This circular supports the academic curricula of all MCCMOS Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations Programs of Instruction

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To: Director, Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School

Subj: FEEDBACK ON MCCMOS CIRCULAR 3.0., MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

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FOREWORD

Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School (MCCMOS) Circular 3.0, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations* explains civil-military operations (CMO) activities and how to plan and execute CMO performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and civil partners. Civil-military operations are essential to the military instrument to coordinate the integration of military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency, and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.

MCCMOS Circular 3.0 provides a doctrinal foundation of Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) CMO and serves as a guide for the commander and his staff. This publication also provides a wealth of information on the broad spectrum of civil affairs activities intended to support CMO on behalf of the MAGTF commander. It is very likely CMO will be conducted by a combination of civil affairs forces and other military forces. The MAGTF commander should recognize civil affairs capability and capacity gaps that require the use of other military forces.

The overall purpose of this circular is to support MCCMOS programs of instruction with a more current reference until such time that an update to MCTP 3-03A (MAGTF CMO) is approved by the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration.

Recommendations for improvements to this pamphlet are encouraged from commands and individuals. The enclosed User Suggestion Form can be reproduced and forwarded to:

Director, Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School
(Attn: Doctrine)
2300 Louis Road (C478)
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5043

Reviewed and approved this date.

S. C. BRZOSTOWSKI
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Director, MCCMOS

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CHAPTER 1
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

1000. Overview

Civil-military operations (CMO) are the activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs (CA) or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, and during all military operations, CMO are essential to coordinate the integration of military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency, and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats (Joint Publication [JP] 3-57, Civil-Military Operations).

In any type of environment and across the range of military operations, Marine Corps commanders must determine how best to engage the civilian populace to accomplish their missions. This publication provides a framework from which to understand, plan, and execute CMO for the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). The Marine Corps has been engaged in CMO since its inception, in locations as diverse as Haiti, Dominican Republic, Mexico, the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In some of these operations, civil-military considerations were paramount and their effective incorporation into planning often determined an operation’s success or failure, such as in the operations known as the Banana Wars in the Caribbean and Central America during the 1920s and 1930s. To capture these hard-learned lessons, the Marine Corps first published the Small Wars Manual in 1940; it was later republished in 1990 as FMFRP 12-15, Small Wars Manual.

Civil-military operations apply at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Marines deploy across the globe to support regional engagement strategies and further national goals through the forward presence of expeditionary units. Marines are involved in multinational training activities and exercises that contribute to international cooperation and stability. Marines respond to complex emergencies, such as natural disasters that overwhelm civil authorities. Marines also contribute to
peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions and they are prepared to use force or the threat of force to deter conflict. If efforts to preserve peace fail, focused military capability is carefully employed to accomplish national objectives swiftly and with as little loss of life as possible. Once hostilities conclude, military forces contribute to stabilization, recovery, and the peaceful transition of control back to civil authorities. Therefore, military operations are more than the simple application of forces, arms, and equipment. Each operation has a civil dimension. The civil dimension requires that commanders consider how their actions affect, and are affected by, noncombatants.

CMO may require military forces to perform activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Designated CA units, other military forces, or a combination of civil affairs and other forces may perform CMO. Therefore, a MAGTF will need to carefully develop, nurture, and maintain positive relations between themselves and the indigenous people, governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in their area of operations (AO). Effective CMO assists military commanders in meeting their international obligations to civilians and achieving objectives.


Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, recognizes that military operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within the conflict continuum that spans peace to war as depicted in figure 1-1. A MAGTF may be called upon to simultaneously execute a variety of missions across the range of military operations, and Marines might be required to conduct major operations or campaigns in a third world country or region; therefore, the MAGTF must be prepared to conduct CMO across the full range of military operations anywhere in the world.
Joint Publication 3-0 also describes six types of activities common to most operations (shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority). These activities usually occur concurrently; the level of effort given to each activity changes throughout an operation. Activities may be compressed or absent entirely according to the nature of the operation.

a. Shaping Activities (prevent, prepare)

Shaping activities set conditions for successful theater operations. During the implementation of the CCDR’s security cooperation planning objectives, CMO can mitigate the need for other military operations in response to a crisis. A commander’s security cooperation activities develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, improve information exchange and intelligence sharing, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access. Shaping activities are largely conducted through other interorganizational participants, with DOD in a supporting role. Civil-military operations (e.g., coordinating medical, veterinary, and engineering) are conducted in conjunction with many security cooperation exercises and events that MAGTF forces are engaged in around the world, such as Cobra Gold, African Lion, and New Horizons.

b. Deter Activities (crisis defined)

MAGTF CMO planners and liaison teams coordinate with interagency partners, international
organizations, and NGOs to prepare for execution of subsequent activities. During a buildup of forces, the CMO task of populace and resources control (PRC), such as publicizing control measures among indigenous populations and institutions and planning to establish control of dislocated civilians (DCs) to preclude interference and facilitate tactical movement of forces and logistical support within the AO, becomes necessary.

c. Seize Initiative Activities (assure friendly freedom of action, assess theater infrastructure)

The MAGTF, either separately or as part of a joint force, establishes conditions for stability by providing immediate assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis. CMO are conducted to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action in support of JFC operations. CMO are designed to minimize civil-military friction and support friendly political-military objectives. The MAGTF forces must ensure that CMO remain continuous as the US Government (USG) works to resolve the crisis at the earliest opportunity.

d. Dominate Activities (establish dominant force capabilities, achieve full-spectrum dominance)

Even though the emphasis is on defeating the enemy, CMO and stability tasks are conducted as needed to facilitate military operations and to ensure a smooth transition to subsequent activities. The CMO tasks of PRC and civil information management (CIM) predominate, especially with regard to minimizing civilian interference on the battlefield and limiting collateral damage to reduce the duration and intensity of combat. As the situation develops, CMO planners, as part of integrated operational planning teams (OPTs) or working groups, should attempt to validate or identify new potential sources of conflict within the population to minimize future instability.

e. Stabilize Activities (establish security, restore services)

The MAGTF may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing multinational, interagency, international organization, or NGO participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. This includes providing or assisting in the provision of basic services to the population. Stabilize activities are typically characterized by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations. All CMO tasks occur, but
nation assistance tasks dominate as CMO facilitate humanitarian relief and restoration of civil order and services as the fighting subsides and emphasis shifts from relief to reconstruction.

f. Enable Civil Authority Activities (transfer to civil authority, redeploy)

The MAGTF will act in a supporting role to the lawful civil authority in the region. The MAGTF forces should work to transition all civil sector functions to legitimate authorities as soon as practical. All CMO tasks are performed, including nation assistance.

1002. Civil-Military Operations Purpose

The purpose of CMO is to facilitate military operations and to consolidate and achieve operational United States objectives, through the integration of civil and military actions while conducting support to civil administration (SCA), PRC, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), nation assistance (NA), and CIM.

These core tasks in the CMO purpose statement represent a broad spectrum of CA activities intended to support CMO on behalf of the MAGTF commander. It is very likely CMO will be conducted by a combination of CA forces and other military forces. The MAGTF commander should recognize CA capability and capacity gaps that require the use of other military forces. The identification of core tasks in the CMO purpose statement assists in defining tangible CMO activities, but it does not limit the MAGTF from using every means available beyond the scope and availability of CA forces. A thorough understanding of the five civil affairs core tasks is fundamental to designing activities of the MAGTF commander that facilitate military operations and optimal use of CA forces.

Civil affairs, as defined in JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, are designated “Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations.” Civil affairs operations (CAO) refer to those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, international organizations, NGOs, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private
sector; or (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Joint Publication 3-57 describes CAO as actions “to coordinate with [host nation] military and civilian agencies, other government departments and agencies, NGOs, or [international organizations], to support US policy or the commander’s assigned mission.” While all CAO support CMO, they remain a distinct CMO element. Figure 1-2 illustrates the relationship between CMO and CAO within the broad context of unified action that involves the synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

A Civil Affairs Marine is one designated, trained and uniquely qualified to conduct CAO in support of CMO. Such personnel should collectively possess knowledge in the following six civil affairs functional specialty areas: rule of law (ROL), economic stability, governance, public
health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. Marine Corps Reserve CA forces should possess personnel capable of addressing all six functional areas; however, it is incumbent on the MAGTF commander to clearly understand levels of CA expertise assigned to him and to immediately request additional assistance or develop organic capability in the CA functional areas lacking expertise or capacity.

a. Civil Affairs Core Task: Support to Civil Administration

Support to civil administration tasks are military operations that help stabilize or continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. Support to civil administration occurs most often in stability operations. Some SCA manifests in the other CMO areas of PRC, FHA, and NA. Support to civil administration consists of the following two distinct mission activities:

- **Civil administration in friendly territory:** The geographic combatant command’s (GCC’s) support to governments of friendly territories during peacetime, disasters, or war. Examples of support include advising friendly authorities and performing specific functions within limits of the authority and liability established by international treaties and agreements.
- **Civil administration in occupied territory:** The establishment of a temporary government, as directed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the populace of a territory that US forces have taken from an enemy by force of arms until an indigenous civil government can be established.

The CMO supporting tasks in SCA vary between assistance to civil administration in friendly territory, and civil administration in occupied territory. In either case, however, the CA mission is one of support to the commander’s operational and support function with respect to the continuity of government in a friendly or host nation. Generally, CMO tasks include:

- Identifying, validating, or evaluating friendly or host nation essential service infrastructure.
- Assessing the needs of the IPI in terms of the six civil affairs functional areas.
▪ Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of the IPI in terms of the six civil affairs functional areas.
▪ Performing liaison functions between military and civilian agencies.
▪ Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational SCA operations.
▪ Participating in the execution of selected SCA operations as needed or directed.
▪ Performing quality control assessments of SCA operations and costs.
▪ Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of SCA operations.
▪ Coordinating and synchronizing transition of SCA operations from military to indigenous government or international transitional government control.
▪ Initiating or refining CIM process with geospatial projects that depict affected populations and civil vulnerabilities.

b. Civil Affairs Core Task: Populace and Resources Control

Populace and resources control is defined as control measures that assist host nation governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder joint mission accomplishment. Populace and resources control measures seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or otherwise threaten joint operation success.

Marines do not conduct military operations in a vacuum free of civilian presence or influence. The following can disrupt military operations:

▪ Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of dislocated civilians in the environment.
▪ Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians conducting legitimate activities.
▪ Illegal or illegitimate activities, such as insurgent operations or black-market activities.

PRC consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control. These controls are normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. Combatant commanders define and enforce these controls during times of civil or military emergency. For practical and security reasons, military forces use PRC measures across the range of military
operations. Populace and resources control operations are executed in conjunction with and as an integral part of all military operations.

Marines base the extent of PRC measures on their current operational environment. When forces deploy in support of a host nation, PRC upholds and strengthens the sovereignty of the legitimate government to govern the people and resources within its borders. In the absence of a sovereign government, implementation of PRC policy begins through the establishment of an interim governing plan, whether its execution is through martial law or a transitional government. Populace and resources control measures implemented at the operational and tactical levels result from policy developed at national strategic and theater strategic levels.

(1) Populace Control

Populace control provides security for the populace, mobilizes human resources, denies enemy access to the population, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures may include:

- Establishing border security, including customs procedures to prevent trafficking of persons, to regulate immigration and emigration, and to establish control over major points of entry.
- Establishing identification procedures, including securing documents relating to personal identification, property ownership, court records, voter registries, birth certificates, and driver’s licenses.
- Establishing and disseminating rules relevant to movement, including curfews, movement restrictions, and travel permits.
- Instituting policies regarding the regulation of air and overland movement.
- Relocating the population as necessitated by military operations.
- Establishing transitional political authority and interim civil administration.
- Dislocated civilian (DC) operations and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are two special categories of populace control that require extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations.

(a) Dislocated Civilian Operations
Dislocated civilian operations (also commonly referred to as resettlement operations) are actions required to move civilians out of harm’s way or to safeguard them in the aftermath of a disaster. The disaster may be natural, such as a flood or an earthquake, or man-made, such as combat operations, social or political strife, or a technological hazard. The requirement to conduct DC operations may occur across the range of military operations.

Dislocated civilian operations include the planning and management of DC routes, collection points, assembly areas, and camps, normally in support of the host nation and international organization efforts. They also include FHA support to the affected populace. Military police are a key component to the successful planning and execution of DC operations. Commanders should seek their involvement early in the planning process. In DC operations, controlling agencies (for example, United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), or host nation) normally care for the basic needs of DCs, such as food, water, shelter, sanitation, and security. Controlling agencies must also be prepared to prevent or arrest the outbreak of communicable disease among DCs. This last point is important for the health of the populace and military forces.

**Categories of Civilians**

During military operations, the MAGTF must consider two distinct categories of civilians—those remaining at their homes or places of habitual residence and those dislocating. United States policy dictates the placement of people in one of these categories. The US category may conflict with how international organizations, NGOs, and the host nation refer to the people. Therefore, CA Marines and CMO planners must be careful in how they describe categories of civilians. The first category includes civilians who are indigenous and other local populace, including civilians from other countries. Civilians within this category may or may not need help. If they can care for themselves, they should remain in place.

Dislocated civilians are civilians who have left their homes. Their movement and presence can hinder military operations. They will likely require some degree of aid, such as medicine, food, shelter, clothing, and similar items. Dislocated civilians may not be indigenous to the area or to
the country in which they reside. Dislocated civilian is a generic term that further subdivides into eight categories. Legal and political considerations define these categories as follows:

- **Displaced Person.** A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country (JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance).
- **Refugee.** A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country (JP 3-29).
- **Evacuee.** A civilian removed from his place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation (JP 3-57).
- **Stateless Person.** Civilian who has been denationalized, whose country of origin cannot be determined, or who cannot establish a right to the nationality claimed (JP 3-29).
- **War Victim.** A classification created during the Vietnam era to describe civilians suffering injuries, loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of their homes because of war. War victims may be eligible for a claim against the United States under the US Code Title 10, § 2734, Property loss; personal injury or death: incident to noncombat activities of the armed forces; foreign countries (commonly referred to as the Foreign Claims Act).
- **Internally Displaced Persons.** Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (JP 3-29).
- **Returnee.** A displaced person who has returned voluntarily to his or her former place of residence (JP 3-29).
- **Resettled Persons.** Subset of displaced persons—civilians who have been able to resettle in a third country, usually with the assistance of UNHCR and the government of their new country of residence, rather than returning to their previous home or land within the country or area of original displacement (JP 3-29).

**Civil Affairs Role in Dislocated Civilian Operations**
The CMO supporting tasks CA forces perform in DC operations include:

- Identifying or evaluating existing host nation and international community DC plans and operations.
- Advising on DC control measures that would effectively support the military operation.
- Advising on how to implement DC control measures.
- Publicizing control measures among IPI.
- Assessing measures of effectiveness (MOEs).
- Participating in the execution of selected DC operations as needed or directed and in coordination with the internationally mandated organizations (for example, UNHCR, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and the ICRC) for their care.
- Assisting in arbitration of problems arising from implementation of DC control measures.

(b) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

The term NEO refers to the authorized and orderly departure of noncombatants from a specific area by the Department of State (DOS), DOD, or other appropriate authority. Although the United States usually considers NEO in connection with combat operations, it may also conduct a NEO in anticipation of or response to any natural or man-made disaster in a foreign country. Civil unrest in a country may warrant evacuation to the United States or other safe haven. Civil affairs forces will normally assist the combatant commander (CCDR) or the ambassador in the planning and management of a NEO through the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) G-9 or liaison team; however, the GCC or US country team needs to include these teams early in the planning process for CA forces to provide effective support. The DOD defines two categories of noncombatant evacuees:

- United States citizens that competent authority can order to evacuate include:
  - Civilian employees of all USG agencies and their dependents.
  - Military personnel of the Armed Forces of the US specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants.
  - Dependents of members of the Armed Forces of the US.
▪ United States (and non-US) citizens that competent authority may authorize or assist (but not necessarily order) to evacuate, include:
  ▪ Civilian employees of USG agencies and their dependents who are residents in the country but are willing to evacuate.
  ▪ Private US citizens and their dependents.
  ▪ Military personnel and their dependents, short of an ordered evacuation.
  ▪ Designated aliens, including dependents of civilian employees of the USG and military personnel of the Armed Forces of the US, as prescribed by the DOS.

Noncombatant evacuation operations remove threatened civilians from locations in a friendly nation or a host nation to safe havens or to the United States. The DOS directs the conduct of such operations. The MAGTF uses military assets in an evacuation only when civilian resources are inadequate. The DOS may request DOD assistance in conducting evacuations to—

▪ Protect US citizens abroad.
▪ Minimize the number of US citizens at risk.
▪ Minimize the number of US citizens in combat areas to avoid impairing the combat effectiveness of military forces.

**Civil Affairs Role in Noncombatant Evacuation Operations**

The CMO supporting tasks CA forces normally perform in a NEO include:

▪ Advising the commander of the civil affairs aspects and implications of current and proposed NEO plans, including assisting in writing the Annex G (CMO) and respective subordinate plans.
▪ Supporting the operation of evacuation sites, holding areas for non-US nationals denied evacuation, and reception or processing stations.
▪ Assisting in the identification of US citizens and other evacuees.
▪ Assisting in the screening and briefing of evacuees.
▪ Performing liaison with the embassy, to include acting as a communications link with US forces in the operational area.
- Recommending actions to the commander to minimize population interference with current and proposed military operations.
- Assisting in safe haven activities, as required.

Joint Publication 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations* contains more information on NEOs and related CMO planning and operations to support evacuations.

(2) Resources Control

Resources controls regulate the movement or consumption of material resources, mobilize materiel resources, and deny materiel to the enemy. Resources controls target specific sectors of a nation’s material wealth and economy, including natural resources, food and agriculture, immoveable property, finances, and cultural and critical infrastructure. Resources control measures may include:

- Establishing procedures to resolve property rights for land and subterranean resources.
- Implementing mechanisms to prevent unauthorized seizures of land or property.
- Securing existing harvest storage facilities to prevent spoilage and looting of harvested crops.
- Implementing rationing and distribution programs for key commodities (food and fuel).
- Establishing border security, including customs procedures to prevent arms smuggling and stop contraband, such as drugs and natural resources.
- Regulating and securing access to valuable natural resources.
- Stopping illicit trade in natural resources and developing governance mechanisms and incentives to bring trade into the market.
- Initiating processes for addressing and resolving resource ownership and access issues.
- Freezing financial accounts of enemy combatants.
- Locking international access of overseas financial accounts to prevent money laundering.
- Protecting and securing strategically important institutions, such as government buildings and archives, museums, religious sites, courthouses, and communications facilities.

Civil-military operations supporting tasks in PRC support the commander’s operations function. Generally, CMO tasks include:
- Identifying or evaluating existing host nation PRC measures.
- Advising on PRC measures that would effectively support the commander’s objectives.
- Recommending command guidance on how to implement PRC measures.
- Publicizing control measures among IPI.
- Identifying and assessing measures of performance (MOPs) and MOEs.
- Participating in the execution of selected PRC operations, as needed or directed.
- Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the implementation of PRC measures.
- Initiating or refining geospatial products that depict affected populations and civil vulnerabilities.

c. Civil Affairs Core Task: Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Foreign humanitarian assistance is conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions, such as human pain, disease, hunger, or need that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Normally, FHA includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; making repairs to essential services; and water purification. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The MAGTF or joint task force (JTF) commander provides foreign assistance to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities and international organizations that possess the primary responsibility for providing FHA. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are those that US forces conduct outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Examples of disasters include hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, oil spills, famine, disease, civil conflicts, terrorist incidents, and incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (see figure 1-3).
With the exception of an immediate response to prevent the loss of life, a MAGTF will conduct FHA only upon the request of the DOS and in coordination with the chief of mission (COM) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The military normally plays a supporting role in FHA. Typical supporting roles include providing prompt aid to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims; making available, preparing, and transporting nonlethal excess property to foreign countries; transferring on-hand DOD stocks to respond to unforeseen emergencies; providing funded and space-available transportation of humanitarian and relief supplies; conducting some DOD humanitarian demining assistance activities; and conducting foreign consequence management. The Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the office within USAID responsible for facilitating and coordinating US Government emergency assistance overseas. The Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance publishes the Field Operations Guide (FOG) for Disaster Assistance and Response with an
overview of USG roles during a disaster. As the lead US agency during a FHA response, USAID, through OFDA, provides guidance for the USG response.

MAGTF participation in FHA operations can include:

- Providing security, which allows civilian agencies to operate safely and uninhibited.
- Conducting assessments on the civil environment.
- Applying specific military capabilities in direct disaster relief roles, such as:
  - Providing food and medical care.
  - Constructing basic sanitation facilities.
  - Repairing public facilities.
  - Constructing shelters and temporary camps.
  - Providing transport for supplies, commodities, and passengers.

Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are inherently complex. They require a significant amount of interorganizational coordination. The United States directs FHA at the strategic level, coordinates and manages it at the operational level, and conducts it at a tactical level. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations require centralized coordination and control. To help achieve FHA objectives, MAGTF CMO planners ensure the nominated programs are:

- Self-sustaining or supportable by host nation civilian or military forces.
- Consistent with internationally accepted standards and principles (for example, the Sphere Project: *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*).

Planners must closely coordinate FHA program development and implementation with the humanitarian community, which includes international organizations, NGOs, and host nation assistance agencies.

