DOS has the lead on foreign policy and controls the majority of the resources which can be used under Title 22, 4 USC, Chapter 32 (Foreign Assistance Act). These resources are typically tied to achieving US objectives. Once an interim civilian government is established, military resources are exerted to support civil administration. JP 3-07, *Stability*, provides additional information on transitional military authority.

b. Support to Civil Administration

Support to civil administration (SCA) is assistance given to a governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government, interim civilian authority or supporting a reconstructed government. SCA occurs when military forces support US Department of State in the implementation of interim civil authority or US foreign policy in support of host nation internal defense and development. SCA supports the US instruments of national power abroad through the execution of tasks affiliated with security cooperation and foreign internal defense as a function of stability activities.

MAGTF SCA helps to build progress toward achieving or restoring effective, legitimate governance in the wake of conflict or disaster. SCA focuses on restoring public administration

and resuming public services while fostering long-term efforts to establish a functional, effective system of political governance.

The conduct of SCA requires a high degree of knowledge of how civilian systems function, plus the skills needed to carry them out. There are six functional areas where CA Marines advise and assist with regards to SCA:

- Governance
- Rule of Law
- Economic Stability
- Infrastructure
- Public Health and Welfare
- Public Education and Information

The CA responsibilities during SCA missions are designed to support the commander with respect to the continuity of government in the host nation (HN). Generally, these include:

- Identifying, validating, or evaluating HN essential service infrastructure
- Assessing the needs of the IPI in terms of the CA functional areas
- Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of the IPI in terms of the CA functional areas
- Performing liaison functions between military and civilian agencies
- Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational SCA operations
- Participating in the execution of selected SCA operations as needed or directed
- Performing quality control assessments of SCA operations and costs
- Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of SCA operations
- Coordinating and synchronizing transition of SCA operations from military to indigenous government or international transitional government control
- Initiating or refining CIM process with geospatial projects that depict affected populations and civil vulnerabilities

2003. Civil Affairs Supported Activities

CA supported activities are those functions in which CA plays a key planning, coordinating, or synchronizing role, but for which they are not the proponent or primary executor. These supported activities include; foreign assistance, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), populace and resources control (PRC), civil-military engagement (CME). These missions are executed through a combination of capabilities provided by elements of the MAGTF or Joint force.

CA supports these operations through the planning, integration, execution, and transitioning of CAO. CA knowledge and expertise of the civil dimension of the battlespace provides commanders with the necessary tools to execute military operations with minimal impact by or on the civilian populace. In the current and predicted future operating environment the MAGTF will conduct these missions that are population centric and require CA capabilities.

CA can enable the integration of populations and resources in support of the commander's mission and end state. They help in the harmonization of unified action partners, IPI, and interagency within the mission requirements, and provide expertise concerning the authorities that oversee the conduct of these operations. Foreign assistance, FHA, PRC, and CME are all heavily regulated depending on the type or subset of mission being conducted. CA forces are trained on authorities that pertain to these missions and can provide critical information to the commander and staff for their successful execution.

a. Foreign Assistance

Foreign assistance is aid given by the United States to other countries to support global peace, security, and development efforts as well as to provide humanitarian relief during times of crisis. Foreign assistance is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative for the United States and vital to US national security. The military may support foreign assistance through a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power supports diplomacy, informational, and economic instruments to promote US national interests. These activities often include security assistance (SA), foreign internal defense (FID), and other Title 10, United States Code (USC) programs and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by USG departments and agencies. The Chief of Mission (COM) is the senior diplomatic representative in a HN. The combatant

commander (CCDR) may conduct CMO to support the COM and enhance HN legitimacy.

The HN, USG, international organizations, or NGOs may see value in MAGTF logistical capabilities: vehicles and fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft to deliver humanitarian assistance (HA) or medical services. The MAGTF should provide military support discreetly to maintain the neutrality of nonmilitary organizations. CMO missions generally benefit the HN government by ensuring that local authorities receive public credit for aiding the civilian populace. When the COM approves foreign assistance activities, CMO planners should integrate CMO with COM objectives.

b. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

FHA consists of DOD activities conducted outside the US and its territories which directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. FHA activities range from supporting security cooperation and related programs to conducting limited contingency operations in support of another USG department or agency. FHA activities include foreign disaster relief and other activities that directly address a humanitarian need. FHA operations can be supported by other activities conducted by US military forces or they may be conducted concurrently with other types of related operations and activities. FHA operations (including foreign disaster relief operations) are normally conducted in support of USAID or DOS.

c. Populace and Resources Control

Military operations are not conducted in a vacuum, free of civilian presence or influence. No matter the operational environment, military operations can be disrupted by actions of the indigenous populace. Whether it is uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians within the operational environment, illegal activities, or any civil functions within these extremes, commanders must consider PRC measures in the planning and execution of operations. While PRC is executed by all elements of the MAGTF, CA forces are integral to the planning, execution, and assessment of military operations concerning PRC measures. CA forces are highly attuned to the impact of that military operations on the civil population as well as those the civil component will have on military operations. They assist in the development of courses of action that will support the commander's goals with minimum impact on civil military

relations or current and future operations.

PRC consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resource control. Both components are normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. During times of civil or military emergency, proper authorities define, enact, and enforce PRC measures. For practical and security reasons, military forces employ PRC measures of some type, and to varying degrees across the competition continuum. PRC operations are executed with, and as an integral part of, military operations. CA forces provide multiple capabilities to the commander that can assist in the development and execution of these measures.

(1) Populace Control

Populace control measures are a key element in the execution of primary stability tasks in the areas of civil security and civil control. Populace control involves establishing public order and safety by securing borders, population centers, and individuals. International law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. Control measures require a capability to secure borders, protect the population, hold individuals accountable for criminal activities, control the activities of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablish essential civil services, and set conditions in the operational environment that support stability through unity of effort.

The authority and extent of populace control measures that a commander may impose varies greatly with the type of mission and the operational environment. The operational environment includes a wide variety of intangible factors such as the culture, perceptions, beliefs, and values of adversary, as well as neutral, or friendly political and social systems. These factors must be analyzed and continuously assessed throughout the operations process to develop situational understanding of the environment. The characterization of the operational environment as permissive, uncertain, or hostile, further impacts the planning for and the execution of populace control measures.

Populace control provides security for the populace, mobilizes human resources, denies enemy access to the population, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace

control measures may include:

- Establishing border security, to include customs procedures to prevent trafficking of persons, to regulate immigration and emigration, and to establish control over major points of entry.
- Establishing identification procedures, including securing documents relating to personal identification, property ownership, court records, voter registries, birth certificates, and driver's licenses.
- Establishing and disseminating rules relevant to movement, including curfews, movement restrictions, and travel permits.
- Instituting policies regarding the regulation of air and overland movement.
- Relocating the population as necessitated by military operations.
- Establishing transitional political authority and interim civil administration.

Dislocated civilian (DC) activities and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) are two special categories of populace control that require extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations. CA forces provide the commander and staff the capability to plan, synchronize and assist in the execution of populace control. Once the populace control measures are established, CA forces can assess these measures and provide feedback to the commander on their effectiveness and present recommendations on necessary adjustment to the measures.

(a) Dislocated Civilian Activities

DC activities are actions required to move or keep civilians out of harm's way or to safeguard them following a disaster. The disaster may be natural (such as a flood or an earthquake), or the result of human action (such as combat operations, social, or political strife), or a technological hazard (such as radiological disaster, cyber outage or attack, or a complete loss of electricity). The requirement to conduct DC activities may occur during any operations within the competition continuum.

The CA supporting tasks in DC activities support the commander's freedom of movement while safeguarding the civilian population. CA Marine tasks include:

- Identifying or evaluating existing HN and international community DC plans and operations
- Advising on DC control measures that would effectively support the military operation
- Advising on how to implement DC control measures
- Publicizing control measures among the IPI
- Assessing measures of effectiveness
- Participating in the execution of selected DC activities as needed or directed and in coordination with the internationally mandated organizations [for example, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)]
- Assisting in arbitration of problems arising from implementation of DC control measures

In DC activities, controlling agencies (for example, UNHCR, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ICRC, or HN) normally care for the basic needs of DCs, such as food, water, shelter, sanitation, and security. Controlling agencies must also be prepared to prevent or arrest the outbreak of communicable disease among DCs, to ensure the health of the populace and military forces.

During military operations, US forces must consider two distinct categories of civilians - those remaining at their homes or places of habitual residence and those dislocating. US policy dictates the placement of people in one of these categories. The US category may conflict with international organizations', NGOs, and the HN terminology or categories. Therefore, CA Marines and CAO planners must be careful in how they describe categories of civilians. The first category includes both civilians who are indigenous and other local populace, including civilians from other countries. Civilians within this category may or may not need assistance. If they are able to care for themselves, they should remain in place.

DCs are civilians who have left their homes. Their movement and presence can hinder military operations. They will likely require some degree of aid, such as medicine, food, shelter, clothing, and similar items. DCs may not be indigenous to the area or to the country in which they reside. DC is a generic term that further subdivides into nine categories. Legal and political considerations define these categories as follows:

- **Displaced person** is a broad term used to refer to internally and externally displaced persons collectively.
- **Refugee** is a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of their nationality and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail them self of the protection of that country.
- **Evacuee** a civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation.
- **Stateless person** a person who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law.
- **War victim** is a classification created to describe civilians suffering injuries, the loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of their homes because of war. War victims may be eligible for a claim against the United States under the Foreign Claims Act.
- **Internally displaced person (IDP)** any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular, as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters and who has not crossed an internationally recognized state border. Also called IDP.
- **Returnee** a displaced person who has returned voluntarily to their former place of residence.
- **Resettled Person** a refugee or an internally displaced person wishing to return somewhere other than his or her previous home or land within the country or area of original displacement.
- **Migrants** are persons who belong to a normally migratory culture who may cross national boundaries, or have fled their native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution. Migrants travel to escape economic stagnation and poverty. This is in contrast to refugees, who travel to escape persecution, conflict, and perhaps death.

(b) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

The term NEO refers to the authorized and orderly departure of noncombatants from a specific

area by the DOS, DOD, or other appropriate authority. Although the United States usually considers NEO in connection with combat operations, it may also conduct a NEO in anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or man-made disaster in a foreign country. Civil unrest in a country may warrant evacuation to the United States or other safe haven. CA forces may assist in the planning and coordination of a NEO. Military support to a NEO involves contact with civilians (foreign nationals and US citizens).