**(1) Relief Missions**

Marines support relief missions across the range of military operations, from domestic disasters that occur naturally to the aftermath of foreign conflicts. Foreign humanitarian assistance missions in the area of disaster relief include technical assessments, transportation of goods and
supplies, securing humanitarian infrastructure, and when deemed appropriate by civilian officials, directing efforts to mitigate the results of natural or man-made disasters. Potential roles for Marines include coordinating the provision of food and medical care; the construction of basic sanitation facilities; the reparation of public facilities; the construction of shelters; and responding quickly to relieve suffering, prevent loss of life, and protect property.

Normally, DOD is in a supporting role during relief missions. OFDA provides foreign disaster assistance and coordinates the USG’s response to disasters abroad. OFDA’s mandate is to save lives, alleviate suffering, and reduce the economic impact of disasters. If a foreign disaster is large enough in scope for the United States to commit forces, OFDA is likely to have a team or teams on the ground in the affected area as well, once security has been established. Such Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) can vary in size and scope, but it is essential that Marines operating in the same disaster area coordinate with them. A military liaison unit within OFDA can assign a liaison officer to a military unit for relief missions and MAGTF commanders supporting relief missions should assign liaison officers to OFDA.

(2) Technical Assistance and Support Functions

Based upon Presidential and/or SecDef and GCC guidance, the JTF or MAGTF commander should establish policy regarding technical advice and assistance to the affected country, international organizations, and NGOs as soon as possible. Technical assistance and support functions include:

- Restoring the communications system.
- Managing military relief supply (to include high-priority relief supply delivery). Marines may also facilitate other government agencies, international organizations, and NGOs with their relief supply efforts.
- Providing emergency medical care.
- Supporting humanitarian mine action (demining) operations by assisting in training on the National Mine Action Authority and conducting liaison activities with the host nation infrastructure, international organizations or NGOs.
▪ Assisting the National Mine Action Authority to establish command and control and to communicate effectively with subordinate organizations, as well as host nation government officials.
▪ Assisting the National Mine Action Authority with its integration into the host nation and international communities.

(3) Foreign Consequence Management

Foreign consequence management is USG activity that assists friends and allies in responding to the effects of an intentional or accidental chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident on foreign territory in order to maximize preservation of life. These operations involve the services and activities necessary to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. They involve measures to alleviate the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by emergencies abroad.

Foreign consequence management operations include:

▪ Assisting with the restoration of essential host nation government services.
▪ Assisting with the protection of host nation public health and safety.
▪ Assisting with the provision of emergency relief to host nation government, businesses, and individuals.
▪ Identifying and assessing the threat posed by hazardous materials.
▪ Providing consultation to host nation decision makers.

(4) Civil Affairs Role in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

The CMO supporting tasks CA forces perform in FHA include:

▪ Participating in the preparation and review of contingency plans that address assisting USG agencies, international organizations, host nation agencies, and NGOs to support FHA.
▪ Monitoring all FHA operations for compliance with applicable laws, agreements, treaties, and contracts.
Reviewing guidance from the GCC regarding FHA operations in theater security cooperation plans, FHA and disaster relief plans, and foreign consequence management plans.

Incorporating FHA assessment and FHA training into theater security cooperation plans.

Assessing the environment in which US forces will conduct FHA operations, including:

- Political situation.
- Global visibility of the situation.
- Media interest climate for FHA operations.

Confirming and validating the host nation’s ability to manage humanitarian assistance in the AO.

Coordinating and synchronizing CMO efforts with interagency and multinational humanitarian assistance efforts in the AO.

Identifying shortfalls in host nation humanitarian assistance plans and resources.

Identifying humanitarian assistance resources, including various government agencies, military units, NGOs, and IPI in the theater of operations, and establishing contact and working relationships as appropriate.

Assessing, monitoring, and reporting the impact of FHA operations on the populace and the populace on the operations.

Developing plans and strategies for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with FHA operations.

Understanding that, even in a permissive environment, elements may use nonthreatening means, such as demonstrations, to impair the credibility or reduce the effectiveness of US military operations.

Initiating or refining CIM process with geospatial products that depict affected populations and civil vulnerabilities.

d. Civil Affairs Core Task: Nation Assistance

Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. Nation assistance operations support a host nation by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive
institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), and US Code Title 10, Armed Forces (DOD) programs performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. All nation assistance operations are usually coordinated with the US ambassador through the country team.

(1) Security Assistance Programs

Security assistance is a group of programs, authorized under US Code Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, by which the United States provides defense articles, military education and training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease in support of national policies and objectives. The legislative authorities governing security assistance are Public Law 87–195 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; US Code Title 22, Chapter 39, Arms Export Control, (more commonly known as the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended); and the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act. All security assistance programs are subject to the continuous supervision and general direction of the Secretary of State to best serve US foreign policy interests; however, these programs are administered by both DOD and DOS. Those programs that are administered by DOD are a subset of security cooperation. GCCs have the responsibility for planning FID operations for their area of responsibility (AOR), but they interface directly with the security cooperation office (SCO) under direction of the COM. GCCs are active in the security assistance process by advising the SCO and by coordinating and monitoring ongoing security assistance efforts in their AORs. Security assistance support areas include equipment, education, and training. MAGTF support to security assistance may include training foreign military forces in CMO and civil-military relations but must be coordinated through the appropriate security assistance channels.

(2) Foreign Internal Defense

FID is that participation by civilian or military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Foreign internal defense is an umbrella concept that covers a broad
range of activities. Its primary intent is always to assist the legitimate host government in addressing internal threats and their underlying causes. Commensurate with US policy goals, the focus of all US FID efforts is support of the host nation program of internal defense and development (IDAD). Foreign internal defense is not restricted to times of conflict. It also can take place in the form of training exercises and other activities that show US resolve in the region.

(3) Title 10, U.S. Code (DoD) programs

Title 10, U.S. Code (DoD) programs include military civic action (MCA), humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by federal agencies or international organizations. Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs generally encompass planned activities and are limited by law to the following: medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of the country that are rural or are underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are most usually conducted in support of theater security cooperation missions and are closely coordinated with the country team. Humanitarian and civic assistance provided must promote the security interests of both the US and the country in which the activities are to be carried out and the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the US forces participating in the activities. Humanitarian and civic assistance activities must complement but not duplicate any other form of social or economic assistance provided by the US.

(4) Civil Affairs Role in Nation Assistance

The CMO supporting tasks CA forces perform in nation assistance include:

- Reviewing US security assistance program goals and host nation IDAD goals and planning CMO to support the host nation program.
- Identifying, validating, or evaluating nation assistance project nominations.
Synchronizing nation assistance projects with other programs, military and civilian.
- Training host nation military to plan, train for, and execute PRC and other CMO appropriate to the IDAD plan of its country.
- Tracking costs associated with execution of nation assistance projects.
- Performing quality control assessments of nation assistance operations and costs.
- Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of nation assistance operations.
- Initiating or refining CIM process with geospatial products that depict affected populations and civil vulnerabilities.

### e. Civil Affairs Core Task: Civil Information Management

Civil information management is the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported unit, higher headquarters, and other DOD and USG agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. This process ensures the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the AO. The proper execution of CIM enhances operations by preventing the duplication of information gathering efforts by follow-on forces. During episodic engagements, the capturing of key civil data, results of civil engagements and civil reconnaissance provide current civil domain information for dissemination through the CIM process.

Civil information is information developed from data with relation to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) within the commander’s operational environment. The management of civil information is the fusion of the CIM process into the common operational picture (COP) and ultimately the common tactical picture to benefit the supported commander, DOD, interagency, international organization, NGO, and IPI situational awareness, situational understanding, or situational dominance.

Civil information management is not solely a task of the CIM cell. It is an essential task for all components of a CA unit and should incorporate information from intelligence and maneuver elements. Civil Affairs Marines and CIM cell personnel should contribute civil information
to the COP and the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) process. Civil information management enhances situational awareness and facilitates understanding for all elements in the operational environment, allowing those elements to achieve decision superiority.

(1) Civil Affairs Core Task: Civil Information Management Process.

The CIM process generates civil information through six steps (see figure 1-4), which are discussed in the following paragraphs.

![Six-Step Civil Information Management Process](image)

**Figure 1-4. Six-Step Civil Information Management Process**

(a) Plan (Step One)

Input from other sources, such as various intelligence organizations, interagency, the host nation, international organizations, and NGOs is essential to developing a better understanding of the civil dimension. The CA staff leverages these external sources of information to provide a
comprehensive understanding of the operating environment, enabling the MAGTF commander to conduct operations that mitigate sources of instability, address civil vulnerabilities, and promote unity of effort.

The establishment of or participation in a CMOC, Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), or other operational- or tactical-level collaboration and information sharing organization is essential for developing a comprehensive understanding of the OE among those conducting CMO.

Effective CIM requires the conduct of assessments to determine conditions in the area of operations. Interorganizational support for these assessments may be critical to their accuracy. The assessment process serves two important purposes: to gain clarity of the baseline and current situation as well as enable the host nation government to be aware of the benefits of the transformation process proposed. Assessments provide an important opportunity to build trust between international and local people and organizations and to develop local ownership of assistance programs.

**Collaboration**

Collaboration is a coordinated effort focused on sharing data. Collaboration increases overall operational efficiency by eliminating redundant collection efforts. Collaborative tools are information systems, including online capabilities that enhance team development and facilitate collaboration. Examples of collaborative tools include the following:

- Information operations working groups.
- Civil-military operations working groups (CMOWGs).
- International organizations, NGOs, and IPI interaction.
- Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP)
- Multinational forces.
- Chat rooms, white-boarding, professional forums, and communities of interest.
- Battle update briefs, commanders update briefs, and targeting boards.
- Maneuver force observations.
▪ Debriefings of Marines involved in daily operations.
▪ International relief web sites.
▪ Geographic information system cell.
▪ Coordination with academic and research institutions.

(b) Gather (Step Two)

Information gathering refers to the literal gathering of relevant data. Driven by the commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR) and integrated with the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan, civil information collection occurs at all levels through civil reconnaissance, data mining, and collaboration with the interagency, international organizations, NGOs, and IPI. At first there is little, if any, quality screening of the data collection, everything related is relevant. Approximately 90 percent of intelligence starts as open source information. The security classification typically associated with intelligence products is due to the source and methods of collection. The intent of CIM is to keep most of this information unclassified and easily shared with non-USG partners.

The heart of collection is the daily interaction between MAGTF forces and the myriad of civilians in the supported commander’s AO, and the capture of these contacts and data points. Every Marine who encounters the civilian elements of an AO is a potential sensor of civil information.

Civil Reconnaissance

Civil reconnaissance is a targeted, planned, and coordinated (in conjunction with S-2 and S-3 efforts) observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment. Civil reconnaissance focuses on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented by the acronym ASCOPE. Priority information requirements focus on civil reconnaissance for the purpose of collecting civil information to enhance situational understanding and facilitate decision-making. Civil-military operations planners integrate civil reconnaissance into the overall MAGTF commander’s plan.

Potential sources of civil information in a coordinated civil reconnaissance plan include:
▪ Ongoing ASCOPE assessments of the AO that identify MOE trends.
▪ Identified unknowns in civil information.
▪ Gaps identified during collation and analysis (steps 3 & 4).
▪ Gaps remaining in the area study and area assessment.
▪ Interaction with IPI, including but not limited to:
  ▪ Host nation government officials.
  ▪ Religious leaders.
  ▪ Tribal or clan leaders.
  ▪ Dislocated civilian camp leadership.
  ▪ Dislocated civilians on the move.
  ▪ Infrastructure managers and workers.
  ▪ Local industry personnel.
  ▪ Medical and educational personnel.

**Data Mining**

Data mining is the process of extracting patterns from raw data. Conducted by all Marines, data mining uses a combination of open source and restricted-source materials for routine and continuous study and research. Data mining is focused by:

▪ Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).
▪ Requests for information.
▪ Running estimates.
▪ Remaining gaps in the area study and area assessment.

**(c) Consolidate (Step Three)**

Consolidation is the ordering of the data into groupings. The Marine Civil Information Management System (MARCIMS) is a tool used to perform this step. MARCIMS can be used to create a knowledge portal for CIM that enables users to collect, organize, tag, search, browse, visualize, and share structured CIM knowledge.
Semantic Wiki provides automatic categorization of collected data and makes information more accessible. The benefits of leveraging semantic wiki technology for civil-military operations include:

- Provides timely and accurate reporting and situation awareness.
- Prevents duplication of effort.
- Facilitates assessments and CMO mission planning.
- Fosters collaboration through hashtag and mention features.

**Processing**

Processing is the physical and cognitive manipulation of the separate pieces of data into information. Processing structures the collated data into a usable form for the analyst. The data collector often collates and processes the data into information. The analyst should provide feedback to the civil information collection manager to improve the effectiveness of the collection.

**(d) Analyze (Step Four)**

Analysis is the process by which collected information is evaluated and integrated with existing information to produce intelligence that describes the current and predicts the future impact of the threat and/or environment on operations. The analysts and civil information manager mold the civil information into a knowledge product. Analysis can uncover indicators of potential events previously obscured in the background data. The CIM supervisor must direct the analytical efforts to those gaps in the COP rather than exhaustively refining known data. Analysis of civil information is similar to the normal red team–blue team analysis in process but instead focuses on:

- Identifying mission variables.
- Identifying operational variables.
- Identifying trends.
- Conducting predictive analysis.
- Identifying civil vulnerabilities.
(e) Produce (Step Five)

Production is the packaging of civil information into easily disseminated forms and structures. The production phase of the CIM process ensures CIM products and services are relevant, accurate, timely, and useable by commanders and decision makers. Products of civil information analysis are:

- Layered geospatial information.
- Civil information for the COP.
- Civil considerations products.
- Answers to requests for information.
- Reported PIRs.
- Updates to ongoing CA assessments, area studies, and running estimates.

(f) Share (Step Six)

Dissemination is actively pushing knowledge products to consumers. The consumers may not realize what they need; therefore, CA forces must anticipate the information needs of the supported unit or agency. Requests for information should not initiate the production of an estimate or assessment; production should be an ongoing task. Sharing is the cornerstone of CIM and is the hallmark of interorganizational cooperation. Thorough dissemination of civil information reduces redundancy and ensures that the maximum effects are achieved by using limited resources to their fullest potential. Mechanisms for dissemination may vary by situation and echelon but the process and goal remain constant. The G-9 should be a key manager in the dissemination of civil information. Examples of dissemination include:

- Integration with the COP.
- Civil information repositories.
- Reports.
- Update briefs.
- Online databases.
An appreciation of CMO purpose, core tasks, and civil affairs functional expertise helps MAGTF commanders effectively conduct CMO and enhance mission accomplishment. MAGTF commanders must work with civil partners to overcome CMO challenges inherent to any mission with a preponderance of forces that may not be uniquely designed or qualified to conduct CMO-related tasks. The key to success is to prepare every Marine in the basic tenants of CMO and to leverage CA Marines to the greatest extent possible.

1003. Desired Outcome of Civil-Military Operations

- Minimize civilian interference; maximize support.
- Allow MAGTF commander to meet legal and ethical obligations.
- Enable and support the MAGTF commander’s selected course of action (COA).
- Gain situational awareness.
- Enhance freedom of action.
- Isolate the enemy.
- Enhance legitimacy of MAGTF in the eyes of the civilian population.
- Help shape the civil dimension of the battlespace.
- Increase acceptance of the MAGTF and its mission with local, regional, and national leaders.
- Support shaping activities for successful theater operations.
- Set conditions for stabilization activities.
- Enable mission accomplishment throughout the operation.

1004. Facilitating Civil-Military Operations

MAGTFs strive to build civil relationships and perform civil activities and functions in all operations to varying degrees. The most successful operation, regardless of combat intensity, carefully considers how to build strong civil rapport and support while judicially applying military resources to accommodate civil requirements.

The following paragraphs describe considerations that highlight important aspects for conducting effective CMO and can be applied universally.
a. Building Relationships through Effective Communications

Effective CMO hinges on MAGTF personnel possessing strong interpersonal skills with which to effectively convey command messages, coordinate unified action, and prevent miscommunication. Strong communication skills allow personnel to effectively explain friendly intentions and prevent miscommunication, increasing the probability of mission success.

b. Building Relationships through Ethical Actions and Conduct

MAGTF commanders should understand ethical obligations to civilian populations when conducting combat operations. The law of land warfare dictates occupying forces are held accountable for the safety and security of populations. The MAGTF commander must ensure his forces are trained and prepared to address ethics challenges. Not only should Marines strive to uphold national values, but ethical behavior minimizes the enemy’s ability to create propaganda and helps build relationships, thereby enhancing unity of effort.

c. Building Relationships through Cultural Awareness

Cultural intelligence is described as the ability to be effective across various cultural contexts—including national, ethnic, organizational, generational, and ideological spectrums. MAGTF commanders that leverage subordinate staff members who display strong attributes of cultural intelligence will increase their likelihood of mission success. This will be especially true when attempting to build rapport and establish trust with the local population and civilian partners.

The ability to successfully integrate cultural knowledge and understanding into operational planning and mission execution is often best accomplished by establishing relationships with indigenous people. Relying on third party information or anecdotal history may potentially accentuate bias and blind spots. Awareness of history, basic cultural beliefs, and customs is important. True understanding of the operational environment, however, can only take place through direct interaction with people and participation in local day to day existence. Marines should incorporate indigenous cultural advisors and the input of interpreters to assist with cultural nuances.
A MAGTF commander’s ability to understand the interdependent relationships indigenous people have with their environment will greatly enhance their ability to effectively communicate cross-culturally. Such an understanding requires knowledge on economics, social structure, political structure, and belief systems. Heightened knowledge of civil and cultural considerations help units to understand evolving socio-cultural issues that affect operational planning, the commander’s decision-making, and the conduct of operations.

**d. Building Relationships through Conflict Resolution**

Commanders who effectively address social conflicts normally create rapport with disputing parties by applying appropriate conflict resolution methods. Resolving civil conflict requires a great deal of experience and expertise. The amount of influence a commander is able to generate is normally directly proportional to how well he manages civil relationships through conflict management or conflict resolution.

**e. Building Relationships through Civil-Military Engagements**

Civil-Military engagements may provide information and/or influence attitudes, perceptions, and behavior. Civil-Military engagements provide a venue for building relationships, solving conflicts, conveying information, calming fears, and refuting rumors, lies, or misinformation. Effective integration of these engagements into daily operations has the potential to mitigate negative unintended consequences, counter adversary propaganda activities, and increase local support for friendly forces.

As part of the Annex G, CMO planners should develop a civil-military engagement plan that clearly defines host-nation civil targets for the commander and the senior civilian representative. It is imperative that the civil-military engagement plan adheres to the established command focus, and complement existing command relationships and concepts of operation. MEF and Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)-level CMO planners should focus on engagements that have operational-level influence; while Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Battalion Landing Team (BLT) CMO planners should focus on tactical-level actors within the larger MEF or MEB framework. Civil-military operations planners at a lower command echelon must not
disproportionately empower an individual at the expense of other host nation leaders at the MEF/MEB level; thus, engagement planning must be synchronized across the MAGTF.

1005. Civil-Military Operations and Other Information-Related Capabilities

Information operations are the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Information-related capabilities (IRCs) are tools, techniques, or activities employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions. There are fourteen IRCs, the most common ones involved with CMO include public affairs (PA), combat camera (COMCAM), military information support operations (MISO), and counterintelligence.

Successful CMO rely heavily on informing and influencing internal and external audiences, positively influencing friendly stakeholders, minimizing noncombatant interference, and addressing adversarial propaganda. Complete integration and timely use of IRCs is critical in establishing stable environments, because public perception is often the key to success. Civil-military operations planners should work closely with the G-3/S-3 future operations planners and G-2/S-2 Marines to identify leaders within the area of operations that have the potential to enhance or disrupt the operation and target these individuals as part of the larger engagement plan. Coordinated influence activities are important because they help to minimize haphazard messaging (verbal and nonverbal) that often confuse or mislead civil audiences.

In an expeditionary setting, CA teams, PA personnel, and MISO teams all may disseminate information to local populations. Planners from each of these fields, therefore, must actively coordinate within the information operations working group or cell or coordinate directly when there is no information operations coordination capability established. These planners must also be fully integrated into the targeting cycle.

1006. Civil-Military Operations Support to Intelligence Planning
Intelligence is the product resulting from the six-step intelligence cycle of planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, production and analysis, dissemination and utilization of available information concerning the area of operations. Civil-military operations planning must include the development and dissemination of civil intelligence products to maintain heightened situational awareness. An example would be producing social network analysis products to determine the impact of influential indigenous persons on MAGTF operations.

The G-2/S-2 and CMO planner processes complement each other. Intelligence products inform and focus CMO planning. CMO can provide the G-2/S-2 with information on politics, civilian press, the local population, demographics, infrastructure, and interorganizational partners, enhancing understanding of the battlespace. Marines engaged in CMO must provide collected data and information from their civil interactions and engagements to the G-2/S-2 planners in order to provide the MAGTF commander with the most holistic IPB possible. Another key to successful CMO is to make civil information a priority within the command. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is the cornerstone of the decision-making process and forms the basis for developing intelligence requirements, named areas of interest, and the ISR plan.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is the term presently applied to activities that combine reconnaissance and surveillance as maneuver tasks with the production and dissemination of intelligence as a staff task. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is a continuous operation focused on the collection of relevant information that is analyzed to create intelligence and knowledge that informs the MAGTF commander's decision-making process. Civil-military operations requirements must be included in ISR plans so that resources are made available to examining civil issues impacting MAGTF plans. Examples would be collecting information on civil movement to ascertain key civilian lines of communications, tracking infrastructure build over time, or infantry units reconnoitering villages.