The CA supporting tasks in NEO include:

- Advising the commander of the CMO aspects and implications of current and proposed NEO plans, including writing the CMO annex to the OPLAN.
- Conducting civil reconnaissance and an initial CMO assessment of the AO to validate information and assumptions of the CMO staff estimate and to advise the commander of CMO-related issues affecting the NEO.
- Recommending actions to the commander to minimize population interference with current and proposed military operations.
- Maintaining close liaison with embassy officials to ensure effective interagency coordination.
- Providing liaison to HN security forces and government officials.
- Identifying and establishing contact with international organizations and NGOs present in the AO.
- Identifying sources of indigenous material and labor to support military operations.
- Analyzing and assessing the safe haven (conduct a country study).

(2) Resources Control

Resources control provides security for the natural and constructed material resources of a nation state, mobilizes economic resources, denies enemy access to resources, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents and criminal entities. Resources control measures include, but are not limited to, licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints, and border security, to include customs inspections, ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

Resources control directly impacts the economic system of a HN or territory occupied and

governed by US forces. Resources control actions regulate public and private property and the production, movement, or consumption of material resources. Controlling a nation's resources is the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. During a civil or military emergency, proper authorities define, enact, and enforce resource control measures to maintain public order and enable the execution of primary stabilization tasks in the areas of civil security, civil control, restoration of essential services, and support to economic and infrastructure development.

Enactment of resources control measures must conform to legal and regulatory policy and be enforced justly and firmly by the HN. US forces will not execute these measures unless the requirements are clearly beyond the capabilities of the HN's security forces, the HN has requested assistance, and appropriate US authorities (to include the US Ambassador) have granted approval for such assistance. Resources control includes property control which is the control of movable and immovable private and public property. CA Marines can support the HN's lead by facilitating coordination and security. In addition, CA Marines can support the HN by providing advice, assistance, and training for HN forces executing these missions.

Resource control measures may include:

- Establishing procedures to resolve property rights for land and subterranean resources.
- Implementing mechanisms to prevent unauthorized seizures of land or property.
- Securing harvest storage facilities to prevent spoilage and looting of harvested crops.
- Implementing rationing and distribution programs for key commodities (food and fuel).
- Establishing border security, including customs procedures to prevent arms smuggling and stop contraband, such as drugs and natural resources.
- Regulating and securing access to valuable natural resources.
- Stopping illicit trade in natural resources and developing governance mechanisms and incentives to bring trade into the market.
- Initiating processes for addressing and resolving resource ownership and access issues.
- Freezing financial accounts of enemy combatants.
- Locking international access of overseas financial accounts to prevent money laundering.
- Protecting and securing strategically important institutions, such as government buildings and archives, museums, religious sites, courthouses, and communications facilities.

Implementing effective resources control requires the HN government or transitional military authority to inform the populace of the measures to be imposed and the justification for the action. This message to the population must clearly convey that the control measures are necessary due to security and the populace. Enforcement of the restrictions must be consistent and impartial so the government establishes and maintains legitimacy among the populace. A well-crafted PRC plan limits control measures to the least restrictive measures necessary to achieve the desired effect. Continuous assessment of the operational environment measures the effectiveness of the restrictions, the attitude of the population toward the government, and the impact the restrictions have on the operational environment. As the security situation improves, restrictions should be modified or rescinded.

d. Civil-Military Engagement

CME is a formal program of record initiated by United States Special Operations Command, and part of DOD's strategy, to building partner-nation capacity in a preventive, population centric, and indirect approach to enhance the capability, capacity, and legitimacy of partnered indigenous governments. It is persistent engagement conducted by, with, and through unified action partners to shape and influence the IPI within the operating environment in support of the geographic combatant commander's campaign plans, the theater special operations command's campaign support plan, and in conjunction with US Embassy strategies. The CME program increases the capability of USG supported IPI, reduces the influence of malign actors within targeted countries and regions, and leverages civil vulnerabilities and resiliencies within the HN.

2004. Civil Affairs Operations in the Information Environment

a. Global Operating Model

The 2018 National Defense Strategy introduced the new Global Operating Model. The new model describes how the Joint Force will posture and employ to achieve its cooperation, competition, and wartime missions. It features four layers: contact, blunt, surge, and homeland to perform these missions. The competition mission is a shift in approach to achieving warlike aims below the threshold of armed conflict – particularly with regard to near peer competition from China and Russia. Information is central to cooperation and competition. Informational

power is the ability to affect a relevant actor's decision making and behavior through the use of information and information activities.

b. Operations in the Information Environment

Because of the nature of CA, CAO and CMO activities are information-related capabilities and critical to Operations in the Information Environment. To understand how CAO/CMO is utilized within MAGTF or JTF operations, an understanding of information operations is essential. CAO/CMO activities and effects contribute to the achievement of military operations in the information environment (IE) objectives. OIE are defined as: the sequence of actions conducted by organizations tailored to use information for the purpose of affecting the perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of relevant actor behavior. These actions are conducted in and through the IE and represent the application of informational power.

Information-related capabilities (IRCs) are capabilities, functions, or activities that use data, information, or the electromagnetic spectrum to produce lethal or nonlethal effects in the physical or informational dimensions with an expressed intent to cause deliberate effects within the cognitive dimension of the IE. Information actions are the use of IRCs planned and coordinated to create specific effects to achieve mission objectives.

CAO is an IRC directly inform and influence the civil population. CAO activities are guided by the commander's information narrative, objectives and themes. Through the IE concept, CAO activities are coordinated and synchronized with the activities of other IRCs to support the MAGTF's operational objectives.

CHAPTER 3

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING

“We promised the Iraqi people freedom, democracy, security and a new and far better life... Yet, here we are, long and difficult years into that conflict... we still have not created the state we promised them. On the contrary, our costly and valiant efforts have produced an outcome our government did not predict or intend - a failed state spinning out of control into anarchy and civil war.

- Gen. Anthony Zinni (Ret.)

3000. Overview

It is difficult to imagine any scenario where Marines will operate in an environment without the presence of a civilian population and where civil considerations will not affect military actions. The goal of CMO planning is to mitigate the negative effects of military actions on a civilian population and conversely, prevent the civilian population from interfering with military actions against an enemy. Military actions will require a careful balance between the application of force and the need to accommodate legal, moral, and civil responsibilities associated with conducting operations in populated areas. Therefore, the MAGTF commander and their staff must analyze how the civil landscape affects the mission. They need to develop specific approaches and goals directly related to conducting CMO. They need to design operations so that the need for violence and destruction does not obscure an end-state of ultimately re-establishing civil control.

3001. Civil-Military Operations Components

The components of CMO are broad categorizations consisting of the supporting actions required to achieve a designated role towards the achievement of CMO objectives. Each CMO component consists of a number of CMO activities. Each Service has capabilities that support the overall CMO goals and objectives through the execution of assigned missions and tasks. The Marine Corps has the responsibility to establish its own capabilities to support CMO. The three components of CMO include civil-military relations, enabling operations, and information management see Table 3-1 below.

a. Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations are established, restored, or maintained by executing the CMO activities of interorganizational cooperation and IPI cooperation and relationships.

b. Enabling Operations

Enabling operations include CAO, medical civil-military operations, military government, military police activities, engineer activities, psychological operations, public affairs activities, cyberspace operations, and sustainment activities. These enabling operations and activities are executed by Marine or functional component commands supporting the Joint Force Commander.

c. Information Management

Each of these enabling operations/activities produces information that promotes situational understanding of the operational environment, specifically as that information applies to the civil component. This information allows the MAGTF commander to obtain knowledge of the operational environment and the systems, links, and nodes that comprise the civil dimension that exists within the operational environment.

Table 3-1. Components of Civil-Military Operations.

Civil-Military Relations	Enabling Operations	Information Management
<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Indigenous Populations and Institutions▪ Interorganizational Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Civil Affairs Operations▪ Medical CMO▪ Military Government▪ Military Police Operations▪ Engineer Operations▪ Psychological Operations▪ Public Affairs Activities▪ Cyberspace▪ Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Civil Information Management▪ Medical Intelligence▪ Police Intelligence▪ Geospatial Engineering▪ Target Audience Analysis

3002. The Planning Process

The planning process supports the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5, *Planning*, describes planning as an essential part of command and control, with command and control enhancing the commander's ability to make sound and timely decisions. Effective decision-making requires both the situational understanding to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. An essential function of planning is to promote understanding of the problem - the difference between existing and desired conditions - and to devise ways to solve it. Planning involves both art and science, combining analysis and calculation with intuition, inspiration, and creativity.

MCDP 5 divides planning into three hierarchical levels: conceptual, functional, and detailed. Conceptual planning is the highest level of the planning hierarchy. Conceptual planning establishes aims, objectives, and intentions by developing broad concepts for action. At the lowest level of the planning hierarchy is detailed planning. Detailed planning translates broad concepts into a complete and executable plan. Detailed planning generally corresponds to the science of war and is an analytic process of breaking down the concept into executable tasks. Detailed planning works out scheduling, coordination, or technical issues involved with moving, sustaining, administering, and directing military forces. Detailed planning determines the actions necessary to accomplish the objectives defined during conceptual planning. Between the highest and lowest levels of the planning hierarchy is functional planning, which involves elements of both conceptual and detailed planning. Functional planning is concerned with designing supporting plans for discrete functional activities like maneuver, fires, logistics, information operations, intelligence, force protection, and civil-military operations.

In general, conceptual planning provides the basis for all subsequent planning. Planning should normally progress from the general to the specific, however, conceptual planning must also be responsive to the outputs of functional and detailed planning. For example, the realities of deployment schedules (a functional concern) can dictate employment schemes (a conceptual concern). Functional planning must in turn be responsive to the detailed requirements of execution. Conceptual, functional, and detailed planning are seldom conducted sequentially

because the situation and available information are continually evolving. To facilitate command and control, the Marine Corps employs several planning processes.

a. Troop Leading Steps

There are six steps that align with the acronym BAMCIS - begin planning, arrange for a reconnaissance, make the reconnaissance, complete the plan, issue the order, and supervise. While these steps have wide applicability, they are generally used by small unit leaders who lack adequate staff.

b. Marine Corps Planning Process

The Marine Corps planning process (MCP) supports the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. For Marine units with staffs, MCP is a proven, battle-tested approach to planning. It is a six-step process comprised of Problem Framing, Course of Action (COA) Development, COA War Game, COA Comparison and Decision, Orders Development, and Transition.

c. Rapid Response Planning Process

Used primarily by Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2) is a time-leveraged planning process that enables a MEU to begin execution of an assigned task within six hours. To do so, MEUs conduct the deliberate planning - within the context of the intended area of responsibility - as well as the rehearsal of potential missions, such as FHA or NEOs, during pre-deployment training. Accordingly, R2P2, when coupled with the extensive use of standing operating procedures, enables a MEU to focus its execution planning on those aspects of a problem unique to the current situation.

d. Joint Operating Planning Process

Marine Corps forces will always operate in a joint environment. Joint Force Commanders and their staffs use Joint Operating Planning Process (JOPP), as described by JP 5-0, for strategic plans and operational-level campaigns. MAGTF Command Elements, which may serve as or

interact with a Joint Force Headquarters, must be capable of operating effectively within a JOPP framework.

e. Comparison of US Military Planning Processes

CA Marines and/or CMO planners may work with US Army CA units and personnel, therefore, CA Marines and CMO planners should be familiar with the US Army’s Military Decision Making Process— a seven-step process comprised of Receipt of Mission, Mission Analysis, COA Development, COA Analysis (War Game), COA Comparison, COA Approval, and Orders Production. Similarly, CA Marines and/or CMO planners may be tasked to provide support to US Navy units (e.g., Naval Construction Battalions) where familiarity with the six-step Navy planning process comprised of Mission Analysis, COA Development, COA Analysis (War Game), COA Comparison and Decision, Plan/Orders Development, and Transition is useful. Table 3-1 below, presents the major steps of common planning processes CA Marines will likely encounter.

Table 3-2. Comparison of US Military Planning Processes

Service	USMC	U.S. Army	U.S. Navy	Joint Doctrine
Steps	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Problem Framing • COA Development • COA War Game • COA Comparison & Decision • Orders Development • Transition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Receipt of Mission • Mission Analysis • COA Development • COA Analysis (War Game) • COA Comparison • COA Approval • Orders Production 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mission Analysis • COA Development • COA Analysis (War Game) • COA Comparison & Decision • Plan/Orders Development • Transition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning Initiation • Mission Analysis • COA Development • COA Analysis & Wargaming • COA Comparison • COA Approval • Plan/Orders Development

3003. CIVIL PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

Civil preparation of the battlespace (CPB) is used to examine civil considerations in support of problem framing and the overall intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) process. CPB is conducted through the framework of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available - time available) in order to focus on civil considerations as they relate to the overall operational environment and mission accomplishment. CPB analyzes the various

aspects of civil information and assesses the civil impact of friendly, adversary, and external actors, as well as the local populace, on MAGTF operations and the achievement of MAGTF objectives.

CPB is a four-step iterative process that is designed to support MAGTF decision makers, staff, and the total force by filtering, recording, evaluating, analyzing, and producing civil information and staff products. It is conducted to apply aspects of the civil environment within the MCPP while complementing IPB. The four steps of the CPB process are:

- Define the civil operating environment
- Analyze the civil operating environment
- Develop a civil environment model
- Determine civil actions

Each step in the process is refined continually to ensure that the CPB products are accurate and relevant in decision making. See MCCMOS Circular *Civil Preparation of the Battlespace* for detailed information.

3004. CIVIL AFFAIRS PRODUCTS

CA Marines prepare area studies, conduct assessments, and create and maintain staff estimates to assist in the planning and updating of mission requirements and tasks throughout the competition continuum. Execution of CPB enables CA Marines and CMO planners to utilize and employ planning tools such as the civil environment model to facilitate understanding of the civil environment during initial planning and update the understanding of the civil component for the commander's COP. The information and material contained within these products is critical for the commander's and staff's situational understanding and the formation of the commander's vision for the operational environment, including:

- Impacts of the populace on military operations
- Impacts of military operations on the populace
- Assisting in the development of courses of action
- Assisting in the development of branches and sequels
- Completion of objectives, goals and milestones

- Transition of task to the appropriate civil authorities once the operations are complete.

a. Area Studies

CA Marines support the commander with the ability to retrieve accurate and current data on demand. CA Marines obtain, analyze, and record information in advance of need. The basic evaluation of an area is the CA area study that establishes baseline information relating to the civil components of the area in question. The CA area study is a pre-mission study, prepared regionally by country, or to a specific subnational area within a country as the baseline research document for CA forces. The CA area study presents a description and analysis of the geography, historical setting, and the social, political, military, economic, health, legal, education, governance, infrastructure, and national security systems and institutions of a country using a combination of open and restricted source materials. It is important to work with the collective intelligence sections to avoid redundancy in efforts. CA Marines update the information detailed in the CA area study periodically prior to the receipt of a mission.

This baseline information is used as the basis for the creation of the CMO staff estimate during the planning process. If an area study does not already exist then the CA element must, time permitting, create one during operations preparation and planning, or it must conduct similar research and analysis required to directly produce the CMO staff estimate.

b. Civil Affairs Assessments

CA assessments provide a precise means to gather meaningful and significant information. CA Marines perform three basic types of assessments - the initial assessment, deliberate assessment, and the survey. Gathering information should not be a haphazard process. Each type of assessment is based upon the information and analysis of the previous type. Additionally, each type of assessment in the progression becomes more focused, specific, and detailed with an ultimate goal of identifying civil vulnerabilities that pose a threat to the successful and timely completion of the mission. As with all military missions, this task must have a well-formed, practical plan.

(1) Initial Assessments

While the area study is done ahead of the need and reviewed and updated prior to deployment, the initial assessment is conducted upon entry into the designated AO. The objective and focus of the initial assessment should be broad enough to allow CA forces to quickly get an updated baseline of the general conditions within the entire AO to validate or refute the information and assumptions used in planning as well as to update the CMO priorities and information collection plan. During continuous operations, the initial assessment requirement may not be necessary for follow-on CA forces due to the transfer of current and detailed operational data during transition. CA teams conducting initial assessments must be aware of the security situation at all times.

(2) Deliberate Assessments

Deliberate assessments are conducted in a methodical manner in accordance with CMO priorities and the CMO information collection plan on specific geographic areas or social, economic, governmental, or infrastructure systems of interest. They are a determination of current conditions, capabilities, or attitudes within these defined areas. Deliberate assessments are characterized by firsthand observation, interviews, and other tools to gather information used to make knowledgeable decisions and to determine locations and priorities for follow-on in-depth analysis. CA teams may use a wide variety of detailed checklists or formats during a deliberate assessment to ensure they have scrutinized all aspects of the assessment area. However, CA Marines may be issued with a Marine Civil Information Management System (MARCIMS) handheld devices which are populated with preloaded data forms with predetermined fields that are derived, modified versions of the original Joint CIM forms to suit Marine Corps needs and requirements. Additionally, custom forms can be created per request to tailor operation needs.

c. Surveys

The survey is a detailed assessment in which the object of the assessment is examined carefully, as during an inspection or investigation. Surveys are conducted in a methodical manner in accordance with CMO priorities and the civil information collection plan on specific locations identified as requiring in-depth analysis during deliberate assessments. This analysis may include people, groups, locations, facilities, or capabilities within a location or part of a critical

geopolitical, cultural, or ethnic system. For example, CA Marines may administer the tactical conflict survey as a part of the overall Stability Assessment Framework process for a particular area of interest or AO. During a survey, the CA team may use a variety of detailed checklists or formats within the CIM construct to ensure they have scrutinized all aspects of the specified entity, location or facility targeted for survey. Survey development should leverage operations/research analysis capabilities if available. The findings of a survey may lead to a refined mission statement or reallocation of forces and resources.

d. Civil Information Collection Plan

An information requirement is any information element the commander and staff require to successfully conduct operations. Commanders cannot successfully accomplish activities involved in the operations process without the necessary information to make informed decisions. Civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, and data mining (the collection of information from a combination of open and restricted source materials for routine and continuous study and research) should be synchronized into the civil information collection plan. For the purposes of command and control, validated civil information collection plan requirements are requirements that, when answered, will fill a gap in knowledge and understanding of the civil component through analysis of civil considerations within an AO and the area of interest. Civil reconnaissance and civil engagement fill identified gaps or requirements in the civil information collection plan and may be conducted concurrently with other operations. The commander's intent, priority intelligence requirements, and the commander's critical information requirements focus CAO and the civil information collection plan. In return, CA forces provide the operations process with a continual flow of essential civil information through the CA/CMO staff estimate during offensive, defensive, and stability activities. This relationship tailors CAO to effectively identify and assess civil vulnerabilities, enabling the MAGTF to achieve mission objectives.

e. Staff Estimate

Staff estimates provide information, conclusions, and recommendations from the perspective of each staff section. Staff estimates help to refine the common operating picture and supplement it with information not readily displayed. Staffs synthesize information and provide commanders with forms of staff estimates to help build and maintain situational understanding. Upon receipt,

or in anticipation of a mission, each staff section begins updating its estimate based on information requirements related to the mission. CA Marines record relevant information in staff estimates. They maintain a continuous assessment of the civil domain as related to current operations as a basis to determine if they are proceeding according to the mission, commander's intent, and COP. The CA/CMO staff estimate feeds directly into the MCPP process, whether conducted unilaterally as part of CAO or integrated into the supported unit's planning process and development of the COP.

During COA Development and COA War Game, CA/CMO planners ensure each course of action effectively integrates civil considerations (METT-T + civil considerations) and present a summary of their staff estimate to describe how their findings impact or are impacted by other staff functions. The CA/CMO planner must be able to articulate how operations affect civilians and to estimate the requirements for essential stability tasks that commanders might have to undertake based on the capability of the force and that of the interagency, international organizations, and NGO partners. Ultimately, the CA/CMO planner recommends the best course of action from the CAO perspective, even though it may not be the course of action the staff recommends to the commander.

Keeping commanders informed to facilitate their decision-making is a critical requirement of planning. During planning, estimates are a primary means of informing the commander.

f. Annexes

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 6, *Command and Control*, MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations*, and MCWP 5-10, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, describe how the staff support the commander in understanding, visualizing, and describing the operating environment; making and articulating decisions; and directing, leading, and assessing military operations. Staffs make recommendations and prepare plans and orders for the commander. Staffs use annexes as attachments to plans and orders to provide more detail and organize information. The CA/CMO staff supports the commander in communicating the commander's decisions and intent through these products. Key information recorded in the staff estimate informs the orders process, particularly in the functional annexes. The CA/CMO staff (G-9 or senior CA Marine) refines the CAO aspects of the plan and order by publishing Annex G (Civil-Military

Operations), further amplifying the commander's intent in terms of CAO and CMO-related tasks. In addition to Annex G, the CA/CMO staff is involved in the development of Annex V (Interagency Coordination), in conjunction with the assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) or the battalion or regimental operations staff officer (S-3) and operations staff. In addition, the CA/CMO staff must take great interest in Annex P (Host-Nation Support)

(1) Annex G (Civil-Military Operations)

Commanders and staffs use Annex G to describe how CAO, in coordination with other military and civil organizations, support the CONOPS described in the base plan or order. The annex follows the five-paragraph format: situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, command and signal (SMEAC). Annex G can have an unspecified number of Appendices, but it typically has at least three:

- Execution Matrix
- PRC Plan
- CIM Plan

Other elements of the Annex G may include Tabs, Exhibits and Attachments that capture relevant information from the CPB process (e.g., stakeholder analysis, civil factors and relevance, civil environment model, etc.) or other staffing efforts (Green Cell products). For information relating to proper formatting, see MCWP 5-10, *Marine Corps Planning Process*.