The sum total of aforementioned intelligence and information gathering efforts is to gain a greater appreciation for the operational environment. The degree of effort, amount of civil information, and need for expert cultural analysis must be accounted for in CMO planning. The magnitude and importance of collecting civil information requires an iterative process to manage
information. Civil information management, a civil affairs core task, allows commanders to build a complete common operating picture upon which to base operational planning and execution.

1007. Civil Affairs and Defense Support of Civil Authorities

According to Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), defense support of civil authorities is “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, [DOD] civilians, [DOD] contract personnel, [DOD] Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C. status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.”

Defense support of civil authorities domestic emergencies/activities include all-hazard disaster response operations working under differing legal authorities and chains of command when coordinating with and working alongside non-DOD, state, local, and tribal agencies. Civil Affairs Marines are familiar with DSCA and, due to their expertise in humanitarian assistance/disaster response, may be called upon to coordinate disaster response activities with Federal, State, and local civil authorities. DSCA involves limited authorities and express limitations placed on the scope of the federal military’s role (US Code, Title 18, § 1385, Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus).
CHAPTER 2

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

2000. Overview

Civil-military operations are an inherent command responsibility. They encompass the activities MAGTF commanders take to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations with civil authorities, the general population, and other organizations. MAGTF commanders are responsible for the organization and centralized direction of CMO in their operational areas to facilitate military operations in support of political and military objectives derived from national strategic objectives. Marines conduct CMO to coordinate the instruments of national power, minimize civil-military friction and threats from the civil component, maximize support for operations, and meet the commander’s legal obligations and moral responsibilities to the civilian populations within the operational area. While all Marines can conduct CMO, commanders may draw upon CA forces or other subject matter experts (SMEs) for advice and expertise. Within the Marine Corps and the other services are CA forces specially trained and organized for the planning and conduct of CMO. During operations, CA forces conduct activities that support and nest within the overall mission and commander’s intent.

Civil Affairs Marines have the ability to advise the MAGTF commander on CMO, assist the G-3/S-3 current and future operations planners with CMO, fulfill special staff member functions within the MAGTF, and satisfy duties as members of a supporting civil affairs unit. Civil Affairs Marines are specifically trained to consider and understand civil variables in the planning and conduct of operations, conduct civil assessments, utilize interpreters, manage projects, and manage a Civil-Military Operations Center. Throughout operations, CA Marines or Marines focused on CMO can contribute directly to mission success through negotiation, mediation, and facilitation of interaction among interorganizational partners and local populations. These Marines are trained in the understanding and inclusion of cultural considerations in planning,
training, and execution. They assist the commander in understanding and visualizing the civil component of the operating environment.

The CMO staff (G-9 or G-3/S-3 CMO) is the principal advisor to the commander and staff on CMO. The CMO staff:

- Facilitates the integration of CMO into operations and exercises with the G-3/S-3.
- Advises the MAGTF commander and G-3/S-3 on the capabilities, allocation, and employment of subordinate CA units and how they can enhance mission accomplishment.
- Provides specific country information for training or deployment.
- Develops the Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) to operation plans and orders.
- Coordinates with supporting CA forces to conduct interorganizational collaborative planning/coordination and integration of nonmilitary stakeholders with the staff to synchronize operations.
- Ensures the timely update of the civil component of the COP through the civil information management process.
- Prepares and maintains the CMO running estimate and advises the commander on the obligations incurred from the long- and short-term effects (economic, environmental, and health) of military operations on civilian populations.

**2001. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil Affairs Capabilities**

The Marine Corps CA force consists of designated Active and Reserve Component forces and personnel organized, trained, and equipped to support the MAGTF commander’s need to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO across the range of military operations. Civil Affairs Marines train in the five civil affairs core tasks of nation assistance, foreign humanitarian assistance, support to civil administration, populace and resources control, and civil information management.

**2002. Marine Civil Affairs Common Skills and Capabilities**

Civil Affairs Marines are capable of planning, coordinating, executing, assessing, and transitioning CMO in joint, combined, and interorganizational environments, while maintaining
the responsiveness and adaptability to operate in ambiguous situations. To meet these challenges, CA Marines are well-versed in the following common skill sets:

- **Civil Reconnaissance:** Civil Affairs Marines are specially educated and trained to perform civil reconnaissance missions in support of the MAGTF commander’s concept of operation.
- **Intelligence Preparation:** Civil Affairs Marines are educated and trained to account for civil considerations that facilitate operations, civil intelligence requirements, and the identification of civil information/intelligence requirements.
- **Civil-Military Engagement Plan:** As part of the Annex G, CA Marines are educated and trained to identify civil leadership and other individual influential civilian entities capable of facilitating or obstructing the MAGTF commander’s concept of operation. As a consequence of engagements facilitated by CA Marines, additional information will be produced, further contributing to the MAGTF commander’s overall understanding of the area of operations.
- **Medical:** Each reserve CA detachment has an organic public health team, and CA teams may be augmented with medical personnel.
- **Regional focus and cultural awareness:** Civil Affairs Marines are knowledgeable of regional geography, political, social, and economic systems. Civil Affairs Marines are familiar with specific regional religious and ethnic differences, and are able to operate within the cultures indigenous to the AOR.
- **Negotiation and mediation:** Civil Affairs Marines mediate, negotiate, and facilitate interaction among local and interorganizational partners.
- **Mission planning:** Civil Affairs Marines plan, prepare for, execute, and continually assess CA activities. CA Marines advise the MAGTF commander and staff in CMO, conduct CA support to mission planning, and prepare to transition CA activities to civil authorities.
- **Green cell:** Civil Affairs Marines are capable of analyzing the civil environment and wargaming civil considerations during planning.
- **Information Operations:** Civil Affairs Marines assist the MAGTF Information Operations Officer in integrating planned CMO into information operations to ensure that information operations and civil affairs are creating the most favorable effects for the MAGTF commander and are not at odds with the effects created in specific areas of the operational environment.
- **Targeting**: Civil Affairs Marines are familiar with the targeting process and can contribute civil information and civil considerations to both lethal and non-lethal targeting.

- **Assessments**: Civil Affairs Marines are familiar with monitoring and evaluation (M&E), development of MOP and MOE, and are capable of assessing operational objectives.

- **Project management**: Civil Affairs Marines use the six-step process to identify, validate, plan, coordinate, facilitate, and monitor both material and nonmaterial civil projects to achieve a supported commander’s objectives relating to the civil component of the operational environment.

- **Liaison**: Civil Affairs Marines are embedded into relevant supporting organizations to coordinate operations and articulate MAGTF objectives.

- **International Civilian Response**: Civil Affairs Marines are familiar with international civilian organizations (e.g., international organizations such as the UN and ICRC and NGOs such as Catholic Relief Services and the International Medical Corps) and can conduct or facilitate interorganizational coordination.

### 2003. Civil-Military Operations Organizational Elements

There are unique and specific organizational elements dedicated to conducting CMO. The following sections capture major entities and capabilities that commonly exist to accomplish CMO activities on behalf of the MAGTF commander.

**a. Civil-Military Operations Planners**

Civil-military operations planners support the MAGTF/GCE commander’s concept of operation. CMO planners are well-versed in MCPP and should participate in OPT efforts. They advise the commander and staff on the effects of the civil environment on the commander’s concept of operation.

**b. Civil Information Management Cell**

The CIM cell is located within the G-9. It collects civil information, enters it into a central database (MARCIMS), and fuses civil information with the supported element, higher headquarters, other USG/DOD agencies, and other agencies/organizations as appropriate.
Coordination among other elements will ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of raw and analyzed civil information to all levels throughout the AO.

c. Civil Affairs Group

A civil affairs group (CAG) provides the MAGTF commander with specially trained and organized civil affairs personnel in order to facilitate the planning, coordination, and execution of CMO. The CAG is a subordinate command of Marine Forces Reserve and will function either as an integral unit or in support of the gaining force commander; or will provide separate detachments, separate teams, staff augments, or liaison personnel. The CAG structure is explained in greater detail later in the chapter.

d. Civil Affairs Detachment (Active and Reserve Components)

Civil affairs detachments provide access, influence, visibility, and information. A Marine CA detachment is capable of planning, executing, and controlling CA activities and can perform any of the following functions: establish and run a CMOC, establish and run a CIM cell, conduct damage/solatia payments, nominate and manage projects, conduct physical assessments of structures, conduct civil engagements, conduct entry and exit polls at medical civic action program/dental civic action programs, and assist with providing essential services. They also coordinate the protection of arts, monuments, and archives, distribution of humanitarian aid supplies, establishment of dislocated civilian camps, evacuation of civilians from combat zones, and establishment of polling sites during elections.

e. Civil Affairs Team

The CA team is the basic civil affairs tactical support element provided to a supported commander. The CA team is capable of conducting civil reconnaissance and assessments of the civil component of the AO. CA teams assess the civil environment and atmospherics. They identify critical vulnerabilities and sources of instability and stability. They support Community Health Engagements, and support the building, maintaining, and/or sustaining of community relations. The success of the overarching CMO plan is predicated on the actions of the CA team
at the lowest tactical levels. The CA team, due to its limited size in personnel and capabilities, is focused on accomplishing specific CA tasks and leveraging higher headquarter elements for command and control support and operational reach-back for additional CA capabilities when required.

2004. Civil Affairs Units and Organization

Marine Corps CA forces currently consist of three active duty detachments, one assigned to each MEF, and four Reserve Component CAGs, each assigned to the force headquarters group as shown in figures 2-1 and 2-2.

The MEF detachments work in the MEF G-3 and can be tasked to support major subordinate elements as required. Forces from within the CAGs are requested through the Marine Forces Command, who will forward the request for forces to Marine Corps Forces Reserve. The CAGs have habitual relationships with MARFORs and MEFs where applicable:

- 1st CAG, in Camp Pendleton, CA, is aligned operationally with I MEF, and regionally with US Pacific Command (USPACOM); United States Marine Corps Forces, Pacific; US Central Command (USCENTCOM); and United States Marine Corps Forces, Central Command (MARFORCENT).
- 2D CAG, in Washington, DC, is aligned operationally with II MEF, and regionally with US European Command; US Africa Command; Marine Forces Europe and Africa; USCENTCOM (Levant); and MARFORCENT.
- 3D CAG, in Great Lakes, IL, is aligned operationally with III MEF; United States Marine Corps Forces, Pacific; Special Operations Command; and US Marine Corps Forces North and regionally with USPACOM.
- 4th CAG, in Hialeah, FL, is aligned operationally with MARFOR SOUTH and II MEF (in support of 2D CAG) and regionally with USCENTCOM, MARFORCENT, and SOUTHCOM.

This operational and regional alignment between forces can facilitate integration and interoperability, strengthen mutual trust, improve unity of effort, and provide more effective
synchronization of activities in order to ensure successful planning and execution of operations. This does not limit the CAG’s relationships or ability to work with or for other forces.

In addition to previously described CA forces, CMO planners are located throughout the Active Component in some of the MEFs, MEBs, MEUs, and regiments, as shown in figure 2-1. These CMO Planners aid the commander’s decision-making ability by providing a civil perspective and conducting integrated planning with the other staff sections throughout the planning process.

![Figure 2-1. US Marine Civil Affairs Total Force Structure (as of 2016)](image)

As a planner and advisor, the senior CMO planner must ensure that the CMO working group participates in the MAGTF planning effort. The CMO working group consists of all CMO planners, any attached CA forces not currently employed, other augmentation as necessary (cultural SMEs, governance/development SMEs), and where applicable, interagency, international organization, and NGO liaisons. Civil affairs detachments may assist in the planning effort; however, the primary purpose of the CA detachment is to operate away from
headquarters to collect civil information, provide civil assessments, facilitate civil engagements, monitor the progress of a unit’s CMO, and support the regimental combat team (RCT) or MAGTF commander’s concept of operations.

Commanders can request civil affairs forces beyond their organic capabilities in the same manner as any other request for forces. The Active Component detachments are administratively attached to the MEF headquarters group and operationally to the G-3 when the MEF headquarters group is not deployed. These detachments (and their teams) are designed to be the MEF’s immediate (“fly-away”) capability when CA support is required for a quick reaction to a crisis response, contingency operation, or theater security cooperation event. They should be deployed first, with the intent to replace them with Reserve Component forces from the CAG as soon as possible to allow the Active Component detachment to be used for follow-on events. The CAG may take longer to deploy, normally 90 days, but they normally possess a greater depth of CMO knowledge, civilian skills beneficial to mission accomplishment, and specialized teams. Civil affairs detachments/teams may remain under the control of the MEF/CAG and serve in a general support role to subordinate units but are more often under the operational control of the MEB, RCT, MEU, or BLT. In this case, the subordinate unit is responsible for the logistics and security of the attached CA force. Command and control of these forces will be at the discretion of the commander.

An Active Component detachment is led by a major and consists of 51 Marines. It is designed to be broken into six CA teams. A CAG is commanded by a colonel and consists of 171 Marines and eight sailors. Their structures are shown in figures 2-2 and 2-3.
The CAG has four detachments, each comprised of three CA teams and a headquarters element with unique capabilities meant to complement their Active Component counterparts. Marine CA teams are generalists in nature, meaning that they do not contain specialists with regards to...
governance, ROL, economics, infrastructure, etc. They can, however, be augmented by the larger group or detachments with such specialties as necessary. The following are examples of unique CAG capabilities:

**a. Civil Liaison Team**

The civil liaison team is made of the interorganizational integration officer and a liaison officer from each detachment. Each team is tasked organized and formed as required. The civil liaison team facilitates collaborative civil-military efforts with other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and international organizations.

**b. Public Health Team**

A public health team consists of a doctor (naval officer) and hospital corpsman from the public health section, and the environmental health officer from each detachment. Each team is tasked organized and formed as required. The purpose of the public health team is to address immediate health and medical issues and to coordinate services with other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and international organizations. The public health team can be used to support community health engagements.

**c. Displaced Persons / Refugee Team**

A displaced persons / refugee team consist of a displaced personnel / references officer, environmental health officer, and a civil affairs specialist. Each team is tasked organized and formed as required. The purpose of the displaced persons team is to coordinate maneuver units and host nation planning and management of DC routes, collection points, assembly areas and camps.

**d. International Law / Claims Team**

An international law/claims team consists of a staff judge advocate (SJA) and two civil affairs specialists per detachment. Each team is tasked organized and formed as required and may include the rule of law officer or contracting officer from the G-9 Branch. The purpose of the
international law/claims team is to provide local area legal advice to the MAGTF commander and to assist in the adjudication of civil claims against the USG.

**2005. Civil Affairs Forces Concept of Employment**

Marine CA forces are task organized to support traditional MAGTF structure. A CA team will normally deploy in support of a MEU or battalion, a CA detachment is organized to support a MEB or RCT, and a CAG is designed to support a MEF, MEB, or JTF. These are guidelines and are adaptable to the needs of the mission. Civil-military operations planners and CA Marines should be utilized at the earliest possible opportunity.

Having CA forces in the initial wave can help shape perception efforts with the civil population and authorities and support mission accomplishment. Civil affairs forces should deploy with the initial entry force, allowing them to gain situational awareness by conducting preliminary assessments. Village/town assessments and civil engagements can also help locate and isolate adversarial forces or organizations. They can assist lead elements ensuring they meet all legal and moral obligations to civilian populations in the AO. Using their unique skill sets, CA Marines can help enhance freedom of action by maximizing civilian support and friendly force access to resources while minimizing civilian disruptions to MAGTF operations. CMO planners and CA Marines should participate in planning from the beginning to ensure successful transition of operations to interorganizational partners.

**2006. Command and Control**

A MAGTF commander may decide to augment his organic CMO cell within the G-3 and establish a G-9 CMO. Once established, the G-9 conducts an initial assessment to determine the CA force augmentation requirements for the MAGTF. The section will coordinate with the other staff sections of the MAGTF by participating in various boards, working groups, and the OPT as required. Typically, at the MEF level, a G-9 watch officer will be established within the combat operations center. The G-9 will send liaison officers to higher commands and external organizations.
When an entire CAG is activated, the CAG commander as the senior CA/CMO subject matter expert, will normally serve as the G-9. The CAG is structured to operate as augments integrated within the MAGTF or as a unit within the MEF. The CAG will not operate as a maneuver element, but as a force provider. Forces from the CAG will support the gaining force commander as a detachment, separate teams, staff augments, or liaison elements. In this case, the MEF detachment will also fall under the G-9 for tasking. One example is shown in figure 2-4.

![Diagram of MEF CG structure](attachment://figure_2-4.png)

**ACE** aviation combat element  
**BCT** brigade combat team  
**Det** detachment  
**LCE** logistics combat element

**Figure 2-4. Example of Civil Affairs Integration into a MEF**

At all levels, the future planning cell should include a CMO planner. For MEB- or RCT-level activities, consideration should be given to using the MEF detachment or requesting a detachment from the CAG. If a MEU requests a CA team, it may be attached to any of the major subordinate elements or serve in GS of the MEU, as the situation allows. During combat, the team may be attached to the GCE, whereas during a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
scenario, the team may be in direct support of the logistics combat element, depending on the considerations of the commanding officer. Command and control structure will be largely dependent on METT-T and civil considerations or at the discretion of the commander. One example is shown below in figure 2-5.

Figure 2-5. Example Detachment Augmentation of both a MEB and a MEU

When there is a need for MAGTF CMO planning, but less of a requirement for CA forces, a G-9 may be stood up without activating a CAG. In this case, school trained CMO Planners can be organized into a G-9 or a CMO planning cell. Also, within the CAG headquarters detachment, a G-9 branch exists that can quickly fall in on an existing MAGTF CMO cell to create the G-9 (see figure 2-7). This augmentation cell is well suited for a MEF (forward) or even a JTF and is the only place within Marine Corps civil affairs that these unique capabilities can be found. In addition to their operations section and CIM cell, two areas normally found in a CA unit, the CAG G-9 branch also contains a budgeting section, a support section, and a functional specialist section. The first two contain military occupational specialty (MOS) trained financial management personnel and logistics personnel, respectively. The functional specialist section includes personnel designated to perform special functions relating to governance, medical services, education, ROL, and economic development.
The G-9 is the principal coordinating staff officer for synchronizing and integrating CMO. The G-9 conducts the initial assessment during mission analysis that determines CA force augmentation requirements. The G-9 staff provides direction and staff oversight of the supporting CA unit during mission execution; however, they are not in command of those forces.

The G-9 and his staff ensure each COA effectively integrates civil considerations (the “C” of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available (METT-T) and civil considerations). The G-9 and his staff consider not only tactical issues but also logistics support issues. Care of DCs is of particular concern. The G-9 analysis considers the impact of operations on public order and safety, the potential for disaster relief requirements, NEO, SCA, and protection of culturally significant sites. If the unit does not have an assigned G-9, the commander may assign these responsibilities to another staff member.

The G-9 enhances the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and personnel in the AO to ensure mission success. The G-9 has staff planning and oversight responsibility for:

- Managing assigned and attached CA forces.
- Coordinating all aspects of the relationship between the military force and the civil component in the operational environment.
- Advising the commander on the effect of military operations on the civilian populations.
- Minimizing civilian interference with operations. This includes DC operations, curfews, movement restrictions, and deconflicting civilian and military activities with due regard for the safety and rights of refugees and internally displaced persons.
- Coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating civil-military plans, programs, and policies with national and combatant command strategic objectives.
- Advising on the prioritization and monitoring of expenditures of allocated Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA), payroll and other funds dedicated to CMO objectives. The G-9 ensures subordinate units understand the movement, security, and control of funds. The G-9 coordinates with the fund controlling authority/financial manager to meet the commander’s objectives.
- Coordinating and integrating contingency planning for CMO-related products.
- Managing additional personnel assigned to the CMO staff.
- Coordinating and integrating area assessments and area studies in support of CMO.
- Supporting emergency management and civic action projects.
- Supporting protection of culturally significant sites.
- Supporting FHA.
- Supporting emergency distribution of food, shelter, clothing, and fuel for local civilians.
- Supporting PRC operations.
- Staff coordination for the integration of civil information into the COP.
- Ensuring the effective integration of the civil considerations into the planning cycle.

To plan and orchestrate unit operations, in peace or in war, the supported unit’s operations officer must rely heavily upon items from the G-2/S-2 and the G-9, such as:

- Civil inputs to the COP.
- Threat assessments that account for potential enemy actions and reactions to planned CMO.
- Analysis of civil information that identifies concerns of population groups within the projected AO and potential flash points that can result in civil strife and violence.
- Cultural awareness briefings.
- Situational and planning maps.
- Overlays (in this instance, overlays of DC movement routes, critical infrastructure, and significant social, religious, and cultural shrines, monuments, and facilities).

The unit’s operations officer plans and integrates the overall operations effort. The unit G-9 plans, coordinates, and provides staff oversight of CMO and civilian component issues through direct coordination with the operations officer. Throughout this process, the G-9 staff continuously ensures the fusion of the civil inputs received from subordinate CA elements, maneuver elements, other government agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and host nation sources to the unit commander’s COP.

Figure 2-6 and subsequent sections provide specific information on specific functional specialist billets and MOSs within the CAG.
The purpose of ROL operations is to create security and stability for the civilian population by restoring and enhancing the effective and fair administration and enforcement of justice. ROL operations are of great importance in stability operations and are an important aspect of security sector reform. ROL operations are particularly significant in the immediate aftermath of major ground combat operations, when it is imperative to restore order to the civilian population in the vacuum that almost inevitably results when combat disrupts the routine administration of the society. Close coordination is critical between the ROL and governance sections for synchronization and synergy of efforts to restore, reform, and assist the court and legal system and the public safety system. A judicial system is powerless without an effective public safety system, whereas a public safety system is not legitimate without a fair and efficient judicial system.