(2) Annex V (Interagency Coordination)

Annex V follows the five-paragraph SMEAC format; however, some subparagraphs are modified to accommodate communication with the interagency partners. The G-3/S-3, in conjunction with the G-9 or CA/CMO planner, develops Annex V though the G-3/S-3 would likely lean heavily toward the G-9 or CA/CMO planner to draft and/or publish it. Annex V provides military and interagency personnel with detailed information (mission, scheme, and tasks) to direct the necessary coordination and interaction between the MAGTF and interagency organizations. It describes how the commander intends to cooperate, provide support, and receive support from interagency partners throughout the operation. The G-9 or CA/CMO

planner is the primary staff entity for contact with the interagency as well as other entities within the civil component for civil-military matters.

Interagency partners may require the establishment of coordination mechanisms. These coordination mechanisms must be addressed in Annex V. They may include exchanges of liaisons and the establishment of a CMOC, humanitarian assistance coordination center, humanitarian operations center, joint interagency task force, joint interagency coordination group, or other interagency coordination entities.

(3) Annex P (Host Nation Support)

Annex P uses the five-paragraph SMEAC format. Commanders and staffs use Annex P to describe how sustainment operations support the CONOPS described in the base plan or order. The G-4/S-4 is the staff officer responsible for Annex P. Host-nation support is the civil and military assistance provided by the HN to the forces located in or transiting through that HN's territory. Efficient use of available host-nation support can greatly aid forces and augment the deployed sustainment structure. Much of any host-nation support will be derived through a bilateral, multilateral, or other international agreement. International agreements occur within the entirety of the HN population and thus have an impact on the IPI. These international agreements will often call for additional acquisition and cross support agreements. From these agreements, the MAGTF obtains local resources to support operations. The G-9 or CA/CMO planner is usually in the best position to coordinate on behalf of the G-4/S-4 for utilization of local resources. Such resources may include water, energy, food, ports, roads, and other resources to sustain the force.

(4) Joint Force Annex G (Civil-Military Operations)

The Joint Annex G promulgates CMO requirements in a formal plan or operation order. CMO require coordination among CA, maneuver, health support, military police, engineer, transportation, and SOF. CMO involve cross-cutting activities across staff sections and subordinate units. The Joint Annex G identifies, consolidates, and de-conflicts the activities of the various sections and units. Planning and coordination at lower echelons require significantly more details than discussed in the Joint Annex G.

3005. Joint Operations Planning

Planners should incorporate CMO into the JOPP. CMO planners must ensure their input supports the JFC's intent and operational concept. The J-9 normally leads the CMO staff element and is an important asset in planning and coordinating CMO. Planning should establish the objectives, MOEs, decisive points, and desired outcomes of the operation or campaign. CMO planning normally conforms to six lines of effort: governance, economic stability, infrastructure, public health and welfare, public education and information, and rule of law.

Normally, a Joint Task Force will have a J-9, CMO directorate of a joint staff, to serve as the joint force commander's (JFC) lead for planning CMO. While not all of the geographic combatant commands have this staff section organic to their joint manning document, Marine CA can provide planning teams to assist the JFC with deliberate and crisis action planning.

Just as in the MCPP, CA Marines in the CMO staff (J-9) provide the commander with an analysis of the civil components that shape the operational environment during the JOPP. Civil considerations are evaluated for those aspects of the operational environment that directly affect a mission. The CMO staff provides the commander detailed analysis of civil considerations focused on the civil component of the AO. CMO planners further develop and implement their plans in conjunction with civilian officials from other USG agencies and other nonmilitary organizations in order to synchronize and harmonize US and multinational efforts. The J-9 responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

- Advising the JFC and staff on legal and moral considerations as they pertain to the civil component.
- Determining the requirement for a CMOC to maintain liaison with interorganizational partners in the area of operations.
- Participating in the targeting process to identify civil component protected targets.
- Participating in the information operations planning to ensure CMO is synchronized and harmonized with IO.
- Analyzing the effects of civilian populations on military operations.

- Analyzing the effects of military operations on the civil component.
- Assessing the host nation resources to support military operations.
- Identifying nongovernmental and other independent organizations operating in the AO.
- Recommending CA force requirements.
- Participating in required boards, cells and workgroups as required.
- Maintaining the CMO staff estimate.
- Developing Annex G, CMO.
- Assisting the operations directorate with development of Annex V, Interagency Coordination.

3006. Civil Affairs Graphic Control Measures

A military symbol is a graphic representation of units, equipment, installations, control measures, and other elements relevant to military operations. A graphic control measure is used on a map or overlay to regulate forces and warfighting functions. Control measure symbols generally fall into one of three categories: points, lines, and areas. These symbols can be combined with other military symbols, icons, and amplifiers to display operational information. Tactical task symbols are used in course of action sketches, synchronization matrixes, and maneuver sketches. As an element of doctrine, these symbols provide a common visual language for all users.

Standardization of military symbols is essential if operational information is to be passed among military units without misunderstanding. Military symbols are governed by the rules in MIL-STD-2525D, *Joint Military Symbolology*.

3007. Boards, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups

a. General

Effective operations require close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates. Marine Corps staffs vary greatly in size and composition. A commander has broad authority to organize the staff as required to assist in the exercise of command and control. Factors influencing the staff's organization will include command element level (i.e., SPMAGTF, MEU, MEB, MEF), mission requirements, the operational environment, capabilities of subordinates, and the commander's own preferences. Generally, the commander will group

the staff members into a personal staff, a principal staff, and a special staff, and will exercise command and control horizontally and vertically through either the command channel or the staff channel.

(1) Command Channel

The term used to describe the chain of command that descends directly from the commander to subordinate commanders. Through this channel, a subordinate commander always has direct access to his immediate superior. A direct, personal relationship between commanders is essential to effective command. The command channel is the direct official link between higher and subordinate commands.

(2) Staff Channel

The channel through which the commander issues instructions to the staff and through which staff officers respond with information and recommendations. The commander normally issues orders and instruction to the staff via the Chief of Staff (COS) or Executive Officer (XO). The COS/XO normally serves as the channel through which staff officers submit advice and recommendations to the commander, enabling the COS/XO to ensure proper coordination throughout the staff and the integration of all related information.

b. Definitions

Effective planning and operations require close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates and higher, subordinate and adjacent commands. The most common technique for promoting cross-functional collaboration is to form boards, centers, cells, and working groups and other enduring or temporary organizations to manage specific processes and tasks supporting mission accomplishment. These functions facilitate planning by the staff, decision making by the commander, and execution by the HQ. Virtual collaboration tools can facilitate participation in these staff functions.

- **Board.** An organized group of individuals appointed by the commander (or other authority) that meets for the purpose of facilitating a staff action and accelerating the decision cycle by recommending a decision on, or a solution to, a key issue. The Board's

convening authority determines the scope of its mission. Board members typically include representatives (LNO) from major staff elements, subordinate commands, and other interested organizations. A targeting board is an example.

- **Center.** A center is an enduring functional organization with a supporting staff. It often operates from permanent facilities. Center members typically include LNO(s) from subordinate or external organizations. Despite security risks, centers may include coalition and host nation representation in order to provide a more holistic view. Examples of centers include the combat operations center or the tactical air command center.
- **Cell.** A subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity within a designated larger organization. For example, an assessment cell.
- **Working Group.** Established to analyze (or synthesize) a given issue or mission area for the benefit of the command, a working group may be enduring or ad hoc. It consists of a core functional group plus representatives from other interested command elements. It makes an excellent venue for collaboration with other stakeholders. A good example of a working group is the CMO working group.

c. Civil-Military Operations Working Group

Commanders may establish a CMO working group (CMOWG). The CMOWG brings all the stakeholders in CMO together to focus, synchronize and harmonize their efforts in achieving the commander's CMO priorities. In addition to the CMOWG, CMO planners ensure that they are actively involved in the information operations working group (IOWG), the intelligence fusion working group, the targeting working group and other boards and relevant groups to the current operation.

The composition of the CMOWG changes based on level of command but the G-9 should chair the group (lead CMO planner). Other members of the CMOWG may include:

- Current operations representative
- Future operations representative
- Logistics representative
- Intelligence representative

- Fires representative
- Subordinate CA element(s) representative
- Representative of the HOC/HACC/CMOC
- Information operations representative
- Communication strategy and operations representative
- Medical representative
- Command chaplain representative
- Engineer representative
- Military police representative
- Staff judge advocate representative
- Political advisor, if applicable
- Interagency/interorganizational representative(s)
- Liaison officer(s)

d. Information Operations Working Group

The information operations working group (IOWG) is a collaborative staff meeting led by the senior Information Operations practitioner. CA Marines and/or CMO planners participate and provide the following information to the IOWG:

- Specific country information
- Timely update of the civil component of the COP through the CIM process
- Civil considerations within the operational environment
- Concerns of population groups within the projected JOA/AO and potential flash points that can result in civil instability
- Cultural awareness briefings
- Information on DC movement routes, critical infrastructure, and significant social, religious, and cultural shrines, monuments, and facilities
- Information impacts on the civil component
- Key influences

e. Targeting Working Group / Board

The targeting working group and/or board meets according to the unit's battle rhythm to determine methods and resources to achieve desired effects. The G-9 or senior CA Marine/CMO planner should be represented in this critical board to assist with nonlethal targeting and protection of the civil component. CA Marines and/or CMO planners participate and provide the following information:

- Specific country information
- Civil component update derived from the CMO staff estimate
- Information on DC movement routes, critical infrastructure, and significant social, religious, and cultural shrines, monuments, and facilities
- Recommend restrictive fire areas for population centers and protected targets
- Coordinate targets that are to be engaged through civil engagement
- Timely update of the civil component of the COP through the CIM process
- Civil considerations within the operational environment
- Concerns of population groups within the projected area of operations and potential flash points that can result in civil instability
- Cultural awareness briefings
- Information impacts on the civil component
- Key influences
- Review of target package to ensure lethal and nonlethal effects are synchronized and harmonized