ROL operations include measures to:

- Provide for the restoration of order in the immediate aftermath of military operations.
- Restore and enhance the operation of the court system, to include vetting and training judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, legal advisors and administrators, and restoring and equipping court and administrative facilities.
▪ Restore and reform the host nation civil and criminal legal system, to include reviewing and revising statutes, codes, decrees, and other laws to ensure compliance with international legal standards, as well as adopting interim measures for the immediate administration of justice.
▪ Provide for an effective corrections system that complies with international standards, to include selecting, vetting, and training corrections officials, and constructing or renovating appropriate facilities.

ROL operations are seldom exclusively a military or even a USG activity. ROL operations must be a collaborative effort involving:

▪ United States military assets, including military police, engineers, combat forces, logistics elements, legal personnel, and CA personnel.
▪ Other agencies of the federal government, to include DOS, Department of Justice (DOJ), and USAID.
▪ Interorganizational partners.
▪ Coalition and other national elements, including military and civilian agencies.
▪ Nongovernmental organizations engaged in judicial and legal reform.
▪ Host nation legal professionals, including judges, prosecutors, defense counsels, legal advisors, legal administrators, and legal educators.
▪ Host nation law enforcement personnel, including administrators, police, investigators, and trainers.
▪ Other host nation government officials.

In CA organizations and task-organized forces based on CA organizations, attached SJA personnel, civil affairs public safety specialists with law enforcement backgrounds, and others with backgrounds in judicial administration, corrections, and other relevant areas carry out ROL operations. Commanders may detail ROL section personnel to work with a host nation, interagency, international, or other group carrying out ROL operations. The judge advocates in the ROL section must have extensive training in international law, comparative law, and human rights law.

(1) Functions
• Evaluating and assisting in developing transitional decrees, codes, ordinances, and other measures intended to bring immediate order to areas in which the host nation legal system is impaired or nonfunctioning.
• Evaluating the reform of host nation laws to ensure compliance with international legal standards and providing appropriate assistance to the drafting and review process when necessary.
• Evaluating legal training given to host nation judges, prosecutors, defense counsels, and legal advisors, and providing appropriate training when necessary.
• Evaluating the legal training given police and corrections officials to ensure compliance with international human rights standards.
• Serving as judges, magistrates, prosecutors, defense counsels, and legal advisors for transitional courts.
• Evaluating legal and administrative procedures to ensure compliance with international law, the law of the power administering the territory, and the law of the supported country.
• Determining which host nation offices and functions have the legal authority to evaluate, reform, and implement the law.
• Advising US military commanders and US, international, and host nation authorities on the status of the host nation legal system and its compliance with international standards and providing recommended reforms.
• Advising US military commanders and others on the application of international law, US domestic law, and host nation law to the process of restoring and enhancing ROL in the host nation.

Normally, a senior SJA (typically a lieutenant colonel or colonel) is assigned to act as the SJA and senior ROL officer for the MEB or MEF or other organization conducting CMO. The SJA/senior ROL officer has two functions: as the SJA, he is the legal advisor to the commander and is on the commander’s personal staff. As the senior ROL officer, he is the chief of the ROL section. The SJA/senior ROL officer provides staff supervision of ROL operations and other legal activities of the judge advocates in the organization. The SJA/senior ROL officer is under the technical supervision of the SJA of the higher-level command or task force.
(2) Capabilities

The ROL section is organized to:

- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of the host nation legal systems and the impact of those on joint force CMO strategy.
- Evaluate the host nation legal system, to include reviewing statutes, codes, decrees, regulations, procedures, and legal traditions for compliance with international standards, and advising and assisting the host nation and other ROL participants in the process of developing transitional codes and procedures and long-term legal reform.
- Evaluate the personnel, judicial infrastructure, and equipment of the host nation court system to determine requirements for training, repair, construction, and acquisition.
- Provide support to transitional justice, to include acting as judges, magistrates, prosecutors, defense counsels, legal advisors, and court administrators when required.
- Coordinate ROL efforts involving US and coalition military, other US agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and host nation authorities.
- Assist the SJA in educating and training US personnel in the indigenous legal system, obligations, and consequences.
- Advise and assist the SJA in international and host nation legal issues as required.
- Assist the SJA with regard to status-of-forces agreement and status-of-mission agreement issues.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government public safety systems to support penal systems’ administration.

b. Economic Stability Functional Area Specialty

The economic stability section consists of functional specialists in economic fields and business administration. It provides technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command. The section assesses government, corporate, and private resources and systems. Using these assessments, based on the civilian skills of its members, the team determines how to assist in the efficient management of resources, goods, and services to enhance the viability of the society’s economic system. The economic stability section provides
recommendations and, when appropriate, directions to maintain, sustain, and improve economic systems and services. Skills found in this section include economists, bankers, civilian supply and distribution technicians, business administrators, entrepreneurs, agriculturalists and farmers, food specialists and technicians, marketing and distribution specialists, and other officer and enlisted personnel whose civilian skills make them suitable for improving a nation’s economic system.

(1) Functions

The economic stability section has a number of functions; specifically, this section:

- Develops plans, policies, and procedures and provides operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing food and agricultural systems and agencies for producing, processing, storing, transporting, distributing, and marketing.
- Coordinates the use of indigenous government and commercial food and agricultural resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
- Assists in coordinating IPI, international organizations, NGOs, and US assistance and resources to support food and agricultural systems as part of CMO (crop and livestock improvement, agricultural training, and education).
- Develops plans, policies, and procedures and provides operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing economic and commercial systems, agencies, and resources.
- Develops and implements plans to reduce or mitigate black-market activities.
- Conducts liaison and coordinates with local government administration agencies and commercial enterprises in support of CMO.
- In coordination with the SJA, ensures compliance with international laws and conventions regarding use of labor and when acquiring and using local resources (supplies, equipment, and facilities).
- Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing government and commercial supply systems and facilities.
- Facilitates the coordination of government, commercial, and private property, facilities, supplies, equipment, and other resources for military use, CMO, and government administration.
In coordination with the SJA, establishes policies and procedures on custody and administration of public and private property.

(2) Capabilities

The economic stability section is organized to:

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing food and agriculture systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of food and agricultural systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for food and agricultural resources (livestock, poultry, grain, vegetables, fruit, fish, fiber, and forestry) management to support government administration.
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining food and agricultural systems and agencies.
- Assist in coordinating IPI, international organizations, NGOs, and US assistance and resources to support food and agricultural systems as part of CMO (crop and livestock improvement, agricultural training, and education).
- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in monitoring and assessing the indigenous economy, economic systems, commercial activities, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of economic systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Advise and assist with budgetary systems, monetary and fiscal policies, revenue-producing systems, and treasury operations.
- Advise and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating economic and commerce systems, agencies, and organizations.
- Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements of employing economic controls (price controls, rationing programs, prevention of black-market activities, monetary and fiscal policies, and labor).
▪ Advise and assist in employing local commercial resources, including labor, to support
government administration, CMO, and military use.
▪ Assist in coordinating IPI, international organizations, NGOs, and US assistance and
resources to support local economic development as part of CMO.
▪ Advise and assist the SJA and contracting officials concerning indigenous peoples’ cultural
intricacies.
▪ Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing public and
commercial supply systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
▪ Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of civilian supply systems and the impact of
those systems on CMO.
▪ Determine the availability of local supplies.
▪ Identify private and public property available for military use.
▪ Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government and commercial
supply systems and agencies.
▪ Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements for government and
commercial supply resources to support government administration (transportation, storage,
distribution [including rationing], and the use of captured and salvaged items).

c. Infrastructure Functional Area Specialty

The infrastructure section consists of functional specialists in public works, transportation,
utilities, and communications. It provides technical expertise, staff advice, and planning
assistance to the supported command. The section assesses the indigenous public infrastructure
and systems. Using these assessments and the civilian skills of its members, the team, in
coordination with United States Army Corps of Engineers, USAID, host nation officials, and
vetted contractors, determines methods to design, build, and maintain the organizations, the
architecture, and the systems required to support transportation, water, sanitation,
communications, and power. The infrastructure section provides recommendations and, when
appropriate, directions to maintain, sustain, and improve the indigenous public systems and
services, such as transportation, utilities, and postal systems. Some skills required in this section
include engineers (civil, mechanical, electrical, and environmental); water and sanitation
specialists; electrical distribution specialists and administrators; road construction, telephone, radio, and television specialists; and other officers and enlisted personnel whose civilian skills make them suitable for improving a nation’s basic infrastructure. The intent is to return these systems to locally acceptable levels or pre-conflict levels.

(1) Functions

The infrastructure section has a number of functions; specifically, this section:

- Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing transportation equipment, facilities, and systems.
- Facilitates the coordination of government and commercial transportation resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
- Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public works and utilities equipment, facilities, and systems.
- Facilitates the coordination of government and commercial public works and utilities equipment, facilities, and systems for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
- Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing communication equipment, facilities, and systems.
- Facilitates the coordination of government, commercial, and private communication equipment, facilities, and systems for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.

(2) Capabilities

The infrastructure section is organized to:

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing foreign nation or host nation public and commercial transportation systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of transportation systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial transportation resources to support government administration (motor vehicles and roads, trains and railways, boats and waterways, aircraft and airports, and pipelines).

Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government transportation systems and agencies.

Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing foreign nation or host nation public and commercial works and utilities systems, agencies, services, and facilities.

Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public works and utilities systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial works and utilities resources to support government administration (electric power; natural gas; water production and distribution; sewage collection, treatment, and disposal; sanitation; and public facilities).

Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining government works and utilities systems and agencies.

Assist in employing (coordinating) public works and utilities resources to support government administration and CMO.

Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing government and commercial communication systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.

Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of communication systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial communications resources to support government administration (postal services, telephone, radio, television, computer systems, and print media).

Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government communications systems and agencies.

d. Public Health and Welfare Functional Area Specialty
The public health and welfare section consists of functional specialists qualified in public health and medical services. It provides technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command in creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the institutions and processes through which a society maintains the physical, mental, and social health of its people. Some professions required in this section may include doctors, dentists, hospital administrators, nurses, veterinarians, public health specialists, environmental scientists and specialists, museum curators, archivists, and others whose civilian duties include health and welfare management in addition to arts, monuments, and archives.

(1) Functions

The public health and welfare section has a number of functions; specifically, this section:

- Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public health systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.
- Coordinates the use of IPI government and private sector health resources for use in CMO and in support of host nation government administration.
- Assists in coordinating IPI, international organizations, NGOs, and US assistance and resources to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.
- Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public welfare systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.
- Assists in familiarizing, educating, and training US personnel in the foreign nation or host nation social, cultural, religious, ethnic characteristics, codes of behavior, and language.
- Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in protecting, preserving, and restoring significant cultural property and facilities (religious buildings, shrines and consecrated places, museums, monuments, art, archives, and libraries).
- Assists in locating, identifying, and safeguarding cultural property and in determining ownership.

(2) Capabilities

The public health and welfare section is organized to:
- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing IPI public and private health systems, animal husbandry systems, sanitation systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of health and sanitation systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public health services and resources to support government administration (clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, food preparation and storage, ambulance transportation, skilled personnel, and education).
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government public health systems and agencies.
- Advise and assist IPI, international organizations, NGOs, and US agencies in preventing, controlling, and treating diseases among both human and animal populations (education, immunization, and sanitation).
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public welfare systems regarding the most vulnerable portion of the population (mentally handicapped, aged, infirmed, women, and children) and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government public welfare systems and agencies.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public welfare services and resources to support government administration.
- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on host nation social and cultural matters and determine the impact of those matters on social well-being of the society and the possible effects on CMO.
- Advise and assist in locating, identifying, preserving, and protecting significant cultural property.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government, community, and private systems and agencies to protect, preserve, and restore cultural property.
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining cultural property systems and agencies.

e. Public Education and Information Functional Area Specialty
The public education and information section consists of functional specialists in education and information services. It provides technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command in designing, resourcing, and implementing public education and information programs and systems through media and formal education institutions. Some skills required in this section include educators at all levels, education specialists, school administrators, public relations personnel, media and marketing specialists, and others whose civilian duties include education and information management.

(1) Functions

The public education and information section has a number of functions; specifically, this section:

- Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public education systems, agencies, facilities, and resources.
- Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in the use of host nation mass communication in support of CMO and the supported commander’s inform and influence objectives.
- Recommends information control and civil censorship policies in occupied territory.

(2) Capabilities

The public education and information section is organized to:

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing host nation public, parochial, and private education systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of education systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for the public education system to support government administration (primary, secondary, postsecondary, and technical educational systems).
Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining public education systems and agencies.

Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of government, commercial, and private mass communication systems and determine the impact of those systems on the populace and the possible effects on CMO.

Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing mass communication themes and the impact on inform and influence objectives.

Advise and assist host nation institutions in developing and coordinating public relations activities to support government administration and the “single voice” message.

f. Governance Functional Area Specialty

The governance section consists of functional specialists in public administration and services (excluding public health and welfare, cultural relations, and education). It provides technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command in creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the institutions and processes that govern, protect, and bring prosperity to a society. Some skills required in this section include public administrators, public safety administrators and managers, environmental administrators and managers, and other administrators whose civilian duties include upper-level management of any public institutions at various levels (e.g., city, county, local, state, federal).

(1) Functions

The governance section has a number of functions; specifically, this section:

- Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public administration systems, agencies, and resources.
- Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public safety systems, equipment, and facilities.
- Assists in employing public safety resources to support government administration, CMO, and military use.
- Coordinates with host nation government administrators and agencies in support of CMO.
Develops plans and provides operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing environmental resource management systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.

Coordinates host nation government and private environmental management resources for military use, CMO, and support of the government administration to mitigate, prepare, respond to, and recover from environmental activities.

(2) Capabilities

The governance section is organized to:

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing foreign nation or host nation public administration systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public administration systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing indigenous public safety systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public safety systems and the impact of those systems on the supported commander’s mission.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government public safety systems to support government administration (police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, and emergency rescue).
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government public safety systems and agencies.
- Advise and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating public government systems and agencies.
- Advise and assist in developing technical administrative requirements, policies, and procedures for providing government services to the local population.
- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing foreign nation environmental and pollution control systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of environmental and pollution control systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for environmental management services and resources to support government administration (plans, policies, and procedures to protect natural resources and provide pollution control).
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government environmental management systems and agencies.
- Advise, assist, and support the coordination of IPI, international organizations, NGOs, and US assistance and resources to support local government environmental management as part of CMO.

2008. Civil-Military Operations Considerations per Warfighting Functions

Civil-military operations activities are tasks that support the MAGTF commander’s operational design and accomplishment of overall objectives. Military operations inherently involve interaction with civil authorities and civil populace; therefore, CMO considerations naturally correspond to the warfighting functions construct and are instrumental in planning and execution.

a. How Civil-Military Operations Facilitate Command and Control

The most important aspect of CMO is establishing collaborative relationships among military forces, government, and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace. The establishment of command and control mechanisms like the CMOC is illustrative of an important CMO function that directly supports aspects of command and control as it relates to collaborating with interorganizational partners and providing the MAGTF commander with relevant civil information vital to making operational decisions.

b. How Civil-Military Operations Facilitate Maneuver

Civil-military operations facilitates maneuver in two distinctive ways. The first category is ensuring freedom of movement within the civil populace and preventing civil interference. The second category is ensuring freedom of movement though geopolitical landscapes. Both
categories have a common civil component, whereby, civil engagement with key stakeholders is vital to successful operations. A specific example is DC operations.

c. How Civil-Military Operations Facilitate Fires

In the targeting process, CMO planners can aid in lethal and nonlethal targeting solutions by identifying sources of stability and instability. For lethal targeting, CMO planners can weigh the potential unintended consequences of targeting malign civilian actors and present this information to the commander. The CMO planner can help determine whether the prosecution of a selected target would cause greater damage to local resiliencies. Additionally, the commander must determine the consequences of damaging culturally important sites during targeting that may negatively influence the populace toward the MAGTF mission.

d. How Civil-Military Operations Facilitate Intelligence

There are many opportunities for overlap between CA forces and human intelligence. When conducting IPB, CMO Planners use what is known as the ASCOPE-PMESII analysis method. ASCOPE stands for the six elements in the civil arena: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. PMESII stands for political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure. When combined ASCOPE-PMESII serves as one analytical tool for assessing the civil environment.

Areas address terrain analysis from the civilian perspective such as political boundaries, special financial or agricultural regions, and trade routes. Structures include critical infrastructure, protected cultural sites, and other significant buildings such as schools, hospitals, and detention facilities. Capabilities are the ability of the local authorities to provide key functions and services, including those that save, sustain, or enhance life. Organizations include all non-military groups or institutions within the AO that interact with or influence the populace. People refer to not only formal and informal key actors, but also persons of historic and cultural significance. Events can be routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that have significant effect on the civilian populace or on MAGTF operations. Examples include festivals, holidays, harvest season, floods, and market days. When the CMO planner is conducting
assessments, this method (table 2-1) will aid in examining the civil dimension and should be used when planning operations.

Table 2-1. Example ASCOPE-PMESII Analysis Method

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A Area</th>
<th>P Political</th>
<th>M Military</th>
<th>E Economic</th>
<th>S Social</th>
<th>I Information</th>
<th>I Infrastructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional district boundary, party affiliation areas,</td>
<td>Army Response Force/ambush/IED sites</td>
<td>Agricultural areas, livestock, city centers</td>
<td>Traditional picnic areas, bazaar sites</td>
<td>Radio/TV/paper coverage areas, word of mouth gathering points</td>
<td>Irrigation networks, water tables, areas with medical services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Structures</td>
<td>Regional district centers, halls, polling sites</td>
<td>Military zones, police Gendarmerie HQ,</td>
<td>banks</td>
<td>Mosque, wedding halls, restaurants</td>
<td>#Cellular, radio, TV towers, print shops</td>
<td>Roads, bridges, electrical lines, dams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Capabilities</td>
<td>Dispute resolution, local leadership, ability to have impact</td>
<td>Gendarmerie – national police/providing 24/7 security? QRF present? strength/weapons</td>
<td>Ability to withstand drought, development</td>
<td>Strength of tribal/village traditional structures, Mullahs</td>
<td>Literacy rate, availability of electronic media, phone service</td>
<td>Ability to build/maintain roads, walls, check dams, irrigation systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Organizations</td>
<td>Political parties, group affiliation, government &amp; nongovernmental organizations</td>
<td>political groups present</td>
<td>Banks, large landholders, cooperatives, economic zones, NGOs</td>
<td>Tribes, families, sport youth groups</td>
<td>News organizations, influential mosques, IO groups</td>
<td>Government Ministries, construction companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P People</td>
<td>Governors, councils, elder mullahs, parliamentarians</td>
<td>Military zone–Gendarmerie commanders, military leaders</td>
<td>Bankers, landholders, merchants,</td>
<td>Mullahs, elders, influential families</td>
<td>Media owners, mullahs, elders, heads of families</td>
<td>Builders, road contractors, local development councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Events</td>
<td>Elections, regional council meetings, speeches</td>
<td>Lethal events, unit, loss of leadership, operations</td>
<td>Drought, harvest, business openings</td>
<td>Friday prayers, holidays, weddings, bazaar days</td>
<td>Friday prayers, IO campaigns, project openings, vehicle check point incidents</td>
<td>Road/bridge construction, well digging, center/school construction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Legend:

IED  improvised explosive device  IO  information operations
MFDC  Movement of Democratic Forces  QRF  quick reaction force
TV  television

**e. How Civil-Military Operations Facilitate Logistics**

Civil-military operations planners facilitate logistics by coordinating the use of MAGTF logistics assets to support civil activities without diminishing combat power and leveraging civilian capabilities to quickly transition civil activities to competent civil authorities. Civil-military operations planners attempt to leverage local contracting where possible or desirable to minimize and seek minimal usage of MAGTF assets to support disaster relief efforts by concentrating relief effort to essential support.


During CMO, force protection goes beyond considering enemy actions and addresses the civilian populace as well. Successfully CMO efforts win the support of the local populace and increase the ability to distinguish malign actors from innocent civilians. A potential consequence of maintaining open lines of communications with the civil populace is the likelihood of receiving early warning to US forces of impending attacks and providing information on any other suspicious activity.
CHAPTER 3
COORDINATION WITH CIVILIAN COUNTERPARTS

3000. Overview

Successful CMO requires effective coordination. Effective coordination requires fostering relationships and building rapport with civilian counterparts. Civil-military operations require a fundamental understanding of the functions of their civilian counterparts but more importantly effective coordination and communication. The MAGTF must master those skills and coordination methods. This includes gaining an understanding and appreciation of the cultural differences of civilian counterparts. Civilian counterparts may include the host nation, international organizations, NGOs, private industry, and the interagency and will likely be on the ground before the arrival of the MAGTF.

Many civilian organizations and agencies have unique skills, resources and experiences that can contribute to common goals or end states. It is imperative to look for these complementary skills and knowledge and foster vital links with economic, political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and informational entities pertinent to the operation.