CA Marines and/or CMO planners should constantly assess the battle rhythm of the units they are assigned to or supporting to identify those opportunities to engage and provide input to best support the MAGTF mission. Some additional boards, groups, centers, and cells that may be relevant are listed below:

- Rules of engagement or rules for the use of force working group
- Emerging operational planning teams
- Assessment working group (plans or future operations cell)
- Force Protection working group

f. Joint Interagency Coordination Group

The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of US Government (USG) civilian and military experts accredited to the Combatant Commander (CCDR) and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG (or equivalent organizations) provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs (or equivalent organizations) complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the Department of Defense and the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council systems. Members participate in deliberate planning and crisis action planning, and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize operations with the efforts of civilian USG agencies and departments. Typically supported by US Army Civil Affairs Commands (CACOM), it is not unusual to have USMC CA personnel support a JIACG (e.g., CAG G-9 section). Senior CMO planners have the capabilities to provide analysis of civil considerations in coordination with the JIACG (or equivalent organization) and to develop civil input to the supported Joint Force Commander. A CMO staff section may plan, coordinates, and provide staff oversight of CMO and civilian component issues through direct coordination with the supported unit's operations directorate. Throughout the process, this staff section's plans officer continuously ensures the fusion of the civil inputs received from subordinate CA elements, maneuver elements, USG agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and host nation sources (private/non-private sectors) to the joint COP. The integration of CMO into the staff or working group is imperative. The capabilities of the private sector partnership when orchestrating interagency coordination / interorganizational cooperation can and may prove to be highly valuable.

CHAPTER 4

CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS WITHIN THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE

“For however strong you may be in respect of your army, it is essential that in entering a new province you should have the good will of its inhabitants.”

- Niccolo Machiavelli

4000. Overview

CA activities are vital to all operation types and across the competition continuum. MAGTF operations often disrupt the routine life patterns of civilians, their lines of communications, and possibly their access to basic needs and essential services. These disruptions can then dramatically interfere with military operations and must be acknowledged and alleviated in order to achieve the commander’s required effects and to reach desired end states. There are few uninhabited places in which the MAGTF is likely to fight, so Marines must plan to conduct minimum-essential stability tasks (providing security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment). CAO can mitigate adversary threats by leveraging populations, civil capabilities, and civil networks to enhance the commander’s situational understanding and the unit’s lethality. CAO support the establishment of a secure and stable OE that is consistent with US interests.

Commanders at all levels will encounter civilians during military operations and must plan to address civil considerations. Within the OE, indigenous supplies, facilities, services, and labor resources exist that US commanders might use to support military operations. Without proper planning for military interactions with the IPI, the commander’s desired end state will be harder to achieve. Combat operations can be disrupted by uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians, hostile or illegal actions by entities within the populace, and failure to coordinate unity of effort.

4001. CIVIL AFFAIRS METHODOLOGY

Civil affairs methodology is a process used by CA Marines to plan, execute, and assess civil affairs activities and CMO tasks assigned to CA units and elements. The CA methodology is not

a planning process, nor is it directly aligned with any specific planning process. It is meant to be a guide for how CA Marines think about the conduct of CAO. It ensures that CA forces adequately identify and interpret mission challenges and problems through a lens focused on civil considerations. CA Marines and CMO planners must still understand and integrate into Marine and joint planning processes in order to provide the commander with viable recommendations affecting the civil component, that support the mission, desired objectives, and end state. The CA methodology describes how CA Marines should approach all CAO and CMO. It consists of the following six phases:

a. Assess

Assess current conditions against a defined norm or established standards. This is a continuous process that looks at the civil considerations that shape the operational environment. The analysis of civil considerations is conducted for each of the three components of CMO, the associated CMO activities, and the general aspects of the area of operations (AO).

b. Decide

Decide who, what, when, where, why, and how to focus CA assets and activities toward an objective. This encompasses CA/CMO input to the planning process and directs CA elements to create or observe those conditions or events that would either mitigate a problem set or trigger a specific CA/CMO response. Address all CA/CMO activities in civil lines of operations, or within warfighting functions, from initial response through transition to other military or civilian authorities.

c. Develop and Detect

Develop rapport and relationships with the civilian participants of the operation (including the affected populace) and detect those conditions or outcomes created during the decide phase that would either require mitigation or trigger a specific CA/CMO response. This phase provides input to the COP and helps set up the common operational response. Typical tasks include:

- Facilitating the interagency process in a civil-military operations center (CMOC).
- Conducting deliberate assessments and local meetings.

- Supporting DC control points.
- Monitoring public information programs and CA/CMO-related reports from the field.
- Documenting significant contacts and relationships in CIM.

d. Deliver

Deliver planned CAO. This phase is executed according to plans synchronized and harmonized with unified action partners and the IPI and linked to the supported commander's intent. The duration of this phase is dependent on achieving the end state.

e. Evaluate

Evaluate the results of the executed mission(s). This phase validates the CAO/CMO concept of support and determines whether the established measures of effectiveness (MOE) have been met. This constitutes CA "battle damage assessment" and looks at the effects of the operation on the three components of CMO and the associated CMO activities, determines the sustainability of any projects or programs initiated during the execution phase, and recommends follow-on actions. Products include trip reports, after-action reports, new mission requirements, and input to execution orders for transition plans.

f. Transition

Transition current CAO or CMO to follow-on CA units, other military units, host nation assets, United Nations (UN) organizations, international organizations, NGOs, or other civilian agencies, as appropriate. This phase is CA's direct contribution to a sustainable solution and the commander's ability to fulfil the desired end state. The outcome of this step includes successful transition of authority or relief-in-place of operations and programs that are durable and sustainable by the follow-on force or organizations.

4002. Offensive

Offensive operations/tasks are conducted to take the initiative from the enemy, gain freedom of action, and generate effects to achieve objectives. The offense imposes the commander's will on the enemy. The offense is the most direct means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the

initiative to gain a physical and psychological advantage. In the offense, the decisive operation is a sudden action directed toward enemy weaknesses and capitalized on speed, surprise, and shock. Executing offensive tasks compels the enemy to react, creating new or larger weaknesses that the attacking force can exploit.

During the execution of offensive tasks, the main effort is military-to-military contacts; however, civil considerations remain a key piece of every operation and must be planned for. CAO support to offense includes:

- Recommending employment options for CA capabilities.
- Gaining civil information through civil reconnaissance and civil engagement.
- Gathering civil information to develop the civil component of the supported commander's COP, enable the isolation of enemy forces, and enable the legitimacy of the US mission.
- Providing civil component analysis and evaluation toward the identification of centers of gravity, decisive points, critical links and nodes, and branches and sequels.
- Denying the enemy civil component resources.
- Participating in the targeting process by nominating restrictive-fire areas and no-fire areas to minimize unnecessary damage to the civil infrastructure and culturally sensitive sites.
- Tracking damage to infrastructure and other combat-related effects to the civil component.
- Providing civil component analysis to planning processes to protect the populace, critical assets, and infrastructure.
- Processing information through CIM to develop the civil component of the commander's COP.
- Planning and executing support to PRC to evacuate endangered populations.
- Advising on the presence of culturally, economically, and politically significant assets and resources within the AO.
- Supporting operations that develop a secure environment for stability tasks.
- Preventing or mitigating civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military operations on the civil populace.

- Identifying and addressing friction points between military operations and the civil population.

4003. Defense

Defensive operations/tasks are conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable to the offense and stability. Normally the defense cannot achieve a decisive victory. However, it sets conditions for a counteroffensive or a counterattack that enables forces to regain the initiative. Defensive tasks are a counter to an enemy offensive action. They defeat attacks, destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible. They also preserve control over land, resources, and populations. The purpose of the defense is to retain key terrain, guard populations, protect lines of communications, and protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks. Commanders can conduct defensive tasks to gain time and economize forces so offensive tasks can be executed elsewhere. CAO support to defense includes:

- Recommending employment options for CA capabilities.
- Gathering civil information to develop the civil component of the supported commander's COP and isolate enemy forces.
- Providing civil component analysis and evaluation toward the identification of centers of gravity, decisive points, critical links and nodes, and branches and sequels.
- Denying the enemy civil component resources.
- Participating in the targeting process by nominating restrictive-fire areas and no-fire areas to minimize unnecessary damage to the civil infrastructure and culturally sensitive sites.
- Tracking damage to infrastructure and other combat-related effects to the civil component.
- Providing civil component analysis to planning processes to protect the populace, critical assets, and infrastructure.
- Gaining civil information through civil reconnaissance and civil engagement.
- Processing information through CIM to develop the civil component of the supported commander's COP.
- Planning and executing support to PRC to evacuate endangered populations.

- Advising on the presence of culturally, economically, and politically significant assets and resources within the AO.
- Advising on counter mobility operations directed at economically significant roads, railways, bridges, and other infrastructure.
- Advising the commander regarding civilian movements during the planning for emplacement of minefields.
- Supporting operations that develop a secure environment for stability tasks.
- Preventing or mitigating civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military operations on the civil populace.
- Identifying and addressing friction points between military operations and the civil population.

4004. Stability

Stability tasks are conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. These tasks support governance by a HN, an interim government, or a military government. Stability tasks involve coercive and constructive actions. They help to establish or maintain a safe and secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Stability tasks assist in building relationships among unified action partners and promote US security interests. Stability tasks can help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions while supporting transition to a legitimate HN governance. Stability tasks cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives. Stability tasks must maintain the initiative by pursuing objectives that resolve causes of instability. Commanders are legally required to provide minimum-essential stability tasks when controlling populated areas of operations. These essential services provide minimal levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment.

CA forces conduct CAO during the execution of offensive and defensive tasks to preserve combat power and lethality by mitigating the effects of the civil component on combat operations and ultimately setting the conditions for stability tasks. The level of CAO support

required to execute stability tasks is directly related to the conditions within the OE. CA Marines continually monitor the conditions of the HN throughout the operation, applies available resources to affect the civilian component, and recommends military government or functional skills required to support this critical phase. CAO support conventional forces, SOF, USG agencies, and the HN civil administration in transitioning power back to the local government.