During the decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the international community found itself in two protracted land-based complex operations; operations that required a robust presence of both the USG and other partner nations. These operations have called for the interface of the MAGTF and civilians such as the integration of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). This chapter focuses on civilian partners with whom the MAGTF may engage in civil-military operations.
3001. United States Government Agencies (The Interagency)

The interagency (IA) refers to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense.

The discussion in this chapter will focus more on details that highlight how to work effectively with these organizations. The following USG agencies are the most likely partners during the conduct of CMO.

For more systematic oversight and informational details on these and other USG agencies with which DOD has frequent interactions, refer to Annexes in Appendix A of JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations* and Marine Corps Technical Publication 3-03C, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Interorganizational Coordination*.

a. The United States Department of State

The US Department of State (DOS) is the USG agency responsible for planning and implementing the foreign policy of the United States. The DOS leads and coordinates US interagency participation that includes not only the US, but also the host nation, other nations, international organizations, cooperating nongovernmental organizations, and other participants. In most cases primary coordination occurs with the country team. Major responsibilities include oversight of official United States representation abroad, managing foreign assistance and foreign military training programs, countering international crime, and providing an array of services to US citizens as well as foreign nationals seeking entrance to the US.

The DOS is divided into offices and bureaus that are either functional or regional (similar to the way CCMDs are organized.). Within a normal Embassy overseas, the DOS’s principal relationship with DOD is to ensure that defense activities support national foreign policy and to facilitate defense activities overseas. In its role as facilitator of defense activities overseas, DOS approaches foreign governments through high-level visits, or contact with foreign government representatives in the US to negotiate agreements or obtain authorization for defense activities in the sovereign territory of the foreign country.
(1) Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration

The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM) provides aid and sustainable solutions for refugees, victims of conflict and stateless people around the world, through repatriation, local integration, and resettlement in the United States. There may be a BPRM officer assigned to the US embassy. The BPRM officer will be in charge of resettlement and issues that affect migration within the host nation. They will likely interface with international organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration and may in some cases fund these international organizations. It is important to note that BPRM is the lead agency with regards to refugee populations and USAID takes the lead with internally displaced populations.

The much vaunted “whole of government” approach rests on the unexamined but seriously flawed premise that technical experience is readily transferable between cultures. In practice the theory has serious flaws. To improve results requires acknowledging the defects in the theory, instituting new kinds of training of Foreign Service and developmental professionals, adjusted structures in mission leadership, reevaluation of risks appropriate for civilians, and lengthened tours by military and senior leaders to put political and cultural learning into practice.

Strategic Realities in Irregular Conflict
Franklin D. Kramer and Melanne Civic
January 10, 2013

(2) Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

In recognition of the impact that DOD activities have on US foreign affairs, DOS has assigned a single bureau, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), to be its primary interface with DOD. The PM manages political military relations throughout the world, including training and assistance for foreign militaries, and works to maintain global access for US military forces. The PM promotes responsible US defense trade, while controlling foreign access to military technology through export controls. The PM also coordinates US programs that help rid
countries of landmines and other conventional weapons. The PM helps protect national security by leading interagency efforts to plan for future crises—including planning US responses to cyberspace-attacks against vital computer networks or to CBRN attacks overseas.

(3) Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations

The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) supports the Department’s conflict and crisis-response efforts through locally grounded analysis, strategic planning, and operational support for local partners. The CSO was formerly known as the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The CSO provides overseas assistance through conflict analysis, strategic planning, and SME support. The CSO helps develop prioritized strategies that target the causes of instability and address high-risk periods such as elections or political transitions. They also assist the USG and host nation with plans focusing on local initiatives to connect media, community leaders, technical experts, and under-represented groups.

b. The United States Agency for International Development

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provides and manages US foreign economic and humanitarian assistance programs around the world. USAID is an independent federal government agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. The USAID is sometimes mistakenly seen as an integral part of DOS. The USAID is the development arm of the USG whereas the DOS is the policy and diplomatic arm. In general, USAID prefers to be seen as distinct and separate from their DOS counterparts. USAID offices are often separate from the US embassy and known as the USAID “Mission”, not to be confused with the US mission which is another way to refer to the US embassy. United States Agency for International Development objectives are ordinarily promulgated in the form of a Country Development Cooperation Strategy.

The USAID implements programs in five functional areas: 1) environment 2) population and health, 3) democracy, 4) economic growth and 5) humanitarian assistance and support for post-crisis transitions.
Most of USAID is dedicated to long-term development. This is contrasted with the offices that focus on post-crisis and humanitarian assistance. These latter offices fall into the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA). The MAGTF will most likely interface with staff members from the DCHA Bureau.

The USAID is divided into functional and regional bureaus and offices, similar to DOS. United States Agency for International Development employees are either technical SMEs (as reflected in the five programming areas) or provide admin support. The Agency does not implement programs or projects. It hires implementing partners to perform these tasks.

The USAID provides funding and oversight for programs that fall in line with the DOS/USAID Joint Strategic Plan (hereafter Joint Strategic Plan) and Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (hereafter QDDR). The USAID does not execute projects in the field; rather USAID hires “implementing partners” to manage USAID-sponsored projects in foreign countries. Most of the implementing partners are either US-based NGOs or for-profit companies and consulting firms that provide technical expertise and high-level consultants. Most CMO interface with USAID will likely be undertaken with the offices that are nested in the DCHA.

- **Office of Transition Initiatives**

  The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) works in select conflict-prone countries to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs. Office of Transitional Initiatives programs are often initiated in fragile states that have not reached the stability needed to initiate longer-term development programs. The OTI is funded by a separate transition initiatives budget account with special authorities that allow immediate spending where it is most needed.

  For example, following the 2010 uprising in Kyrgyzstan, OTI initiated a program that included regionally-based programming focused on national and local sources of ethnic conflict and instability. This type of programming contrasts with long-term assistance that
focuses on sustainable and normally country-wide strategies such as the improvement of business, health care, and education.

- **Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance**

  The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is responsible for leading and coordinating the US Government’s response to disasters overseas. The OFDA responds to disasters in order to ensure aid reaches people affected by rapid on-set disasters, such as earthquakes, volcanoes, and floods, and slow-onset crises, including drought and conflict or a combination of both. The OFDA will normally dispatch a DART which varies in size depending on the nature of the disaster. A Marine Fellow is assigned to OFDA to assist in coordinating disaster relief efforts with the MAGTF.

- **Office of Food for Peace**

  The Office of Food for Peace (FFP) provides emergency food assistance to those affected by conflict and natural disasters. It also provides development food assistance to address the underlying causes of hunger. The FFP’s emergency programs are the most visible form of humanitarian assistance. Emergency food aid programs main functions are to maintain or improve the nutritional status of vulnerable groups in order to save lives, reduce suffering and lessen the impact of shocks on overall food security.

  During an emergency response, FFP uses in-kind food aid such as locally or regionally procured food, cash transfers or food vouchers to ensure communities have access to food. The type of response depends on conditions on the ground and what the best tools are for reaching people as quickly as possible for maximum impact. Sometimes Food for Work programs are employed to improve nutritional status and fund short-term projects such as infrastructure repairs in post-disaster situations.

- **Office of Civil-Military Cooperation**

  The Office of Civil-Military Cooperation (formerly the Office for Military Affairs), manages and facilitates USAID's day-to-day interface with DOD including coordination on policy,
planning, training, exercises and communications. It provides USAID input to DOD policy and planning guidance, directives and instructions, military doctrine, joint publications, and handbooks. In addition, the Office of Civil-Military Cooperation produces familiarization courses on working with the military for USAID personnel and on the objectives and structure of both DOD and USAID.

c. The United States Department of Agriculture

Within the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), most day-to-day international programs and personnel are administered by the Foreign Agricultural Service. The Foreign Agricultural Service sends agricultural counselors and attachés to work in US embassies throughout the world. Foreign Agricultural Service counselors and attachés work with the members of the country team. Their primary focus is to advise and give technical expertise on issues such as market access, food aid, capacity building and biotechnology. In other circumstances such as the recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, USDA may assign employees to provide more field-level technical expertise at a PRT. However, more times than not they will work at the embassy level with host nation government counterparts.

Additionally USAID may also employ agriculture SMEs who provide oversight for USAID agriculture programs in developing countries. These SMEs provide program and project oversight and employ implementing partners to carry out the programs. In contrast, the USDA provides SMEs and agricultural attachés that work at the national-level with the host-nation agricultural ministry.

d. The United States Department of Justice

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) is a large department with many overseas programs ranging from drug enforcement to providing experts in many areas of the ROL. Much in the way USDA provides agriculture expertise, DOJ may assign its employees to work in embassies or directly for a DOS funded program. These SMEs will most likely work with the host nation ministry of justice.

e. The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) employees are assigned to work with foreign government officials. They assist host government departments and staff to develop professional and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism. The ICITAP supports both national security and foreign policy objectives.

Department of State, USAID and DOD all fund ICITAP programs that span the globe from Mexico to Algeria and the Philippines. Programming includes providing SMEs in areas of terrorism and trans-national crime, marine and border security, criminal investigations, forensics, community policing and criminal justice coordination.

f. Drug Enforcement Administration

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the primary narcotics enforcement agency for the US Government. The DEA’s mission is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and bring to the criminal and civil justice system of the United States, or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and principal members of organizations, involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the United States; and to recommend and support non-enforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances on the domestic and international markets.

The DEA may be involved in crop eradication, crop substitution, and training of foreign officials. Responsibility, under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State and US ambassadors, for all programs associated with drug law enforcement counterparts in foreign countries. Drug Enforcement Administration investigations are becoming increasingly complex and frequently require more sophisticated investigative techniques such as electronic surveillance.

g. Rule of Law Programming

Rule of law programming is defined as assistance to support legal, judicial and law enforcement reform efforts undertaken by foreign governments. Due to the fundamental nature of the
functional areas germane to DOJ, it is a logical primary resource for ROL SMEs. This assistance is divided into four or five main sectors: judicial and court systems (including civil and criminal), law enforcement (police), penal systems and lastly, legislative systems that make the laws. Sometimes civil society is also included as an additional category.

This assistance will take the form of construction of buildings such as police stations or courthouses; training programs for judges, lawyers, administrators, corrections and police officers.

The DOJ provides lawyers, DEA agents and other law enforcement personnel (often via ICITAP) to work on ROL programs overseas. These programs may be funded by DOS or their own internal funds.

While there is some overlap, the requirements for training a civilian police force differ from those of training a national military. The military is trained in a set of TTPs aimed at providing point security. Police provide a very different type of civil security—“serve and protect”—therefore, DOJ is better suited for training civilian police forces.

### 3002. The United States Embassy

A US embassy (mission) is responsible for the conduct of bilateral diplomacy with foreign governments. An embassy is headed by an ambassador, also known as the COM.

#### a. The Ambassador

The ambassador is a Presidential appointee and the President’s personal representative overseas. The ambassador is the senior US official in the country. By law, ambassadors coordinate, direct, and supervise all USG activities and representatives posted in the foreign country to which they are accredited. Ambassadors do not exercise control of US personnel attached to and working for the head of a US mission to an international organization (e.g., US ambassador to North Atlantic Treaty Organization or any US or UN staff) or US military personnel operating under the command of a CCDR. Generally, each ambassador has an agreement with the CCDR identifying DOD personnel for whom they are responsible. A common misunderstanding about
Ambassadors is that although appointed by the President, they report directly to the Secretary of State, not to the President.

b. United States Country Team

The US country team is the senior interagency coordinating body and the core of Embassy operational decision-making. The DOS uses the Integrated Country Strategies as the key document to define mission goals and objectives for diplomacy, development, and security within a country.

The senior defense official (SDO)/defense attaché (DATT) is the principle DOD official in a US embassy, as designated by the SecDef, and is the COM’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues. The SDO/DATT is the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a US diplomatic mission. All DOD elements assigned or attached to US embassies are aligned under coordinating authority of the SDO/DATT. Where separate SDO and DATT offices exist, they remain separate with distinct duties and statutory authorities. The SDO/DATT also serves as the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy, to include elements assigned to or working from a given embassy. The SCO, or referred to as the Office of Defense Cooperation within USPACOM AOR, falls under the SDO/DATT and is responsible for all security cooperation and security assistance functions within the host nation. The SCO works both for the SDO/DATT and by extension the ambassador, as well as the CCDR.

Individual elements of the country team will also be working daily with their military counterparts and reporting updates to the country team. This can create tensions regarding who is the final authority. The DOD may also have liaison officers, defense attachés, or security assistance officials assigned to the country team who are under the ambassador’s authority, independent of CCMDs.

c. Political Advisor

Political advisors (POLADs) are senior DOS officers (flag-rank equivalent) detailed as personal advisors to leading US military leaders/commanders to provide policy support regarding the
diplomatic and political aspects of the commanders' military responsibilities. Critical differences exist between the ways Department of Defense and Department of State personnel approach most areas of their professional existence. From organization to hierarchy, training and education, forms of address, specific protocol etc., part of the POLAD's job is to bridge the gap between these differences. Their roles are expanding as a result of increased intermingling of interagency partners and the onset of the 3Ds: diplomacy, defense and development.

The POLAD can be of great assistance in interagency coordination. Political advisors are usually assigned to JTF commanders and GCCs to whom they are directly responsible. Political advisors provide USG foreign policy perspectives and diplomatic considerations and establish linkages with US embassies in the AOR or joint operational area.

d. Regional Security Officer

The regional security officer (RSO) is responsible for protecting the US embassy (or consulate), its personnel and information. The RSO serves as the US embassy’s law enforcement liaison to the host nation and arranges training for foreign police and security officers to combat terrorism. It also advises Americans about safety and security abroad and assists US related schools and organizations in obtaining security grants. American embassies and consulates overseas are a frequent target of terrorists and other criminals. The RSO develops, implements, and manages a range of physical, cyber, and personnel security to mitigate threats. Marine security guards fall under the authority of the RSO.

e. Emergency Action Committee

The emergency action committee (EAC) is an advisory body within the US embassy that assists in preparing for and responding to threats, emergencies, and other crises (such as NEOs) in the country. The EAC develops its post-specific emergency action plan.

f. Mission Disaster Relief Officer

The mission disaster relief officer (MDRO) is the focal point for disaster-related information, planning, and response activities relevant to the host nation and is appointed by the Ambassador.
This assignment is normally an additional duty to the Officer’s main function in the Embassy. The MDRO is a member of the post’s EAC and is responsible for preparing Appendix J of the *Emergency Action Plan*, entitled *Assistance to Host Country in a Major Accident or Disaster*, usually referred to as the *Mission Disaster Relief Plan*. The MDRO is familiar with host nation disaster authorities and capabilities and other potential humanitarian partners. The MDRO also continually liaises with the USAID/OFDA regional advisor, DOD staff on the country team, and the DOS’s BPRM.

The MDRO is responsible for disaster related issues affecting the host population, however the MDRO should notify the chief of the consular section as soon as possible after a disaster occurs. The consular section is responsible for ascertaining the welfare of American citizens who may be affected by the disaster and for warning Americans not to travel to the disaster zone. After a disaster has been declared, the MDRO is responsible for drafting the disaster declaration cable and submitting it to the ambassador for approval, sharing information about the welfare and whereabouts of American citizens in the host nation with the post’s consular section, and maintaining regular contact with relevant organizations (UN, donor countries, NGOs, international organizations, etc.).

**3003. Nongovernmental Organizations**

Many NGOs are private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering. Nongovernmental organizations can be categorized into the following general areas:

- Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
- Development.
- Human rights.

*InterAction* is the largest alliance of US-based international NGOs. Members are faith-based and secular, large and small, with a focus on the world’s most poor and vulnerable populations. *InterAction* focuses a part of its efforts on influencing policy decisions on relief and long term development issues, including foreign assistance, the environment, women, health, education and agriculture. Major NGOs can be found on the Interaction Website: [http://www.interaction.org/](http://www.interaction.org/)
- Civil society.
- Conflict resolution.

Nongovernmental organizations are frequently in country before the US military and many are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They often have a long-term and well established presence in the areas where they work as well as the trust of the local population. Additionally they will most likely remain long after military forces have departed.

Nongovernmental organizations range in size and experience from those with multi-million dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to small organizations or charities newly formed to respond to a particular emergency or disaster.

In conflict areas, NGOs derive security and access from their neutrality, impartiality and humanitarian focus. The extent to which specific NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military will be varied as a result.

Nongovernmental organizations may be funded by private donors, international organizations, and government agencies or departments or a combination of all of the above. They consider themselves neutral, impartial, and unbiased. However, they are accountable to their various donors for their resources and thus must follow the guidelines and policies sometimes set forth by those donors.

Additionally, NGOs can provide an improved understanding of the operating environment for the military and potentially enable them to better foster amicable relations with the local population. This is especially true in the process of civil preparation of the battlespace (CPB) where civil information is collected and analyzed in support of planning and execution (CPB defined in Appendix A).

3004. International Organizations

An international organization is an organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes, formed to protect and promote national
interests shared by member states. Examples include the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Even though UN agencies are referred to separately, UN agencies are all international organizations. The UN is a donor agency; however it receives its funding from member governments. Many UN agencies, much in the same way as other donors, will contract work to implementing partners, most commonly NGOs. For more detailed information, refer to the Appendices in Annex B of JP 3-08.

Interaction will occur between the military and International organizations (especially the UN agencies) during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. There may also be interface with UN peacekeeping missions. They are often working simultaneously in areas that are war-torn or just emerging from a complex emergency. The following is a list of those UN Agencies most common in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief with whom the MAGTF will likely work.

3005. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

This UN Office does not execute programs. Rather it serves as the overarching coordination mechanism for the rest of the UN operational agencies mobilizing international assistance when the scale of the disaster exceeds the national capacity. The UN humanitarian coordinator has overall responsibility for ensuring coherence of relief efforts in the field. The following are the major operational UN organizations that contribute to disaster response. Their titles are indicative of their focal area.

Failure to understand the humanitarian community or unwillingness to coordinate with these organizations may lead to a redundancy of effort and a waste of resources. This subsequent section identifies the coordination mechanisms used in international humanitarian responses.

3006. United Nations Cluster System for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

The Cluster System (see figure 3-1) is a UN coordination mechanism designed for international responses to humanitarian crises. The aim of the cluster approach is to strengthen partnerships and ensure more predictability and accountability in international responses to humanitarian emergencies, by clarifying the division of labor among organizations, and better defining their
roles and responsibilities within the key sectors of the response. There are nine functional clusters for coordination at both the field (tactical) and global (strategic) levels, with each field-level cluster led by an agency accountable to the UN humanitarian coordinator. The nine clusters, together with their lead agencies, are:

- Nutrition (United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)).
- Health (World Health Organization).
- Water/Sanitation (UNICEF).
- Emergency Shelter (UNHCR/International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).
- Camp Coordination/Management (UNHCR/International Organization for Migration).
- Early Recovery (UN Development Programme).
- Logistics (UN World Food Programme).
- Emergency Telecommunications (OCHA/UNICEF/ World Food Programme).
It is important to understand a number of precepts when addressing interagency planning in the civilian world. DOS, DOD, and USAID each divide the world up differently, so GCCs may not overlap or be regionally aligned. Some planning focuses on policy and stakeholder actions. Sometimes the planning process is divided by function or geographic region. The DOS implemented new guidance and direction to change the previous top-down and resource driven approaches to planning. Based off of the Joint Strategic Plan and the QDDR released by DOS.
and USAID, regional bureaus are responsible to create joint regional strategies, which in turn are used by each mission to create an integrated country strategy and submit their mission resource request.

a. Department of State/United States Agency for International Development Joint Strategic Plan
The DOS/USAID Joint Strategic Plan is the single, highest-level strategic outline for DOS and USAID; it forms the basis for more detailed planning and budgeting on international affairs policies, programs, and resources in the years ahead. The Joint Strategic Plan outlines high-level foreign policy goals and strategies shared by both organizations and are produced every four years. Some key components of the Joint Strategic Plan are:

- Mission statement.
- Agency-wide long term goals and objectives for all major functions and operations (Strategic Goal Framework).
- Regional priorities.
- Program Evaluation Tools and Methods.

b. Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
Quadrennial diplomacy and development reviews are country-level strategy, budget allocation and request, and performance assessment documents. They identify US foreign policy priorities for each country over the next three to five years; describe the strategies to achieve them; identify and request foreign assistance and State operations resources needed; and measure progress by setting performance targets and reporting against them. The QDDR is the first step in the DOS and USAID annual budget formulation process. (QDDRs are posted on classified Intellipedia.)

c. United States Agency for International Development Planning
United States Agency for International Development planning depends on its country level Missions and forward-deployed American and local staff for assessment, planning, and implementation of the majority of its programs. Because development programming is tailored to
the needs and challenges faced in each country, USAID missions are empowered to develop strategic plans called Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS). This planning model was implemented as a pilot in 2010 and currently includes all countries. The CDCS are designed to synthesize country-specific development challenges (poverty, corruption, human immunodeficiency virus, etc.). The CDCS lay out the USG objectives and approaches for achieving those objectives. Importantly, these strategies are reflective of the development agenda of the host nation itself and work to align US, host nation, and international and bilateral donor programs also working in the country.

3008. Interorganizational Coordination Mechanisms

Requests for US military assistance are initiated with a mission tasking matrix (MITAM). This is explained in detail in Appendix F. Another helpful reference is the USAID/DCHA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Guidance for Disaster Planning and Response –FY 2012. This annual cable is issued to all US embassies worldwide and gives in-depth guidance and information on disaster response. There are a number of coordinating mechanisms that are used in disaster response. The three main mechanisms are discussed in the following paragraphs.

a. Humanitarian Operations Center

The humanitarian operations center (HOC) is a senior level international and interagency coordinating body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large FHA operation. It normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the UN, or a USG agency during a US unilateral operation. Because the HOC operates at the national level, it will normally consist of senior representatives from the affected country, assisting countries, the UN, NGOs, international organizations, and other major organizations in the operation. US participation should include the Ambassador (leading the US representation), USAID representatives, and representatives from the joint force. The HOC is horizontally structured with no command and control authority and all members are ultimately responsible to their own organizations or countries.

b. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center
A HACC is used to coordinate initial contingency planning and interagency coordination. Usually the HACC is temporary; once a CMOC or HOC has been established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the combatant command’s staff and crisis action organization.

c. Civil-Military Operations Center

The Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) provides tactical or operational level coordination between the JFC and other stakeholders. The JFC may establish a CMOC to coordinate and facilitate US and multinational forces’ humanitarian operations with those of international and local relief agencies and host nation agencies and authorities. The CMOC serves as the primary collaboration interface for the joint force among host nation, international organizations, NGOs, multinational military forces, the private sector, and the interagency. Military forces, depending on the needs of the operation, may actually co-locate in a civilian-run or established center.

The CMOC does not set policy or direct operations. It is a coordination mechanism for stakeholders and may be physical or virtual. The organization of the CMOC is theater and mission dependent, flexible in size and composition. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC. More than one CMOC may be established in an operational area, and each is task-organized based on the mission.

The CMOC, HACC, and HOC are distinct but interrelated organizations. The relationship among these organizations and interagency, international, and host nation structures can be complex and challenging. It should not be assumed that the CMOC will be the main coordinating center for the operation.

There is a significant difference between the HOC and CMOC. The CMOC is established by and works for the commander. The HOC is normally established under the direction of the host nation government, the UN, or OFDA during a US unilateral operation. The HOC operates at senior, national level to coordinate strategic and operational unity of effort, while the CMOC works at the local level coordinating US actions to achieve operational and tactical unity of effort.
CHAPTER 4

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

4000. Civil-Military Operations Operational Design

All military operations require careful balance between the application of force and the need to accommodate legal, moral, and civil responsibilities associated with conducting operations in populated areas. It is hard to imagine any scenario where the civilian population and civil considerations will not affect operations. A preponderance of the world’s population resides in and around the littorals, where Marines are most likely to operate. Therefore, the MAGTF commander has to analyze how the civil landscape affects his mission; he has to develop specific strategies and goals directly related to conducting CMO; he has to design operations so that the need for violence and destruction does not obscure an end-state of re-establishing civil control.

4001. Planning Defined

Planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective ways of bringing it about. (MCDP 5-0, Planning)


Civil-military operations are those civil-military activities planned and performed by military forces to maintain, influence or exploit relations between military forces, governmental, nongovernmental civilian organizations and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government to facilitate military operations and achieve US objectives. Civil-military operations planning ensures careful analysis of the civil landscape and incorporation of civil considerations into the overall planning process.

4003. The Marine Corps Planning Process and the Civil-Military Operations Planner

The Marine Corps doctrinal concept of maneuver warfare describes planning as an essential part of command and control. The aim of command and control is to enhance the commander’s
ability to make sound and timely decisions, which requires good situational awareness. Situational awareness allows the commander and staff to understand the problem, define the difference between current and desired conditions, and supports devising ways to solve the problem. Civil-military operations planning is the design and integration of civil-military activities into MAGTF plans in support of the commander’s objectives. It is unique in that much of what is planned involves military forces to maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental, nongovernmental civilian organizations, and civilian populace to achieve the commander’s desired end state.

Proficient CMO planners are skilled at helping to provide the commander and staff with situational awareness and in creating a shared understanding of the problem from a civil-military perspective. Civil preparation of the battlespace is used to examine civil considerations in support of mission analysis and the overall IPB process (see appendix A). Civil preparation of the battlespace is conducted through the framework of METT-T and civil considerations to focus on civil aspects as it relates to the overall operational environment and mission accomplishment. Civil preparation of the battlespace uses myriad methods to specifically analyze different aspects of civil information and assess the civil impact of friendly, adversary, external actors, as well as the local populace, on MAGTF operations and the achievement of objectives.

Most Marine Corps planning begins with the MCPP, a six-element process (problem framing, COA development, COA war game, COA comparison and decision, orders development, transition). It is important for CMO planners to be proficient in CPB and understand the MCPP. Without an understanding of the process used to solve these and other problems, the CMO planner will be less effective in the integration of civil-military operations into MAGTF, joint, and combined operations.

Civil-military operations planners ensure that the commanders, OPT and staff fully understand the civil environment, factors, and perspective to any military problem. Civil-military operations planners ensure that potential solutions include effective CMO measures that support the overall mission. In some cases, the mission and potential solutions themselves may be centered on civil-military actions and objectives (humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, etc.). Civil-military operations planners evaluate the execution of potential solutions from a civil perspective, as well
as identifying the risks and second/third order effects associated with COAs that can affect the population in the battlespace. Products might include the CMO staff estimate, CMO-related tasks in the basic order, and the associated Annex G/Appendices/Tabs. The CMO planner can effectively build understanding of CMO considerations as the plan is transitioned to current operations and executed by elements of the MAGTF.

Finally, the CMO planner ensures that the CMO continue to support execution and subsequent planning. He also ensures that CMO planning is not isolated from the command and control processes, or from the feedback of the elements executing CMO in the battlespace.

A unique challenge a CMO planner will face is that many aspects of CMO are tied to people and organizations outside of the traditional military chain of command. The CMO planner must be adept at planning for and integrating organic MAGTF and other service CMO capabilities, US Government agencies, coalition and foreign government elements (host nation government, police, military), as well as international organizations and NGOs. Besides MAGTF organic CMO capabilities, other CMO stakeholders have national/regional agendas and objectives, chains of command procedures, etc. Some of these assets, particularly NGOs, may have little or no desire to work with or even tacitly cooperate with US forces/Government organizations. This may add friction to the CMO planner’s ability to plan and execute CMO in support of the MAGTF.

4004. Marine Corps Planning Process Underlying Concepts

Planning develops the supporting plans for discrete functional activities, to include the six warfighting functions as well as others such as CMO. It helps link and unify the detailed planning and execution with the overarching concepts developed in conceptual planning. During interface with civilians, planners may discover previously unidentified aspects of the civil environment or tactical situation that substantially affect CMO in the AO.

Civil affairs personnel available within the force and their subject matter expertise and experience level are some of the factors that will determine what CMO capabilities are available for planning, and how the CMO staff will organize for the planning effort.

There should be a staff member with cognizance over the CMO functions, a CMO planner within the command OPT, a civil-military operations working group (CMOWG), and the CA assets that will provide input to the planning process, and ultimately be the plan executors. Any additional assets discussed below may be available during a particular operation. An important early step to successful CMO planning is ensuring that all CA personnel and organizations involved understand their part in the overall organization as well as the roles and responsibilities they will have throughout the planning process. Developing this “CMO concept of operations/concept of support” will often fall to the CMO planning representative, the senior CMO planner – most likely an Active Component 0505 future operations planner, ideally also trained as a 0530 CA officer.

The senior CMO planner will provide guidance and oversight to the commander during planning by serving as the conduit between the G-3/S-3 or G-9 and the command OPT. The CMO planner should be an active participant in all MAGTF planning efforts with the knowledge of how to access resources to provide particular expertise (public health, legal and economic systems, civil engineering, etc.) in the operating environment.

a. Operational Planning Team

The mechanism for CMO Planners to integrate into the MAGTF is through the OPT. Integrated planning is conducted to coordinate action toward a common purpose by all elements of the force. Integrated planning is facilitated by assigning personnel to the OPT who have an appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of their respective organization or activity. In conventional operations, representatives from each of the warfighting functions such as fires, maneuver, intelligence, logistics, force protection, and command and control may be sufficient. In CMO, representatives from government agencies, the host nation police and military, intelligence community, political representatives, and others may be required. Similarly, humanitarian operations may involve representatives from other government agencies, NGAs,
and private relief organizations. The key to integrated planning is to involve the right personnel from the right organizations in the planning process as early as possible to consider all relevant factors, reduce omissions, and share information as broadly as possible.

b. Civil-Military Operations Working Group

The Civil-Military Operations Working Group (CMOWG) consists of CA staff personnel and SMEs (see figure 4-1). The CMOWG plans concurrently with the MAGTF OPT and provides input as required. The composition and scope of the CMOWG vary according to the size of the MAGTF and level of interorganizational involvement. The CMOWG will be most effective when there is maximum participation and transparency among interorganizational partners. The CMOWG conducts CPB, develops the CMO problem statement, creates the CMO concept of support or concept of operations, develops the CMO staff estimate, and produces Annex G.

The size and scope of a CMOWG is dependent on the situation and size of the MAGTF

Figure 4-1. Example CMO Working Group
The CMOWG relies on their CMO planner to:

- Gain understanding and insights into the planning conducted by the OPT.
- Advise the OPT about CA capabilities, limitations, and the civil environment.

c. Green Cell

The green cell is formed to assist the commander and planning group in assessing planning from the civil perspective. The cell forms up and begins its work during problem framing. The green cell plays a prominent role during the COA development and COA war game steps (see Appendix B for detailed explanation of green cell activities).

d. Red Cell

The red cell is formed to assist the commander and planning group in assessing planning against adversary and environment capabilities and actions.

e. Civil-Military Operations Working Group Subject Matter Experts

When possible, include SMEs in the planning effort such as:

- USAID/OFDA.
- Host nation representation.
- Nongovernmental organization(s).
- International organization(s).
- Department of Agriculture.
- Medical Officer
- Veterinarian.
- Department of State.
- Foreign area officers and/or regional area officers.
4006. Civil-Military Operations Inputs to the Marine Corps Planning Process

The MCPP helps organize the thought processes of the commander and his staff throughout the planning and execution of operations. Originally printed in 1940 as NAVMC 2890, the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual states, “The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to the character of the people encountered.” To fully understand the operational environment and support the commander’s decision-making process, we must utilize integrated, informed planning teams to account for and understand the civil dimension of the battlespace. Moreover, CMO planners must actively participate in the planning process from the onset. Civil considerations are ever present in operations and across all warfighting functions; therefore, consideration of CMO must be a part of all phases of planning.

a. Civil-Military Operations and Problem Framing

Figure 4-2 below illustrates some CMO-specific injects and activities during problem framing: relevant and tailored CMO input during this step is absolutely critical to setting the conditions for successful civil-military solutions to the MAGTF problem. This requires a CMO planner to analyze the civil component of the operating environment, and know how this relates to one’s own forces, inter-organizational, joint forces, and host nation partners.
The content of the first event in problem framing, the commander’s orientation, will vary greatly based on mission. The CMO planner should ensure that key information developed in the CPB process is integrated into the orientation, in order to ensure the commander and staff considers the civil component from the outset of planning. During problem framing, the CMO planner should consider the following:

(1) Causes of Conflict Considerations: Overview Civil Conflict

- Windows of Vulnerability
  - Elections.
  - Legislative changes governing the power of key players or the distribution of resources (e.g., decentralization).
- Economic shocks.
- Natural disasters.
- Rebel incursions, riots, or assassinations.

**Institutional Capacity and Response**
- Ability to address incentives for violence.
- Ability to block access to conflict resources.
- Ability to manage regional and international pressures.
- Ability to constrain opportunistic elite behavior.

**Mobilization: Access to Conflict Resources**
- Organizational factors that facilitate collective violence (certain spatial distributions of ethnic groups, civil society networks, patronage or clan networks).
- Financial resources (natural resources, corruption diaspora communities).
- Human resources (recruits, internal and external).

**Incentives for Violence: Grievance and Greed**
- Ethnic or religious grievance.
- Economic causes (e.g., poverty, stagnant or negative growth).
- Competition over natural resources.
- Destabilizing demographic shifts.
- Elite incentives to capture or maintain political or economic power.

**Regional and International Causes: Globalization and Malign Influence**
- Erosion of state sovereignty.
- Vulnerability to global market shocks.
- Arms flows.
- Refugee flows.
- Transborder ethnic movements.

(2) **Windows of Vulnerability**

**Predictable**
- Are major government reforms planned that could result in shifts in political or economic power (e.g., decentralization, anti-corruption, security sector reform)?
- Are contentious elections approaching?

- **Unpredictable**
  - Is the country vulnerable to natural disasters?
  - Does the government effectively respond to mitigate the damage done by natural disasters?
  - Is the economy highly vulnerable to global economic shocks?
  - Do government institutions have a history of effectively responding to political and economic crises?
  - Do local governments effectively and constructively respond to local instability?
  - What is the capacity of the formal/informal economy to absorb new entrants?
  - What is the unemployment rate, particularly for young men in urban areas?
  - Is there a match between the skills of new entrants and the needs of the economy?
  - Are these economies heavily dependent on access to global markets? How susceptible are they to economic shocks?

(3) **Institutional Capacity and Response**

- **Regime Type and Legitimacy**
  - Is the regime democratic, authoritarian, or mixed?
  - How long has it existed in its current form?
  - Is it in a period of transition or erosion?
  - Are there generally accepted rules for political competition?
  - What is the overall level of respect for national authorities?

- **Inclusion/Exclusion**
  - Do government policies favor one group over another? For example, are government services provided equally across different ethnic or religious groups, are exclusive language policies in place?
  - Has the collapse or erosion of state institutions led groups to turn to more immediate forms of identity for survival?
  - Do civil society groups reinforce or bridge lines of division?
▪ How robust are multi-ethnic or multi-religious organizations? Do they have a mass base (e.g., trade unions, business associations) or are they limited to a narrow elite layer?
▪ How are issues of ethnicity/religion taught in schools?
▪ Does the press promote ethnic or religious intolerance?

▪ **ROL/Provision of Security**
  ▪ How strong is the judicial system?
  ▪ Are civil and political freedoms respected?
  ▪ Are other basic human rights respected?
  ▪ Does unlawful state violence exist?
  ▪ Does civilian power control the security sector?
  ▪ Is the government able to exercise effective control over its territory
  ▪ Does the security sector (police/justice sector) effectively and impartially settle disputes between groups or is there a perception of bias?
  ▪ To what extent is the security sector involved in 'shadow' economic activity?
  ▪ Do government institutions effectively regulate legal arms trade and prevent illegal arms trades or do they participate in it?

▪ **Economic Governance**
  ▪ Does economic policy encourage economic growth or impose obstacles?
  ▪ Is policy conducive to macro-economic stability?
  ▪ How pervasive is corruption in state institutions?
  ▪ Do government institutions/civil society groups effectively monitor and enforce financial transparency and accountability?
  ▪ Is the government able to exert economic control over the territory of the state or are there large pockets of autonomous economic activity?
  ▪ Does government policy encourage a good match between available skills and the demands of the market?
  ▪ Do state economic policies favor one group at the expense of another?
  ▪ Are local governments able to encourage local economic growth and investment and respond to local economic problems?
  ▪ Do grassroots and/or national institutions constructively engage underrepresented and marginalized groups in economic development activities?
- Do government programs constructively engage potential recruits, such as unemployed youth?

### Natural Resource Management
- Does government policy seek to improve the sustainable management of natural resources?
- Are there institutions in place that effectively mediate competing claims to natural resources such as land or water?
- Do local/national elites earn significant off-budget income from the exploitation of natural resources?
- Do government institutions effectively regulate trade in pilferable commodities?
- Are natural resources viewed by state elites as a useful tool or prize in a larger political competition?
- Are state institutions able to respond to environmental shocks or natural disasters?

### Demographic Factors
- Are government policies causing demographic shifts, for example through government-sponsored transmigration or agricultural programs?
- Are government institutions able to respond to new demands created by demographic change? For example, are voting rights tied to place of residence or birth (meaning will uprooted populations be able to voice demands through political channels)?

### Regional and International Factors
- Are ethnic and/or religious divisions reinforced by parallel relations in neighboring countries?
- Does environmental degradation have cross-border causes or effects?
- Is economic activity (both legal and illegal) closely tied to regional or global dynamics?
- Is the economy highly vulnerable to global economic shocks?
- Are demographic shifts tied to regional events?
- Is mobilization facilitated by support from other governments or ethnic and religious groups outside the country?

(4) Mobilization: Access to Conflict Resources
• **Organizational Resources**
  - Do organizational structures bridge or reinforce differences in a society? For example, are civil society groups mono-ethnic or multi-ethnic?
  - Are there well-established ethnic or religious associations that could be used to mobilize violence?
  - Have these structures stepped in to provide important services, such as access to employment or education, in the context of a weak state?
  - How closely do organizational resources (e.g., ethnic groups or patronage networks) align with incentives for violence?
  - If incentives and organizations are aligned, are these organizations capable of monitoring group behavior and punishing “defectors” from group goals?

• **Financial Resources**
  - Are groups with an incentive to mobilize violence affiliated with foreign support groups (e.g., diaspora, foreign governments, transnational religious or ethnic groups) that could provide funding?
  - Can those motivated to engage in violence obtain control of pilferable primary commodities?
  - Are resources available through government corruption or patronage networks?
  - Can sufficient resources be gained through smuggling, kidnapping, banditry or other activities on the black or gray market?

• **Human Resources**
  - Is there a population of ready recruits (e.g. unemployed young men in urban or semi-urban areas) available to actors motivated to engage in violence?

• **General Questions**
  - Do groups with incentives for violence have access to all conflict resources - organizational, financial, and human - or only a few?
  - What level of resources do groups have and what level do they need to achieve their goals? Is there a match?
  - Where do these resources come from (e.g., natural resources, corruption/patronage networks, diasporas, foreign recruits, local/international sources) and what does this imply about ease of access and sustainability?
(5) Incentives for Violence: Grievance and Greed

- **Ethnic and Religious Divisions**
  - Is the relationship between ethnic/religious groups characterized by dominance, potential dominance or high levels of fragmentation?
  - Where do these groups live and in what numbers? Are they concentrated in regional pockets or dispersed? If they are concentrated, do they form a majority or a minority in the area?
  - What is the history of relations between groups? Is there a pattern of systematic discrimination or have relations been relatively peaceful and inclusive?
  - Do other divides, for example, political exclusion or economic inequality, reinforce ethnic divisions?
  - Are there elites who face an economic or political incentive to mobilize violence along ethnic lines?
  - Is extremist ethnic or religious rhetoric increasing? Are elites beginning to create or promote ethnic 'myths'?

- **Economic Causes**
  - Is the economy (of the country/region) growing, stagnant, or declining? By what percent?
  - Is the country (or region) low income?
  - Are there large socio-economic disparities? Do these reinforce other lines of division, such as ethnicity?
  - Is the economy heavily dependent on primary commodities? Are these commodities easily pilfered?
  - Is economic power tied to political power?
  - How pervasive is corruption or patronage? Does it flow along ethnic or other lines of division?
  - If there is a large informal economy, is it legal or illegal (i.e., based on drugs, trafficking in humans)?

- **Environmental Causes**
  - Are there major resource scarcities?
  - What are the primary causes of scarcity?
▪ Has scarcity led to resource capture?
▪ Has scarcity led to population transfers?
▪ Do the effects of scarcity (resource capture, population transfers) reinforce other divides (ethnic, religious, economic) and/or generate competition between groups?
▪ Do elites compete over the control of valuable natural resources (both renewable and non-renewable), scarce or not?
▪ Are certain resources (such as land) used as a tool in political competition?

**Demographic Trends**
▪ Do population growth rates differ across distinct, adjacent communities?
▪ Are there other factors (e.g., economic migration) that are tipping the demographic balance toward one group?
▪ Is the rural population expanding? If so, is there access to land or are there other safety valves for population pressures (e.g., migration to states/economic opportunity in urban centers)?
▪ What are rates of urbanization? Is the urban population expanding in a period of economic growth or decline?
▪ What is the size of the youth cohort relative to the adult population?
▪ Are there particular areas (urban centers, distinct regions) where the youth cohort is disproportionately large?
▪ Are young people radicalizing? If so, around what issues? If not, what is keeping this from happening?
▪ Are there rapid increases in young, educated professionals who have no opportunities for political or economic advancement?

**Interaction Effects**
▪ Are there many incentives for violence (both greed and grievance) or only a few?
▪ Are they longstanding and chronic or of fairly recent origin?
▪ Do incentives for violence overlap and reinforce each other or cut across lines of division? For example, does access to economic opportunity overlap with ethnic difference or cut across ethnic difference?
▪ Is there an alignment between grievance and greed? Are elites with a political or economic incentive to mobilize violence well-positioned to tap into a strong grievance?
(6) Ongoing MCPP Activities with Civil-Military Operations Considerations

- CPB Product Refinement

Like the intelligence section IPB, CPB for CMO professionals is a continuous process. As planning progresses and additional information is developed on the environment, the adversary, and the friendly force, the CPB should be modified to reflect this. The CMO Planner must ensure that relevant and significant CPB developments are disseminated to the OPT.

- Red Cell Activities

The red cell should be formed and commence work during the problem framing step. The red cell should coordinate and share information with the green cell.

- Green Cell Activities

The green cell should be formed and commence work during problem framing. Ideally it consists of members of the CMOWG. The green cell develops products and maintains situational awareness of the civil dimension, throughout the planning process from CPB through COA wargaming (see Appendix A for further elaboration on green cell activities).

- Resource Shortfalls Identification

Throughout the planning process, the commander and staff identify critical resource shortfalls in order to determine additional support requirements.