Critical tasks executed by CA forces supporting stability include:

- Recommending employment options for CA capabilities.
- Gathering civil information through civil reconnaissance and civil engagement.
- Processing information through CIM to develop the civil component of the supported commander's COP.
- Providing civil component analysis and evaluation toward the identification of centers of gravity, decision points, critical links and nodes, and branches and sequels.
- Safeguarding civil component resources.
- Planning and executing PRC, in coordination with the provost marshal and military police that support transitional public security to promote, restore, and maintain public order, and protect civilian populations when the rule of law has broken down or is nonexistent.
- Developing mitigation strategies to minimize unnecessary damage to the civil infrastructure and culturally sensitive sites.
- Identifying and tracking damage to civil infrastructure, personal property, and culturally sensitive sites.
- Providing civil component analysis to planning processes to protect the populace, critical assets, and infrastructure.
- Planning and executing dislocated civilian operations to address endangered populations.
- Advising on the presence of culturally, economically, and politically significant assets and resources within the AO.
- Supporting operations that develop a secure environment for stability tasks.
- Strengthening governance and participation.
- Fostering economic stability and development.

- Conducting collaborative planning and coordination, to include US forces, IPI, and unified action partners and interagency, as applicable.
- Assessing the activities and capabilities of the IPI, unified action partners, and interagency in relation to achieving national policy goals and shaping the environment for interagency and HN success.
- Coordinating, collating, and fusing civil information to the COP.
- Providing CA functional specialist support to advisory elements to HN ministerial, provincial, and local government agencies as well as deployed interagency civilian teams.
- Providing functional specialists to plan and lead SCA and transitional military authority missions.
- Budgetary programming and management in order to resource CAO projects and programs in support of stability objectives.
- Providing dedicated liaison to the interagency, IPI, and unified action partners.
- Identifying and assessing the measures of performance and measures of effectiveness of supporting CAO.
- Establishing CMOCs to facilitate communications and coordinating with civilian agencies and organizations.
- Providing civil component analysis to identify root causes of instability.
- Providing CAO support to disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former belligerents into civil society, as well as providing a secure environment.
- Providing CAO support to rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security forces.

4005. Amphibious Operations

Amphibious operations are launched from the sea by an amphibious force embarked in ships or crafts with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force ashore in hostile or potentially hostile area(s) to accomplish an assigned mission. Amphibious operations apply maneuver principles to expeditionary power projection in joint and multinational operations in order to exploit the element of surprise and capitalize on enemy weakness. There are five types of amphibious operations:

- Amphibious Assault
- Amphibious Raid
- Amphibious Demonstration
- Amphibious Withdrawal
- Amphibious Support to Other Operations

Because the majority of the world's population lives within 200 kilometers of the coastline, CAO will be critical to the success of the amphibious operations. Potential tasks executed by CA forces supporting amphibious operations:

- Recommending employment options for CA capabilities.
- Gathering civil information to develop the civil component of the supported commander's COP, enable the isolation of enemy forces, and enable the legitimacy of the US mission.
- Providing civil component analysis and evaluation toward the identification of centers of gravity, decisive points, critical links and nodes, and branches and sequels.
- Denying the enemy civil component resources.
- Participating in the targeting process by nominating restrictive-fire areas and no-fire areas to minimize unnecessary damage to the civil infrastructure and culturally sensitive sites.
- Tracking damage to infrastructure and other combat-related effects to the civil component.
- Providing civil component analysis to planning processes to protect the populace, critical assets, and infrastructure.
- Processing information through CIM to develop the civil component of the commander's COP.
- Planning and executing support to PRC to evacuate endangered populations.
- Planning and executing dislocated civilian operations to address endangered populations.
- Advising on the presence of culturally, economically, and politically significant assets and resources within the AO.
- Supporting operations that develop a secure environment for stability tasks.
- Preventing or mitigating civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military operations on the civil populace.

- Identifying and addressing friction points between military operations and the civil population.
- Providing CAO support to disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former belligerents into civil society, as well as providing a secure environment.
- Providing CAO support to rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security forces.

4006. Operations in the Information Environment

CAO are information activities and are a tool that commanders can employ within a dimension of the information environment to create effects and operationally desirable conditions. CA representation in the IOWG assists in identifying target audiences; harmonizing and synchronizing communications media, media assets, and messages; and providing news and information to the local population. CAO complement information operations and facilitate mission accomplishment by enhancing the relationship between the civilian populace and the overall force. CAO can create conditions that contribute to decisive advantage in the information environment. It is therefore vital that CA forces maintain their credibility with the civilian populace. CAO facilitate efforts to provide accurate, balanced, credible, and timely information to local officials, agencies, and external audiences. CA forces and CMO planners need to ensure that CAO are consistent with the command's themes and messages in order to ensure legitimacy.

a. Military Information Support Operations

Military Information Support Operations (MISO) are designed to develop and convey messages and devise actions to influence select foreign groups and promote themes to change those groups' attitudes and behaviors. As MISO are often directed toward the civil populace, CAO and MISO can be mutually supporting capabilities. Psychological operations forces (PSYOP) forces can increase the effectiveness of CAO through the influence of target populations. MISO can also exploit the psychological effects of CAO conducted to achieve one objective in order to influence populations for other purposes. CAO can support MISO by reinforcing the credibility

of influential messages and provide access to populations for the delivery of messages that can increase receptiveness by the population. CAO support to MISO can include:

- Providing more accurate analysis about the OE through mutual sharing of civil information.
- Representing CA concerns in MISO activities.
- Coordinating with PSYOP elements to ensure a uniformity of messages.
- Coordinating projects in support of MISO plans.

b. Communication Strategy and Operations (COMMSTRAT)

As an official spokesperson, the CommStrat officer can ensure, through established public affairs guidance, that the command speaks with one voice and observes operations security. CA, PSYOP, and CommStrat elements use many of the same communications media, presenting similar messages to audiences for varied intended purposes. CA personnel engage IPI and unified action partners; PSYOP personnel address friendly, neutral, and adversary populations to influence; while CommStrat personnel address national and international news media and U.S. forces in order to inform.

The importance of coordinating CAO with MISO and public affairs activities cannot be overstressed. For example, if information released to the HN populace by CA and PSYOP personnel conflicts with information released to news media and U.S. forces through public affairs channels, the result may be a loss of credibility for all involved and a negation of any positive accomplishments.

4007. Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) is support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events (DoDD 3025.18). DSCA

is a task executed in the homeland and U.S. territories. DSCA is conducted in support of another primary agency, lead federal agency, or local authority. National Guard forces—Title 32 or state active forces under the command and control of the governor and the adjutant general—are usually the first forces to respond on behalf of state authorities. When Federal military forces are employed for DSCA activities, they remain under Federal military command and control at all times.

It is DOD's policy that DOD shall cooperate with and provide DSCA as directed by and consistent with applicable law, Presidential Directives, Executive Orders, and DoDD 3025.18. Assistance is generally one of support; the civilian authorities retain primary responsibility. DoDD 2000.13 states "DOD Civil Affairs capabilities may be used to assist in domestic emergencies and to provide other support to domestic civil authorities consistent with law and in accordance with DoDD 3025.18 [Reference (l)], DoDI 3025.21 [Reference (m)], other DOD issuances, and supporting plans."

United States Northern Command and United States Indo-Pacific Command are the combatant commands with standing missions to conduct DSCA providing, as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, military assistance to civil authorities including crisis management and consequence management (domestic incident management). In addition, United States Special Operations Command has responsibilities for countering weapons of mass destruction and civil disturbance operations in accordance with DoDD 2060.02 and DoDI 3025.21. Civil Affairs forces are uniquely qualified to assist in the planning and conduct of DSCA since many of the same skills, civil considerations, products, processes, and planning considerations are applicable and complement DSCA activities. Generally, CA tasks include:

- Providing consultation through the defense coordinating officer to decision makers.
- Participating in interagency assessment, planning, and synchronizing of DSCA tasks through the JTF and the defense coordinating officer.
- Executing CAO in support of selected DSCA tasks, as needed or directed.

4008. Homeland Defense

Homeland defense is the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President (JP 3-27). The DOD has lead responsibility for homeland defense. The strategy for homeland defense (and DSCA) calls for defending the US territory against attack by state and nonstate actors through an active, layered defense that aims to deter and defeat aggression abroad and simultaneously protects the homeland. The US Marine Corps supports this strategy with capabilities in forward regions of the world, geographic approaches to US territory, and within the US homeland.

CA forces conduct CAO in support of homeland defense. CA forces possess unique capabilities to assist in the stabilization of civil infrastructure and functions. This includes the establishment of a CMOC for synchronization of resources, personnel, and efforts by multiple entities that are working toward stabilizing the impacted areas. The capabilities provided by civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, and SCA, along with the processing of civil information can hasten the transition of operations back to the proper civilian authorities.

4009. Interagency Coordination

Interagency coordination is the cooperation and communication that occurs between agencies of the USG, including the DOD, to accomplish an objective. The accomplishment of strategic objectives identified in U.S. national security policy requires a whole-of-government approach that achieves unity of effort. CA forces enable interagency coordination through organizational structures at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. While much of this structure (and/or billets) are organic to the U.S. Army and/or Special Operations Command, CA Marines should be aware of these capabilities and may be called upon to support them:

- CMO directorate of a joint staff (J-9).
- Theater Civil Affairs planning team (U.S. Army).
- Assistant chief of staff, Civil Affairs operations (G-9).
- Civil Affairs planning team.
- Civil Affairs operations staff officer (S-9).

- Civil-military operations centers.
- Civil-military advisory group (U.S. Army).
- Theater civil-military support element (U.S. Army).
- Regional civil-military support element (U.S. Army)
- Civil liaison teams.
- Civil-military support element (U.S. Army).
- Civil Affairs teams.

The DOS is the lead entity when coordinating between interagency partners of any given country. The DOS is also the lead in establishing an international agreement. The DOD and its components are governed in their authority to make international agreements under DoDD 5530.3, and that authority is limited under Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 181.

4010. International Agreements

An international agreement is any agreement concluded with one or more foreign governments (including their agencies, instrumentalities, or political subdivisions) or with an international organization, that:

- Is signed or agreed to by personnel of any DOD component, or by representatives of the DOS or any other Department or Agency of the US Government.
- Signifies the intention of its parties to be bound in international law.
- Is named as an international agreement or as a memorandum of understanding, memorandum of agreement, memorandum of arrangements, exchange of notes, exchange of letters, technical arrangement, protocol, note verbal, aide memoire, agreed minute, contract, arrangement, statement of intent, letter of intent, statement of understanding or any other name connoting a similar legal consequence.