- Commander’s Critical Information Requirements Review/Update

These are information requirements identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely planning and decision-making. There are two categories of CCIR: friendly force information requirements and PIRs. The CCIR will be updated, modified, dropped, and new CCIR created through planning and execution.
• **Requests for Information**

Gaps in planning information which cannot be answered by the planning group and readily available sources will normally be recorded and forwarded as requests for information (RFIs) to an appropriate organization for answers.

• **Defining the Problem/Problem Statement**

A problem is defined as the difference between the current state or condition and a desired state or condition. Defining the problem leads to an understanding of the difference between existing and desired conditions. Civil-military operations planning is crucial to developing a comprehensive problem statement since civil considerations are inherently germane to any operating environment.

• **Problem Framing Brief**

The CMO planner will provide input to this brief based on the nature of the mission and the role of CMO in the operation. The CMO inputs to the problem framing brief includes:

- Updated CPB.
- CMO task analysis.
- CMO assumptions.
- CMO limitations.
- CMO shortfalls.
- CMO RFIs.
- Recommended CMO-related CCIRs.
- CMO problem statement.
- CMO initial staff estimate.

• **Commander’s Course of Action Guidance**

At some point following the problem framing brief, the commander will provide his guidance for developing potential solutions to the problem.

• **Issue the Warning Order**
The CMO Planner should pass information to CMO assets throughout the force that will be developing supporting plans and have responsibility for executing portions of the plan.

b. Civil-Military Operations Inputs to Course of Action Development

Course of Action Development is the process of synthesizing and articulating options for solving the identified problem. Civil-military operations planners understand that the nature of the operation defines what the CMO planner and the WG will execute in support of the OPT COA Development. For example, in population-centric operations such as in counterinsurgency, stability, or humanitarian assistance operations, the CMO planner and CMOWG may perform COA Development activities much like an OPT. In other operations, where CMO does not play as prominent a role, the CMO staff will develop a concept of support for the COA being developed by the OPT.

Figure 4-3. CMO inputs to COA Development
Figure 4-3 illustrates CMO injects, activities, and outputs during COA development. During the process, the OPT concentrates on the following questions:

- What do we want to do?
- How do we want to do it?
- When do we want to do it?
- Where will the actions occur?

To support this, CMO planners and supporting elements will attempt to answer civil environment questions such as:

- How will our actions impact the civilian population?
- How will the civilian population impact friendly forces?
- As a result of our actions what will happen to, or should be done with, the civilian population (e.g., leave in place, bypass, relocate, etc.)
- How will movements of the civilian population be undertaken (e.g., escorted by local indigenous security force, augment force, etc.)?
- Are adequate resources available to support civil-military tasks and objectives as part of the larger COA?
- Do options address the sources of civil instability or cause of the conflict?

One of the primary products developed during this step is the synchronization matrix. This product is used to synchronize forces and their actions across time, space and purpose in relation to an adversary COA. The CMO planner will ensure that CMO tasks and objectives are included in this product; typically CMO will have its own functional row in the synchronization matrix, and the row is used to record CMO activities throughout the COA.

- **Initial Course of Action Development**
Initial, or “rough cut” COAs are normally broadly sketched options that provide a rough task organization, scheme of maneuver, and enough information so that the initial COAs can be briefed to the commander to ensure that the options are meeting his intent.

The CMO planners review the CMO portions of the initial COAs with the G-9 or senior CA Marine to ensure the COA conforms to the commander’s COA development planning guidance as well as G-9/senior CA Marine guidance. This is the opportunity for the G-9 to make course corrections before the CMO working group conducts detailed CMO support to COA refinement.

A CAG commander or CA detachment officer in charge (OIC) may provide an Estimate of Supportability to the MAGTF based on METT-T and civil considerations analysis and participation in the planning process.

- **Course of Action Refinement/Completion**

  After the commander reviews the initial/rough cut COAs and provides any guidance, the planning group further develops, expands, and refines the COAs to be taken into COA wargaming.

- **Course of Action Graphic and Narrative and Civil-Military Operations Input**

  The COA graphic and narrative broadly encapsulates the supporting concepts of a COA by providing a verbal and pictorial representation of the concepts. The CMO planner should ensure that applicable portions of the CMO plan are correctly portrayed in the COA graphic/narrative. The graphic may display civil-military activities, locations of relief organizations, dislocated civilians, key infrastructure, and culturally or historically significant areas. The CMO graphic and narrative, when approved by the G-9 and the commander, forms the basis for applicable input to the OPT COA Graphic and Narrative, and should be synchronized with information in the Annex G: Civil-Military Operations, and in the CMO Concept of Support in the execution paragraph of the operation plan or operation order.
The planning group will develop a task organization for each COA; in turn, CMO planners will develop a CA task organization which captures how the G-9 intends to structure and resource the force with CA capabilities. At this time, command and support relationships may be established. Proper task organization ensures each unit is properly constructed, sized, and resourced to support the commander’s planning guidance.

- **Course of Action Brief**

The planning group will present a COA brief to the commander and staff, in which each COA is briefed separately. The commander’s wargaming guidance may include what COAs he wants war gamed, what critical events will be war gamed, and what wargaming methods will be used.

- **Commander’s Evaluation Criteria.**

The commander will normally provide evaluation criteria for COA wargaming. These criteria may be based on principles of war, risk factors, etc. In some cases, such as in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, there may be CMO-specific evaluation criteria.

In summary, CMO-related outputs from COA development include, but are not limited to:

- Updated CPB.
- Green cell ML/MD COAs.
- Planning support tools such as a synchronization matrix.
- CMO graphic and narrative.
- Task organization of CA forces.
- Updated CMO staff estimate.
- CMO Assessment Plan.
- CMO Concept of Support.

As part of final preparation for the COA war game step, the CMO planner crosswalks the synchronization matrix with the CMO staff estimate and ensures that the CMO options are
accurately recorded in the staff estimate. With these tools properly developed and synchronized, the CMO planner should be prepared to participate in the planning group COA wargaming.

c. Civil-Military Operations Inputs to Course of Action War Game

The purpose of COA war game is to improve the plan. Civil-military operations planners support the COA war game by providing a detailed CMO plan to include a completed synchronization matrix. The green cell supports COA war game by representing the civil reactions. Just as with a red cell, the green cell will expand the problem, challenge the planning assumptions, provide understanding of the adversary and population through their cultural lens, and reveal overlooked opportunities.

![Diagram of CMO inputs to COA War Game](image)

**Figure 4-4. CMO inputs to COA War Game**

Civil-military operations input to COA wargaming include (see figure 4-4):
- Planning support tools including the CMO COA graphic and narrative and synchronization matrix and decision support matrix.
- CMO Concept of Support.
- CMO staff estimates.
- Updated CPB with an event template and threat courses of action.
- Updated facts and assumptions.

The green cell provides briefs to the OPT that details an overview of the civil situation, to include a discussion of the most likely and most disadvantageous COAs from the civil perspective during war game preparation. This brief should also include the current civil situation to include internal and external influences on the populace. It is critical that the green cell ensure civil actions are realistic. With this information, the CMOWG updates the situation and event templates to reflect tactical areas of interest that support the engagement of high value persons.

The steps involved in the CMO portion of a war game turn are as follows:

- Describe civil actions associated with friendly action.
- Assess enemy reaction and its impact on CMO-related considerations.
- Consult green cell in order to determine most likely or most disadvantageous civil reaction in response to both friendly and adversary actions.
- Determine MAGTF CMO counteraction based on the enemy action and civil reaction. Include the green cell in determining CMO actions and recommending counteractions for other functional areas that may impact the civil-military environment.
- Refine planning tools such as the CMO portion of the synchronization matrix.
- Record results on a CMO COA war game worksheet.
- Record recommendations for modifications to the CMO actions and any CMO requirements to support potential branches and sequels identified by the planning group.
- Record pros and cons of CMO actions based on commander’s and G-9’s evaluation criteria.
Results from Wargaming

An updated COA graphic and narrative with information on the commander’s evaluation criteria is the required outputs of the war game. Additional CMO-specific outputs include:

- Updated CPB products.
- A CMO-specific COA wargaming decision support matrix and synchronization matrix.
- Refined/modified planning factors are:
  - CMO task organization.
  - Identification of CA assets required and shortfalls.
  - Refined CMO-related CCIRs.
  - List of critical events and decision points significant from the CMO standpoint.
  - Refined CMO staff estimate.

COA War Game Brief

The CMO planner and CMOWG will provide input to the OPT for this brief; any input should be reviewed and discussed with the G-3 and G-9 CMO staff to ensure accuracy and understanding. Additional information which should be discussed and that may be used in the war game brief includes:

- Updated CPB products.
- Overview of CMO actions within each COA.
- Significant civil-military events or situations noted during the war game.
- Identification of any additional CMO tasks.
- Revised CMO operational graphic and narrative.
- Revised CMO portion of synchronization matrix.
- CMO resource shortfalls.
- New CMO RFIs.
- Risk assessment of friendly actions/events that negatively impacted the civil environment.
- CMO-specific elements related to the commander’s evaluation criteria.

The COA war game brief concludes with the commander’s approval of any recommended changes to the COAs.

d. CMO Inputs to Course of Action Comparison and Decision

During this step, the commander evaluates each friendly COA against established criteria, compares the COAs with each other, and then selects the COA that he believes will best accomplish the mission (see figure 4-5).

![Figure 4-5. CMO inputs to COA Comparison and Decision](image-url)
Using his evaluation criteria, the commander or his representative leads a discussion about the relative merits of each COA. The senior CMO planner should be an active participant in this discussion, and provide clear and concise evaluation of each COA from a civil-military perspective. This evaluation should be based on experience, judgment, the CMO staff estimate, and the detailed notes recorded by the CMO planner/CMOWG during the COA wargaming step. Typically, functional area representatives and commanders will also provide estimates of supportability for each COA.

Once each COA has been individually evaluated, the commander then compares the COAs against one another. It is important to note that the most advantageous COA from a civil perspective may not be the most advantageous COA from another functional area perspective. Depending on the nature of the mission (e.g., humanitarian assistance and disaster relief), the civil perspective may take priority over other functional areas. The commander may use a comparison and decision matrix, as shown in table 4-1, to help compare one COA against another.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>COA #1</th>
<th>COA #2</th>
<th>COA #3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fewer DCs on MSRs (faster Movement)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid Collateral damage</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage key leaders</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gains cooperation of civilian populace</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>
Preserves key infrastructure

Amount of HA likely to be needed

<p>| | | | |</p>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Best COA is assigned the highest value of the three COAs.  
2. Formula to compute value is to multiply weight times ranking (1, 2, or 3) for that COA  
3. Highest number is most likely COA

Legend:

MSR main supply route

Table 4-1. Example COA Comparison and Decision Matrix

The commander selects a COA (which could be a COA as developed and war gamed, or a modification/combination of the wargaming COAs) and this approved COA becomes the basis for the CONOPS. Once approved, the CMO supporting concept becomes the basis for CMO concept of support to the approved CONOPS.

e. Civil-Military Operations Inputs to Orders Development

Orders development is the process of translating the commander’s decision into oral, written and/or graphic communications sufficient to guide implementation of the decision and provide initiative by subordinates. The G-9 or senior CA Marine is responsible for producing the Annex G. This should be a collaborative process involving all CMO assets that will use this document as the basis for their orders development to ensure CMO unity of purpose and effort (see figure 4-6).
Figure 4-6. CMO Inputs to Orders Development

Key planning products used in orders development are:

- CA staff estimate constructed through the planning process.
- CMO graphic and narrative.
- CMO Synchronization Matrix.

Once all staff sections have completed their portions of the order, a detailed internal review of the force order is conducted. This is the orders reconciliation process. The purpose of reconciliation is to ensure the basic order and all annexes, appendices, etc. are complete and in agreement. The CMO planner will ensure that Annex G information aligns with CMO-related information in the basic order and the synchronization matrix.

After the order has been reconciled internally, the staff then conducts orders crosswalk. The previously reconciled Order is now compared with higher, adjacent, and subordinate command orders to ensure unity of effort and that the overall commander’s intent is met. The CMO planner should ensure that the Annex G is concise, complete, and fully understood by CMO subordinate elements who will execute the plan.
f. Civil-Military Operations Inputs to Transition

Transition is the process that shifts the effort from planning to execution. It may consist of a wide range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals involving all elements of the force. At a minimum, Transition includes a transition brief along with a handover and explanation of any execution tools developed during planning (decision support matrix, execution checklist, etc.). Inputs to transition are depicted in figure 4-7.

![Diagram of Transition Process]

Note: The information shown in bold is meant to highlight the personal involvement of the commander for this part of each step.

Figure 4-7. CMO inputs to Transition

The CMO planner and CMOWG will be an active participant in force transition briefs and drills to ensure that CMO actions, objectives, etc. are fully understood and integrated into execution. The CMO planner will need to brief the CMO Concept of Support. Key products for the brief include:

- CMO graphic and narrative.
- CMO task organization.
- CMO execution checklist.
- CMO decision support matrix.

Whenever possible, the G-9 should also conduct CMO functional transition events. A CMO rehearsal of concept drill will help to ensure CMO unity of effort and success in execution.
CHAPTER 5

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS COLLABORATIVE TARGETING

5000. Overview

Civil-military operations collaborative nonlethal targeting is an interorganizational and multidisciplinary effort to identify, pursue, and assess nonlethal activities that support the achievement of MAGTF CMO objectives. Nonlethal activities are described in the CMO purpose statement and civil affairs core tasks, but also include anything designed to create support from within the indigenous population or to provide support to indigenous populations.

A target is an entity (person, place, or thing) considered for possible engagement or action to alter or neutralize the function it performs for the adversary. A target’s operational importance is determined by conducting an assessment to determine if engaging the target is consistent with planned operations and will help achieve the commander’s objective(s) and the end state.

The emphasis of targeting is on identifying resources (targets) the enemy can least afford to lose or that provide him with the greatest advantage (e.g., high payoff targets), then further identifying the subset of those targets which must be acquired and engaged to achieve friendly success. Targeting links the desired effects to actions and tasks.

Civil-military operations collaborative targeting occurs when pursuit of nonlethal activities dictate close coordination between military forces and civilian organizations. The need for close coordination is driven by shared geographical and functional areas of responsibility, mutual interests and objectives, and requirements to optimize resources. Civil-military operations collaborative nonlethal targeting is inherently complex and difficult to accomplish because civilian partners use different processes for pursuing civil activities that are unique to their organizations and are not necessarily compatible with the joint targeting process used by the MAGTF.

A goal of CMO collaborative targeting is to develop a common understanding of the operating environment among all members of an interorganizational team in order to facilitate unity of
effort. It is the responsibility of the MAGTF commander and his staff to attempt to establish this type of understanding. This approach provides a more comprehensive picture of the challenges to be faced and helps to balance the use of capabilities to achieve operational success. Analysis of the operating environment and common understanding of stability will better enable stakeholders to decide who has best capabilities to target civil activities.

**5001. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Nonlethal Targeting Guidance and Policies**

Marine air-ground task force commanders must express their intent early in the planning process and include appropriate CMO guidance to staffs and subordinate commanders in order to facilitate close coordination with civilian partners. MAGTF commanders must always include guidance that speaks directly to how CMO coordination will take place and establish collaborative processes to build civil-military rapport, establish common civil-military objectives, and create interorganizational/interagency unity of effort. In the absence of adequate guidance from higher headquarters, military commanders must take initiative and request specific guidance in instances where established policies do not support operations or do not exist to support civil-military collaboration. Common examples of CMO policy issues are civilian access to classified information, funding in support of civil activities, and national caveats.

MAGTF commanders establish policies that guide achievement of objectives and in any given circumstance policies must be informed by applicable international and domestic law and US foreign policy and must take into account issues, such as the authority and legal obligations associated with conducting CMO. The law of land warfare, often referred to as law of armed conflict, regulates the conduct of armed hostilities and places certain responsibilities on occupying powers. These responsibilities include taking all measures within its powers to restore public order and safety while respecting, to the maximum extent possible, the laws of the occupied country. Legal advisors should review and assist in preparing plans or orders, as well as any agreements or memoranda of understanding established between US forces and the affected country. Civil-military operations may warrant supplemental rules of engagement unique to an assigned mission.
Civil contracting is an example where MAGTF commanders may not appreciate the importance of legal teams or the significance of establishing guidance and policy as it relates to leveraging contract support. Contracts will have an effect on the overall operation and coordination efforts among partners, and are awarded to external and local vendors. Contracting support must receive clear guidance and oversight, and be very specific in supporting overall MAGTF objectives.

Dealing with the private sector is another example where MAGTF commanders must be cognizant of policies and the impact of providing clear guidance. Private sector efforts can be instrumental in achieving overall mission success but must be carefully coordinated so that various agendas do not interfere or undermine MAGTF objectives.

5002. Nonlethal Targeting Approach

A nonlethal targeting approach is a methodical way to achieve desired civil-military effects over a period of time. It is fundamentally different from lethal targeting that seeks to prosecute hard targets for immediate effect. A nonlethal targeting approach must accommodate civil operating environments that are fluid and not normally conducive to prescriptive approaches seeking predictable outcomes. Any approach to nonlethal targeting must be simple and adaptive for use in permissive, as well as uncertain security environments where hostile elements, such as insurgents, criminals, or embittered local populations inhibit or disrupt civil activities. A nonlethal targeting approach must offer an organizational construct that is logical, executable, and suitable for collaborative civil-military targeting.

An additional aspect to a nonlethal targeting approach is the need to classify discrete targets as positive, negative, or neutral as they relate to the operational environment and its impact to MAGTF operations. These classifications help to differentiate the relative importance of nonlethal targets, but more importantly, they assist in identifying change or the need for change. Changes to the environment created by the MAGTF or otherwise may cause nonlethal targets to fluctuate between these classifications. Extreme fluctuation can become detrimental when positive and neutral targets become decidedly negative. Realistically, every civil environment will have positive, negative, and neutral influences that must be balanced to create stable conditions that are normal to the area of operations.
A recently employed approach to nonlethal targeting is to organize nonlethal civil-military activities into the following categories: infrastructure build, institutional development, provision of services, and significant personalities. Infrastructure build addresses physical infrastructure and economic development positive or neutral targets. Institutional development addresses governance, justice, and security nonlethal targets. Provision of services addresses quality of life issues. Significant personalities address positive, negative, and neutral parties capable of impacting MAGTF operations. These categories provide logical lines of effort that can be further subdivided into manageable tasks. These categories also provide a construct for MAGTF CMO planners to audit required resources and to identify capability gaps that necessitate external support.

**5003. Nonlethal Targeting Forums**

Civil-military operations collaborative targeting forums are organizational constructs that facilitate civil-military coordination or ad hoc groups used to address specific tasks, i.e., targeting. Collaborative forums must exist between civilian organizations and military forces in order to provide credible venues where the accomplishment of civil activities can be discussed, planned, and coordinated. The following examples illustrate how certain forums relate to CMO collaborative targeting.

CMO Working Group (CMOWG): The CMOWG brings all stakeholders together to focus their efforts on accomplishing the mission through CMO and to synchronize CMO with other activities in the battlespace. The CMOWG participates in the MAGTF planning effort and is a forum that can be used to nominate, coordinate, and assess CMO.

The targeting working group is the venue that synchronizes the output of all working groups by integrating lethal and nonlethal actions in support of operations. The MAGTF targeting battle rhythm or timeline is driven by the 96-hour joint air tasking cycle. Targets are prioritized in order to allocate or assign resources to achieve the desired effects. It is understood that target sets and resources or method of delivery may vary between lethal and nonlethal targets, hence nominations may not fit into the normal targeting timeline or occur daily, but input and
attendance should be planned in accordance with the MAGTF targeting working group battle rhythm.

Provincial Reconstruction Team: PRTs were formed in support of contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and consisted of military, diplomatic, and reconstruction SMEs, working to support reconstruction efforts in both countries. The purpose of PRTs is to improve and enhance local governance to transition those functions back to the host nation government. PRTs may form when diplomatic and major reconstruction efforts exceed both host nation and coalition military capabilities. The PRTs in both Iraq and Afghanistan were supported by CA teams and were important coordination and collaboration entities.

The first task in formally establishing collaborative working groups is to develop a mutually agreed upon charter which defines the purpose, method, and end state. The charter identifies all major stakeholders, establishes business rules, and seeks to garner enduring stakeholder participation. Issues such as access to information, roles, responsibilities, battle rhythm, formats, and methods are determined so that constructive discourse can occur and procedures are established to encourage collaboration among all stakeholders.

5004. Joint Targeting

The joint targeting process is inherently important to MAGTF civil-military operations because it provides the necessary military framework for interorganizational collaboration to take place. Interorganizational collaboration is the capability of organizations (or a set of organizations) to enter into, develop, and sustain interorganizational systems in pursuit of collective goals. The employment of nonlethal and lethal MAGTF capabilities, as it relates to targeted efforts, must be guided by common taxonomy and lexicon that can be understood throughout the joint community and civilian partners. In accordance with JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, the purpose of targeting is to systematically analyze and prioritize targets and match appropriate lethal and nonlethal actions to those targets to create specific desired effects that achieve joint force objectives.
The joint targeting process is used to link desired effects to actions and tasks and consists of the following six phase iterative process: end state and commander’s objectives, target development and prioritization, capabilities analysis, commander’s decision and force assignment, mission planning and force execution, and assessment. The Marine Corps’ targeting methodology of D3A (decide, detect, deliver and assess) feeds into the joint targeting process.