Any oral agreement that meets the criteria set forth in DoDD 5530.3 is an international agreement. The DOD representative who enters into the oral agreement will be required to convey the agreement in writing as soon as practical. During a state of war, the Law of War (codified in the Geneva-Hague Conventions), permits local “special” agreements in some cases, that are necessitated by interaction at the tactical and operational level.

When not engaged in a forcible entry, invasion, or occupation, military forces are not permitted in foreign countries in their official capacity without authority being advanced through an international agreement or country clearance of some type. Contingency basing must be negotiated with a foreign country unless basing is being established through forcible entry and establishing a lodgment. Such basing can be authorized through a bilateral agreement also called a defense cooperation agreement. It can also be negotiated through a status-of-forces agreement or a “diplomatic note”. These international agreements are sometimes referred to as HN agreements or host-nation support agreements or diplomatic agreements in common usage. In such agreements use of existing HN, host country, or partner nation bases can be utilized. If new construction is occurring or land is set aside for US forces, it usually requires a separate land use agreement.

DoDD 5530.3 governs DOD responsibilities regarding such agreements. In essence, DOD defers to DOS in the negotiation of international agreements and it binds DOD to adhere to such agreements.

CA forces, in conjunction with the judge advocate general, must understand these agreements in order to advise commanders on what their forces can or cannot do in keeping with the US obligations to a HN, host country, or partner nation. This would also include the interaction of US forces with IPI or other foreign nationals. CA forces also play a significant role in achieving unified action and integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing with civilian entities in keeping with the international agreements.

Joint basing for multinational operations would also require a separate acquisition and cross-support agreement with each participating country, as well as the partner nation. Participating countries are generally required to negotiate their own bilateral agreements with the partner nation unless all participating nations are members of an alliance. Each nation also requires an acquisition and cross-support agreement with the US in order to ensure integrated logistics.

An acquisition and cross-servicing agreement is an agreement, negotiated on a bilateral basis with countries or international organizations, that allow United States forces to exchange most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment.

International agreements can be bilateral (between the United States and a partner nation) or multilateral (such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Bilateral agreements can be negotiated on any number of international matters, to include economic, trade, or defense cooperation. Bilateral defense cooperation agreements are referred to as defense cooperation agreements or less formal agreements can be negotiated as simply diplomatic notes exchanged between foreign ministers.

Commanders have limited authority to negotiate or interact at a tactical or operational level. Such interaction is limited to “special agreements” as addressed under the law of war. Such agreements are typically verbal and must not have an adverse effect on protected persons (such as prisoners of war or civilians). Special agreements are binding between those governments or military commanders that made the agreements. When engaging the civil component, CA Marines often negotiate and make agreements with segments of the populations, HN, host country, or partner nation institutions. These agreements are not considered international agreements. These agreements are established in the course of providing FHA, humanitarian and civic assistance, or other lines of effort that involve the execution of CA project management.

4011. Security Cooperation

Security cooperation (SC) uses a combination of programs and activities by which DOD, in coordination with DOS, encourages and enables countries and organizations to partner with the US to achieve strategic objectives. SC activities develop allied and partner nation militaries and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. SC also provides United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. SC involves an overarching functional relationship rather than a hierarchical relationship with its associated activities/programs. The definition of SC deliberately encompasses a multitude of actions, programs, and missions. Because of the nature of SC, CA forces can enable and support the end state of building security relationships, building partner capacity, and gaining/maintaining access. Some tasks that CA forces conduct during SC include:

- Identify civil considerations.
- Execute assessments.

- Coordinate internally and with the HN.
- Reviewing and supporting HN internal defense and development goals.
- Ensuring HN public support.
- Establishing and maintaining contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.
- Ensuring HN sovereignty is maintained at all times. There can never be the perception that the HN government is a US puppet, specifically when providing civil administration assistance.
- Advocating HN self-sufficiency. (This must be the primary goal of CAO in support of SC.)

4012. Counterinsurgency Operations

Insurgencies can exist apart from or before, during, or after a conventional conflict. Elements of a population often grow dissatisfied with the status quo. When a population or groups in a population are willing to fight to change the conditions to their favor, using both violent and nonviolent means to affect a change in the prevailing authority, they often initiate an insurgency. Ideally, the host country is the primary actor in defeating an insurgency. Even in an insurgency that occurs in a country with a nonfunctioning central government or after a major conflict, the host country must eventually provide a solution that is culturally acceptable to its society and meets US policy goals.

The tasks that counterinsurgents perform in countering an insurgency are not unique. It is the organization of these tasks in time and space that is unique. When the United States directly involves itself in a counterinsurgency, stability is essential.

Entities best qualified to accomplish nonmilitary tasks may not always be available. In such cases, military forces may need to perform those tasks until civilian-led capabilities become available. It is also critical to interact with the population to determine the root causes of instability and improving the relationship between the populace and the HN. CAO, in counterinsurgency, should focus on the following tasks:

- Planning and conducting CR and CE to determine causes of instability.
- Providing SCA, as required, to bolster HN government capability or capacity.

- Conducting transitional military authority until the HN government has the capacity.
- Improving HN legitimacy through activities such as military civil action.
- Developing, planning, and executing projects that address the humanitarian needs of the populace.
- Providing CAO and CMO training to HN and partner security forces and civilian agencies.
- Providing coordination and liaison between the IPI, interagency, and civil component to support unified action.
- Conducting activities with HN authorities, interagency, international organizations, NGO, private sector, or international military partners to deny support to the insurgents.

APPENDIX A

A BRIEF HISTORY OF USMC CIVIL AFFAIRS

The Marine Corps has been engaged in CMO since its inception, in places as diverse as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In some of these operations, civil-military considerations were paramount and their effective incorporation into planning often determined an operation's success or failure, such as the operations in the Caribbean and Central America known as the "Banana Wars." These operations conducted primarily during the first three decades of the 20th century, were epitomized by long-term occupations aimed at bringing stability to the region. To capture these hard-learned lessons, the Marine Corps first published the *Small Wars Manual* in 1940, which was later republished in 1990 as FMFRP 12-15, *Small Wars Manual*.

While the Marine Corps was capturing the lessons of the Banana Wars, the US Army was capturing the lesson from the post-World War I occupation of the German Rhineland and lessons from the Army's time in the Philippines. In 1940, the War Department published Field Manual 27-5, *Military Government and Civil Affairs* – the first doctrine focused on CA. In 1943 Field Manual 27-5 was superseded by a republished version that was co-sponsored by the Navy Department as OpNav 50E-3, *Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs*. During World War II, the Marine Corps established a limited number of CA officer billets in the Fleet Marine Forces, typically manned by subject matter experts directly commissioned from academia. While working with their Navy CA counterparts, the officers conducted planning for the military government of occupied Japanese islands such as Bougainville, the Gilberts, the Marshalls, and Saipan. However, with the execution of Operation Iceberg – the invasion of Okinawa, Fleet Marine Forces were dealing for the first time with large numbers of civilians. While the invasion was under the command of the 10th Army, the majority of the military government officers who served on Okinawa during 1945-46 were graduates of Columbia University's, US Naval Reserve Midshipmen's School of Military Government and Administration.

During both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Marine Corps established CA staff elements at the division and Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) levels, known as the G-5, which focused on CMO planning. There was little requirement for expertise in military government during the Korean War, as the South Korean Government maintained responsibility for governing its territory. Similarly, during the Vietnam conflict, the South Vietnamese Government exercised its authorities. However, a noteworthy development during the Vietnam War was the training of active duty officers in civil affairs. These officers, selected from various military occupation specialties across the Corps, attended the 8-week US Army Civil Affairs School in Fort Gordon, Georgia before deploying to the III MAF area of operations – in particular, the 1st Marine Division zone in the densely populated “rice bowl” area south of Da Nang. By the end of 1966, the two Marine divisions of III MAF essentially fought two separate wars. The 3d Marine Division in the north fought a, more or less, conventional campaign of increased pressure upon North Vietnam, and the 1st Marine Division conducted the counter-guerrilla operations in the populous south - basically an "ink blot" strategy, combining civic and military efforts. As part of the overall pacification and counterinsurgency program in the south, the Marine Corps established the combined action platoon under the “civic action” concept, a program that actually had its roots in the “Banana Wars” and involved embedding small teams of Marines in remote villages. Though largely successful, the combined action platoon concept was implemented late, and not expanded during the war. Thus, many of the lessons learned were forgotten when the war ended.

To address the shortfall of CA expertise within the Marine Corps, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed the establishment of the 4th Civil Affairs Group (CAG) in 1966, later followed by the 3D CAG in 1985. Both CAGs, composed of Marines from the Selected Marine Corps Reserve, are assigned to United States Marine Corps Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), but upon mobilization, support the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) with CA teams, detachments and manning of command element staff sections (e.g., G-9). During the Cold War and Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, these forces were deemed sufficient to fulfill the CA support requirement of a MAGTF and support planning for the numerous humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations that frequently occur throughout the world. In 2001 the Marine Corps, and the rest of the US Armed Forces, found themselves facing a new series of

CMO-intensive challenges, first in Afghanistan then in Iraq, that exceeded 3D and 4th CAG's ability to adequately address. This led, to the creation in 2004, of the first provisional CAG, the 5th CAG, followed by the 6th CAG in 2005, both formed from MARFORRES units. In December 2005, ALMAR 061/05 was released changing the mission statement and table of organization of active component artillery headquarters regiments and cannon battalions to include a secondary CMO mission. Additionally, the 2004 Force Structure Review Group created 28 active duty civil affairs billets specifically to support CMO planning at the MEF, Marine Expeditionary Units and infantry regiments. This was followed in 2008 with the creation of three active duty CA detachments at each of the MEFs, eventually bringing the number of active duty civil affairs Marines to over 200. The Marine Corps took steps in 2010 to address reserve component dwell ratio requirements by creating two additional CAGs—1st and 2D—bringing a total of 4 CAGs in MARFORRES. As the Marine Corps drew forces down after the Iraq withdrawal and Afghanistan surge, CA forces were cut with active forces reduced from over 200 to approximately 70, and reserve forces going from 4 CAGs to 3 (1st, 3D and 4th CAGs).

APPENDIX B

UPDATED AUTHORITIES

Overview

Civil Affairs are designated Active Component and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct CAO and to support CMO (JP 3-57). As defined, CA refers to the force structure—Marine, teams, staff personnel, and units. CA forces conduct CAO in order to support the commander's concept and synchronize with the CMO plan.

CA forces interact with unified action partners, IPI, other civil entities, and the interagency through the planning and execution of CAO to set the conditions for the mitigation or defeat of threats to civil society. These forces are the commander's primary asset to purposefully engage nonmilitary organizations and IPI. The following publications establish the basis for the functions and capabilities required of CA forces.

Unified Action

CMO enables unified action. In accordance with Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, and JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* unified action is a required condition within joint operations. Additionally, Title 10, United States Code (USC) for DOD; Title 14, USC, for the United States Coast Guard (USCG); Title 22, USC, for DOS; DoDD 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major 26 Components*, and DoDD 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, states that the JFC should integrate CA with other military forces [e.g., maneuver, health services, military police or security, engineering, transportation, and special operations forces (SOF)] to work alongside HN agencies, military, and security forces (e.g., national, border, and local police) and to support unified action by interacting and consulting with other government agencies, IPI, international organizations, NGOs, HN, foreign nations, and the private sector to provide the capabilities needed for successful CMO.

Additional specific DOD activities that require interaction with the civil component of the OE

are directed by the Department of Defense. They include in the broader sense DoDD 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*; and DoDD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*. Defense support of civil authorities and defense support to SC can be characterized as the statutorily defined OEs under which DOD exercises different Title 10, USC, authorities, including authorities and permissions to coordinate with the civil component (including civil authorities). Within the realm of SC and contingencies short of declared war, CMO support is rendered to foreign governments [IAW support to the interagency in Title 22, USC, with DOD's limited Title 10, USC, authorities relating to foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) and DoDD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR)*, and in keeping with DoDD 5530.3, *International Agreements*].

Civil-Military Operations

Statutory requirements and limitations of CMO are also derived from DoDD 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*; DoDD S-3321.1, *Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War*; CJCSI 3214.01, *Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory*; DoDD 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)*; CJCSI 3210.06, *Irregular Warfare*; CJCSI 3710.01, *Implementation of DOD Counterdrug Support*; and DoDD 3600.01, *Information Operations*. Additionally, restraints on CMO will exist during SC based upon the established bilateral agreements the US has with any given country. Most agreements prevent interference with HN internal affairs. CMO noncombatant evacuation operations restraints are covered in DoDD 3025.14, *Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Designated Aliens from Threatened Areas Abroad*.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Within the realm of defense support of civil authorities, CMO is limited to the support rendered by DOD to domestic civilian authority: (a) CMO is conducted IAW DoDD 3025.18, *Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)*; DoDD 3160.01, *Homeland Defense Activities Conducted by the National Guard*; DoDD 3025.13, *Employment of DOD Capabilities in Support of US Secret Services (USSS) Department of Homeland Security (DHS)*, (b) CJCSI 3125.01, *Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the*

Homeland; and CJCSI 3710.01, *DOD Counterdrug Support*. (c) HCA may involve cooperation with HN military or paramilitary elements (including the participation of third-party organizations such as non-governmental or private or voluntary groups) to establish trust and enhance relations with the entities. IAW DoDI 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*, HCA:

- Are conducted in conjunction with authorized operations and exercises of the Military Services in a foreign country (including deployments for training).
- Are conducted with the approval of the HN's national and local civilian authorities.
- Complement, and do not duplicate, other forms of social or economic assistance provided to the HN by DOS and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Stabilization

Stabilization is a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process where locally legitimate authorities and systems can manage conflict peacefully and prevent the resurgence of violence.

Stability Activities

Stability activities are various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

Reconstruction and stabilization efforts require a whole-of-government response by multiple USG departments and agencies synchronized with the US military. Establishing a whole-of-government approach to achieve unity of effort should begin during planning. CMO are essential to integrate the military with diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power.

Military Government Operations

Statutory obligation to establish a military government in occupied territory are outlined in various international agreements (e.g., The Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, the law of war) and Department of Defense directives [e.g., Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2311.01E, *DOD Law of War Program*, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5810.01, *Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program*].

GLOSSARY

SECTION I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AO area of operations

ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events

CA civil affairs

CAG civil affairs group

CAOcivil affairs operations

CCDR combatant commander

CIM civil information management

CIMIC civil-military cooperation

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff instruction

CME civil-military engagement

CMO civil-military operations

CMOC civil-military operations center

CMOWG civil-military operations working group

COA course of action

COM chief of mission

CONOPS concept of operations

COP common operational picture

COS chief of staff

CPB civil preparation of the battlespace

DC dislocated civilian

DOD Department of Defense

DODD..... Department of Defense directive

DODD..... Department of Defense instruction

DOS..... Department of State

DSCA..... defense support of civil authorities

FHA..... foreign humanitarian assistance

FIDforeign internal defense

G-2 brigade or higher intelligence staff office

G-3 brigade or higher operations staff office

G-5 assistant chief of staff, plans

G-9 brigade or higher civil-military operations staff officer

GCE..... ground combat element

HACC humanitarian assistance coordination center

HN host nation

HOC humanitarian operations center

HQ headquarters

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IE information environment
IO international organizations
IOWG information operations working group
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IPI indigenous populations and institutions
IRC information-related capability

J-9 civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff; civil-military operations staff section
JIACG joint interagency coordination group
JOPP joint operating planning process
JP joint publication
JTF joint task force

LNO..... liaison officers

MAF..... Marine amphibious force
MAGTF..... Marine air-ground task force
MARCIMS Marine civil information management system
MARFORRES United States Marine Corps Forces Reserve
MCCMOS..... Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School
MCDP Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MCPP Marine Corps planning process
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication

MEB Marine expeditionary brigade
MEF Marine expeditionary force
METT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available
MEU Marine expeditionary unit
MISO Military Information Support Operation
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOS military occupational specialty

NCO Noncommissioned Officer
NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO nongovernmental organization

PMESII political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
PRC populace and resources control
PSYOP psychological operations (forces)

R2P2 rapid response planning process
RLT regimental landing team

S-3 battalion or regiment operations section
SAF Stability Assessment Framework
SC security cooperation
SCA support to civil administration

SMEAC situation, mission, execution, administrative and logistics, command and signal

SNA social network analysis

SPMAGTF special purpose Marine air-ground task force

SOF special operation forces

UN United Nations

UNHCR..... United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

US United States

USC United States code

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USG..... United States Government

Section II. Definitions

assessment—2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (Part 2 of a 4-part definition.) (DOD Dictionary)

chief of mission—The principal officer (the ambassador) in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation. The chief of mission is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all US Government executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a US area military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the chief of mission's direct responsibility. Also called COM. (DOD Dictionary)

civil administration—An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (DOD Dictionary)

civil affairs—Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. See also **civil-military operations**. (DOD Dictionary)

civil affairs group—A Reserve Component organization supporting the MAGTF commander with specially trained and organized personnel in order to facilitate the planning, coordination and execution of CMO and limited civil affairs operations. Also called CAG. (Note to terminologist: There is no Joint or Marine Corps definition of a CAG. Definition was derived from MCRP 5-12D and MCTP 3-03.A)

civil affairs operations— Actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called CAO. (DOD Dictionary)

civil information management— Process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other US Government and Department of Defense agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. Also called CIM (MCRP 1-10.2)

civil-military operations— Activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous

populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called **CMO**. See also **civil affairs; operations**. (DOD Dictionary)

civil-military operations center—An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called **CMOC**. See also **civil-military operations**. (DOD Dictionary)

civil preparation of the battlespace—An analytical method used to examine civil considerations in support of mission analysis and the overall IPB process. Civil preparation of the battlespace is conducted through the framework of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations in order to focus on civil aspects as it relates to the overall operational environment and mission accomplishment. Civil preparation of the battlespace uses myriad methods to specifically analyze different aspects of civil information and assess the civil impact of friendly, adversary, external actors, as well as the local populace, on MAGTF operations and the achievement of objectives. Also called **CPB**. (Note to terminologist: in an effort to illustrate the difference in focus area between intelligence planners and CMO planners, the writers feel the introduction of the term civil preparation of the battlespace is warranted and should be included in this publication and the Marine Corps lexicon of terms.)

civil reconnaissance—A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events. Also called **CR**. (DOD Dictionary)

common operational picture—A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called **COP**. (DOD Dictionary)

dislocated civilian—A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also called **DC**. (DOD Dictionary)

effect—2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. (Part 2 of a 3-part definition) (DOD Dictionary)

foreign assistance—Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment and support for foreign internal defense to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters that may be provided through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. See also **foreign humanitarian assistance; security assistance**. (DOD Dictionary)

foreign humanitarian assistance—Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called **FHA**. See also **foreign assistance**. (DOD Dictionary)

foreign internal defense—Participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called **FID**. (DOD Dictionary)

host nation—A nation which receives forces and/or supplies from allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called **HN**. (DOD Dictionary)

indigenous populations and institutions— The societal framework of an operational environment including citizens; legal and illegal immigrants; dislocated civilians; and governmental, tribal, ethnic, religious, commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called **IPI**. (DOD Dictionary)

information operations— The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Also called **IO**. (DOD Dictionary)

interagency—Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (DOD Dictionary)

internally displaced person— Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular, as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters and who has not crossed an internationally recognized state border. Also called **IDP**. (DOD Dictionary)

nongovernmental organization— A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called **NGO**. (DOD Dictionary)

operational planning team—A group built around the future operations section which integrates the staff representatives and resources. The operational planning team may have representatives or augmentation from each of the standard staff sections, the seven warfighting functions, staff liaisons, and/or subject matter experts. Also called **OPT**. (MCRP 1-10.2)

populace and resources control—Control measures that assist host nation governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder joint mission accomplishment. Populace and resources control

measures seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or otherwise threaten joint operation success. Also called **PRC**. (MCRP 1-10.2)

private sector—An umbrella term that may be applied to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations. (DOD Dictionary)

rule of law—A principle of governance in which all persons and institutions, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly announced, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and consistent with international human rights norms and standards. The drafting of laws must be transparent, and they must be applied fairly and without arbitrariness. In addition, all persons must have access to justice—the ability to seek and obtain a remedy through informal or formal institutions of justice. (Note to terminologist: The Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform, published 13 June 2011, discusses this on page I-3. The above definition is derived from the Joint Handbook)

security assistance— Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency are considered part of security cooperation. Also called **SA**. See also **security cooperation**. (DOD Dictionary)

security cooperation— All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. Also called **SC**. See also **security assistance**. (DOD Dictionary)

stability activities — Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

stabilization — A political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process where locally legitimate authorities and systems can manage conflict peacefully and prevent the resurgence of violence. (DoDD 3000.05)

support to civil administration— Actions that helps continue or stabilize management by a governing body of a foreign nation's civil structure by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. Support to civil administration consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting with those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives. Also called **SCA**. (MCRP 1-10.2)

unity of effort—Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. (DOD Dictionary)

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