MAGTF nonlethal targeting methods must remain consistent with the joint targeting process in order to maintain unity of effort throughout the joint force. Different methods are used to pursue lethal and nonlethal activities but these methods must coexist in an integrated targeting effort with compatible iterative steps that lead to overall mission accomplishment.

5005. Civil Affairs Methodology

The civil affairs methodology uses a process that is compatible with the joint targeting process and accepted civilian practices. Civil affairs methodology is a process used by CA trained Marines to assess, plan, execute, and transition CMO activities. The CA methodology is similar to the joint targeting process steps with a caveat that some civil activities may not equate to high payoff targets but are instrumental in supporting overall civil-military objectives. In the true sense of targeting, the CA methodology analyzes sources of civil stability and instability and recommends applying MAGTF resources through project nominations and civil-military engagement activities. Using CA methodology, CA forces closely examine the elements of the civil environment through the following six steps: assess, decide, develop and detect, deliver, evaluate, and transition (AD3ET).

a. Assess

The assess step begins at receipt of the mission and assesses current conditions against a defined norm or established standards. CMO planners review all mission-related material to include operation plans, intelligence summaries, fragmentary orders, the commander’s intent, and joint common plans. From these sources, CMO planners collect all relevant information, such as interorganizational points of contact. CMO planners assess civil considerations through the framework of ASCOPE/PMESII.
b. Decide

This step develops CA actions for commander’s approval. Civil affairs actions address CMO activities from initial response to transition. This step includes producing CA priorities, CMO concept of support, and the Annex G. In addition, MOPs and MOEs for the various related objectives and tasks are identified.

c. Develop and Detect

This is the execution step of CMO-related tasks. Civil affairs Marines facilitate interorganizational collaboration, establish CMOCs, conduct civil reconnaissance in support of CIM, and monitor public information programs and CMO-related reports. Civil affairs Marines continue deliberate assessments to confirm assumptions made during the assess step. The products of this step include continuous assessments, revised or updated plans, and the issuance of fragmentary orders.

d. Deliver

The output of this step is CMO tasks accomplishment. Properly executed CMO tasks will mitigate or reduce the need for contingency/crisis action operations, particularly in early stages of operations before armed conflict occurs. Monitoring must be continuous until complete transition. A set of targeted civil activities should lead to greater stability. Activities during this step include civil projects/programs oversight, support to local government and community leaders, and collection of civil information.

e. Evaluate

This step evaluates CMO task accomplishment and the effectiveness of accomplishing the task. This step validates the CMO CONOPS and substantiates mission accomplishment through evaluating established MOPs and MOEs. Civil affairs Marines analyze the effects of the operation (intended and unintended) based on objectives and determine the sustainability and viability of projects or programs initiated during the execution phase. During this step, CMO
planners determine the following: need to adjust plan, need for new COAs, mitigation strategies
unintended consequences, termination/transition criteria and timelines.

**f. Transition**

The last step in the CA Methodology is the transition phase. During this step, CMO planners
prepare to terminate or transition civil-military tasks to host nation authorities, international
organizations, NGOs, follow-on CA units, other military units (non-civil affairs), and/or
interagency partners. Transition requires a vast amount of pre-coordination. All parties should
conduct concurrent planning.

**5006. Civil Reconnaissance**

Habitual interaction between Marine forces and civilian organizations is critical to achieving a
more complete understanding of the operational environment. Every civilian in the AO is a
potential source of civil information. Civil-military operations planners, in coordination with the
CA detachments, integrate civil reconnaissance into the CONOPS, support the development of a
comprehensive COP that highlights civil considerations, and influences the commander’s
decision-making process. It does so by providing relevant information focused on lucrative civil
activities and the accomplishment of MAGTF objectives. Potential sources of civil information
from a coordinated civil reconnaissance plan include:

- Observations made by combat elements and CA detachments in routine operations.
- Results of stability assessment questionnaires.
- Debriefings of Marines involved in various civil projects, such as Community Health
  Engagement (medical civic action program, dental civic action program, veterinary civic
  action program, fishery civic action program).
- ASCOPE assessments that are relevant to or highlight stability trends.
- Researching civil information using the appropriate databases.
- Researching DOS background notes.
- Information gathered from Marine Corps Intelligence Activity country studies.
- Information gathered from NGOs and the interagency.
- Information gathered from social media.
- Cultural information, like religious and tribal affiliations.
- Interaction with interorganizational partners.
- Interaction with host nation government officials.
- Reach-back support provided by culture, civil affairs, and CMO SMEs.

These efforts help to refine and maintain situational awareness of the operating environment and must be conducted continuously to ascertain changes to the environment that affect MAGTF operations and the conduct of CMO collaborative targeting.

5007. Analysis of the Operating Environment

Understanding the environment is the most important aspect of collaborative targeting because a solid grasp of the civil environment helps the MAGTF commander and his staff to better formulate and identify root causes of instability that should become the focus of civil efforts.

A thorough understanding of the operating environment requires analysis of social systems and their interrelationships. PMESII should be examined comprehensively as a network because root causes of instability are rarely isolated to just one system or issue. These systems with their major elements, interrelationships, and multitude of nodes combine to create adaptive complex relationships that evolve with changing circumstances.

Collaborative targeting seeks to influence change by exploiting windows of opportunity to positively affect overall system behavior. It is essential to understand that systems involving economic, political, and social interaction are dominated by humans, who continually adapt to actual or anticipated actions, and are not open to easy observation or predictable behavior. Therefore, CMO collaborative targeting must expect uncertainty, augment traditional intelligence gathering with expert judgment, and apply intuition in cases where reliable information does not exist.
Civil partners may use different approaches or methods in collaborative targeting but the common denominator must be the shared understanding of instability problems. A shared understanding of instability sets conditions that allow for mutual support and collaboration.

**Civil Information Analysis**

Civil considerations analysis is accomplished through civil reconnaissance, data mining, and information sharing and is supported by the civil information management system. The analysis of civil information necessitates close examination of ASCOPE as it relates directly to the civil operating environment. Use of the CA methodology (ASCOPE/PMESII) and other pertinent methods produce relevant civil considerations that inform MAGTF planning and potentially direct CMO collaborative targeting.

Civil considerations analysis occurs during the assessment phase, but it is an ongoing effort throughout MAGTF operations that must be pursued jointly with external partners and fused with all available analytical products to facilitate unity of effort among interorganizational partners. Iterative civil analysis is profoundly important because CMO collaborative targeting must stay abreast of evolving environments that directly affect CONOPS and the pursuit of extant civil activities.

A key point to recognize in conducting civil information analysis is the relative effort, order of magnitude, and degree of difficulty associated with compiling and analyzing civil information in highly complex environments. Civil analysis also requires subject matter expertise that may not be within the core competencies of the MAGTF, such as: language, religion, economic and infrastructure development, institution building. MAGTF commanders, CMO planners, and CA forces must recognize this potential shortfall in CA manpower and civil expertise and seek to leverage every means available to obtain civil information analysis produced by interorganizational partners.

**5008. Civilian Approaches to Conflict Assessment, Analysis and Targeting**

The Interagency and NGOs approach targeting in a notably similar way to the military. Both the interagency and NGOs seek to identify the problem and then how to solve it. Due to their
mandates and biases, what they target may be different from the military. Moreover, it is important to understand and appreciate that there are a multitude of tools and methodologies to assist with the identification of different problem sets.

One of the most common intersects between military and civilians are in a conflict-ridden theater. For this reason, this publication’s primary focus is on conflict assessments versus other types of assessments, how to collaborate more effectively with partners to program funds and resources. This is one of the most difficult challenges facing all stakeholders. This is because stakeholders generally have different mandates and resources and may have biases that limit our ability to see the full spectrum of targeting possibilities.

USAID has designed conflict analysis tools: Currently, USAID uses the Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0 (Fig. 5-1). CAF 2.0 gathers information similar to CPB and SAF. The main difference is that their analysis that may not span the full breadth that an ASCOPE/PMESII analysis does. Moreover, the CPB process for civilians occurs during the assessment phase not prior to it as is the case in MCPP. Additionally it is also important to note that these tools cited here are not universally applied nor institutionally mandated in either agency. In other words it will not be used by all USAID or DOS staff in the field, but is a tool that is available to apply in conflict settings.

![Figure 5-1. Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0](image)

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a. Conflict Assessment Research

Before conducting a conflict assessment it will be necessary to find the following skill sets and resources:

- Local networks or people who can help organize and participate in interviews, focus groups, etc.
- Knowledge of local languages and cultures.
- Ability to travel to areas where research will take place.
- Ability to design and carry out rigorous research methodologies.
- Ability to synthesize data into knowledge and prioritize information.
- Relationships or contact with donors, governments, and others working in the region.

This is best done via partnerships formed with other organizations and is the most effective way to carry out conflict assessments. Before the conflict assessment is launched a tool must be selected.

b. Conflict Assessment Tools

The following list presents an array of current conflict analysis tools currently within the international community (listed below):

- Department of State CSO analytics.
- USAID Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0.
- District Stability Framework.
- Stability Assessment Framework (SAF).
- CDA do no harm framework.

This is not comprehensive or exhaustive nor is it meant to be prescriptive. There are common elements that are necessary for an effective conflict assessment:
c. Key Requirements From an Assessment Tool

The key requirements of an assessment tool include those that address factors that both drive and mitigate conflict. District Stability Framework cited in Marine Corps doctrine and SAF, as it appears in Appendix C, are civil affairs tools that incorporate these tenants.

- **Factors Driving Conflict**

  These factors include a range of lenses (categories) to map stakeholders and their means, motivations, and core grievances, to map relationships between driving factors, and to identify issues arising from the local context and windows of vulnerability given the historic legacy of the conflict.

- **Factors Mitigating Conflict**

  Mitigating factors include a range of lenses (categories) to map stakeholders supporting peace, to identify local traditions, values, and institutions supporting resiliency and social capital, and to assess possible windows of opportunity.

Examples include:

- Who is driving the conflict and who is supporting peace?
- What are the driving and mitigating factors?
- When did the conflict escalate or deescalate in the past and what is the forecast for future windows of opportunity or vulnerability?
- Where is the conflict taking place? Are governance mechanisms functioning?
- Why are the key actors motivated to drive and mitigate conflict?
- How are key actors driving or mitigating conflict? With what means?

**d. Data Quality**

A good conflict assessment framework is insufficient without good quality data. Inaccurate or inadequate data put into a perfect framework will still result in a faulty conflict assessment. This wastes time and money on interventions that do not work.
Guidance on the research process is imperative and includes knowing how to:

- Gather data sources that are accurate, reliable and triangulated. Data sources include books, reports, blogs, news articles, twitter feeds, polling, interviews, focus groups, observations and the interactive methods described in this handbook for use in multi-stakeholder workshops.
- Evaluate the quality of each data source. Identify gaps in data or places where there is uncertain or contradictory data. Identify hypotheses for why data may be conflicting. Make a plan to gather further information.

Researchers should ask—

- What information are we missing?
- Whose perspectives do we need to seek out?
- What research process could we use to discover this information?

**e. Theory of Change**

A theory of change suggests how an intervention will change the conflict. It is the rationale for doing something. For example, an assessment might point out particular drivers of conflict. A theory of change would then suggest how those drivers of conflict could be addressed in order to prevent violent conflict.

A theory of change is not a single theory such as the theory of relativity but a method to identify the perceived logic between the key factors driving conflict and those efforts that will prevent conflict or contribute to stability. Table 5-1 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008) describes theories of change at different levels.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory of Change</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual change: If we transform attitudes, behaviors and skills of a significant portion of individuals, we will create a critical mass of people who will advocate peace effectively.</td>
<td>Individual change through training, personal transformation or consciousness-raising workshops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy relationships and connections: Strong relationships are needed to bring about peace. Breaking down barriers, stereotypes improve relations between factions.</td>
<td>Processes of intergroup dialogue, networking, relationship building processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal of the resources for war: Wars require weapons, supplies and transport as well as human capital. Interruption of these supplies will disrupt the system.</td>
<td>Campaigns focused on cutting off funds for war, civil society pressure and resistance from the population, international arms control, embargoes and boycotts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of violence: Reducing levels of violence carried out by combatants will increase chances of bringing security and peace.</td>
<td>Cease fires, zones of peace, introduction of peacekeeping forces, promotion of nonviolent methods of attaining political, social and economic goals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-1. Theories of Change

5009. Tracking Progress in Civil-Military Operations Collaborative Targeting

Assessments underpin and drive CMO collaborative nonlethal targeting. Assessments are the impetus behind generating collaborative iterative processes where targets are continually evaluated and pursued. Civil-military operations targeting will not be successful if assessment processes, methods, and procedures are not understood and addressed early in the initial planning phase.

An essential prerequisite to the conduct of assessments is to address lexicon issues and then agree on how to conduct assessments as it relates to collaborative CMO nonlethal targeting. A widely accepted definition of assessment is: the act of assessing; appraisal; evaluation. This definition is lacking or incomplete when it comes to evaluating complexities associated with
conducting CMO because the word assessment is also closely associated with other words like: surveys, studies, reviews, analysis.

**a. Conducting Campaign-Level Assessments**

Campaign-level assessments are conducted at operational and strategic levels and require a high degree of expertise not often found in MAGTF staffs. Therefore, careful consideration should be applied to forming campaign assessment efforts early in initial planning as objectives and end states are developed.

The purpose of campaign-level assessments is to support operational- or strategic-level decision-making. Operational and strategic decision-making deals with future problems, not current tactical problems. Therefore, by definition, campaign assessments must attempt to forecast future problems so they may be interceded and addressed in the pursuit of accomplishing operational or strategic goals. The most important aspect of conducting campaign-level assessments is that they are meant to be a forecasting tool that examines and aggregates an abundance of information throughout all levels of warfare i.e., tactical, operational, strategic.

For MAGTF CMO campaign-level assessments, there are four requirements to make assessment efforts useful in CMO collaborative targeting:

- Assessments at the different levels of warfare (tactical, operational, strategic) and across interorganizational partners must be linked. Vertical linkage in the chain of command is critical to ascertaining facts. Horizontal linkage across interorganizational partners provides an integrated assessment combining the separate diplomatic, information, military, and economic assessments from civilian and coalition governments.
- Collected information and operational end states must be logically connected. There must be a logical connection between the processed information collected and forecasted end states. Credible and logical reasons must be presented as to why the combined (qualitative and quantitative) values of the collected information forecast the stability or instability should transition occur. Satisfying this requirement provides a mechanism for addressing the
obstacles to achieving the end states, which is critical to supporting the commander’s resource decisions.

- The required information must be identified and collected. There are three possible failure modes: collecting irrelevant information, not collecting necessary information, and not knowing which of the previous two failures are present.
- The collected information must be processed using valid logic, math, and science to the greatest degree possible. In the absence of empirical data, it is especially necessary that assessment staffs creatively apply subjective, professional judgment to objective and subjective information in order to formulate and justify assessment criteria.

Of the requirements, the first requirement of linking the assessments at different levels of warfare is most challenging because disparate interpretations of CMO effectiveness lead to loss of confidence in any collaborative CMO nonlethal targeting process. In order to avoid this pitfall, it is very important to understand how unique organizational assessments relate to a larger CMO campaign-level targeting effort. For purposes of clarity in discussing collaborative assessments, these unique organizational assessments are best described as M&E efforts.

b. Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring is routine observation and recording (assessment) of activities taking place in any operation or project. It is a process of gathering information and checking progress. It requires systematic observation and provides feedback on progress. The feedback is used to track task accomplishment and informs decision-making as it relates to overall mission accomplishment.

Monitoring allows an organization to make adjustments as operations are conducted and provides useful information in analyzing the environment. Determining proper use of resources, identifying sources of instability and resiliencies, supervising execution, generating lessons learned, and determining effectiveness are all results of monitoring.

Monitoring indicators are established during planning according to the following types:

- Output indicators: used to describe the project activity (e.g., amount of money spent, miles of road built, number of patrols), referred to as MOP.
Impact indicators: measure change in conditions or behavior (e.g., improved economy, greater mobility, perception of safety), referred to as MOE.

During execution and later on after mission termination, monitoring provides the information needed to conduct evaluations in support of decision-making and the compilation of lessons learned that are beneficial in subsequent operations.

Evaluation is a process of judging achievement as it relates to executing plans and accomplishing objectives, and requires value judgment. It is directly related to monitoring in the sense that information is evaluated for express purposes. Evaluation seeks to identify impediments as it relates to achieving objectives and searches for solutions in constantly evolving conditions. Evaluation also enables cost-benefit analysis to be conducted in measurable terms against mission accomplishment. Evaluation is also conducted during initial planning, continuously during execution, and at the end upon mission termination, but is distinguished by the need for information management to support analysis and decision-making. It is important to understand the difference between campaign-level assessments and M&E. Campaign-level assessments need to be conducted when the MAGTF is leading or participating in JTF-level operations in which interorganizational partners must align efforts to achieve operational or strategic goals.

Campaign assessments serve two purposes distinct from conducting M&E:

- Assess complex long-range objectives from multiple organizations that are postulated to take an extended time to accomplish (i.e., years).
- Are robust and capable enough to assess all interorganizational inputs.

In a hierarchy, a campaign-level assessment is the highest level of assessment where subordinate organization’s M&E efforts are guided and aggregated into a single comprehensive analytical product that supports strategic decision-making. Monitoring and evaluation efforts are used at each subordinate level, as well as the highest headquarters element to track organic, tactical through strategic efforts. The term or practice of M&E does not limit or diminish the impact or relevance of its efforts. Monitoring and evaluation efforts must exist throughout all relevant organizations and entities to track progress and measure success as it relates to evaluating individual goals. The degree to which M&E is pursued should be predicated on mission analysis.
and the resources available to observe and analyze information. Monitoring and evaluation
specific and general assessment decisions are defined as the MCPP is utilized and civil
considerations are factored into the overall operational design.
APPENDIX A

Civil Preparation of the Battlespace

Civil preparation of the battlespace is an iterative analytical method used to examine the civil operating environment. It analyzes different aspects of civil information and assesses the civil impact of friendly, adversary, external actors, and the local populace on MAGTF operations. The purpose is to gain a comprehensive understanding of the civil operating environment in order to inform decision makers of possible civil actions that may impact MAGTF missions. The following four steps are used to develop CPB products:

Step 1. Define the civil operating environment

Step 2. Analyze the civil operating environment

Step 3. Develop a civil environment model

Step 4. Determine civil actions

Civil Preparation of the Battlespace Execution

Step 1: Define the civil operating environment. This step focuses on collecting civil information. This is a disciplined approach to gather and organize civil information, categorize and record the results. The starting point of this effort may be an existing area study of the designated AO to be further refined using civil consideration matrices. At a minimum, information will be categorized using standard civil considerations (ASCOPE) as the baseline. This product (either in ASCOPE or ASCOPE / PMESII format) is the basis of all further civil information collection.

Gather and organize information relevant to the assigned AO: This is the “what do I see?” approach to looking at the data. For example, consider:
AREAS—Consider how areas affect the MAGTF’s mission (terrain, vegetation, weather, urban areas, civilian movement corridors)? How do MAGTF operations impact civilian activities in these areas?

STRUCTURES—Are there structures with significance to MAGTF operations (government buildings, bridges, churches, power, water, etc.)? What are consequences/implications of destruction / damage? What are the benefits for controlling or protecting key structures?

CAPABILITIES—What are the capabilities of the population to sustain itself (public administration, safety, emergency services, etc.)? What resources and services can support the MAGTF’s mission?

ORGANIZATIONS—What are the organized groups affiliated / not affiliated with the government? Are there key leaders associated with these groups? Are there non-indigenous organizations present (e.g., NGOs, international organizations, foreign militaries)?

PEOPLE—How many people live in the AO? What is the demography? Who are the key individuals in the local population and what can they do to assist MAGTF operations? Are the people cooperative/uncooperative with their government and/or MAGTF operations?

EVENTS—What are the agricultural seasons (e.g., planting, harvesting)? What are the holidays / festivals and when do they occur? Are there patterns of natural disaster events?

Determine information requirements.

- Evaluate existing databases and determine intelligence and information gaps.
- Collect materials and submit RFIs.

Organize the information gathered. For example; time permitting, further refine ASCOPE utilizing operational variables (PMESII).

- Political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of government, to include political structure (both formal and informal).
Military variable includes the military capabilities of all armed forces (e.g., host nation, insurgents, local militia, and police).

Economic variable consists of general economic categories of the AO (e.g., energy, raw materials, labor distribution, income/food distribution, goods/services, and illicit markets).

Social variable describes societies within an operational environment (population members are subject to the same political authority, occupies a common territory, have a common culture and shares a sense of identity).

Information variable involves the collection, access, use, manipulation, distribution and reliance on data, media and knowledge systems (both civilian and military) by the local communities.

Infrastructure variable includes the basic facilities, services and installations needed for a community or society to function.

The finished product for Step 1 is a collation of civil considerations (ASCOPE) organized by operational variables (PMESII) as seen in table A-1.

**Table A-1. ASCOPE / PMESII Analysis Example**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Military/Police</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Areas (District Boundary, Party affiliation areas)</td>
<td>Military Areas (Coalition / local nation bases, historic ambush/IED sites)</td>
<td>Economic Areas (bazaars, shops, markets)</td>
<td>Social Areas (parks and other meeting areas)</td>
<td>Irrigation networks, water tables, medical coverage</td>
<td>Radio/television/Newspapers (where people gather for word-of-mouth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Structures (town halls, government offices)</td>
<td>Military / Police buildings (police HQ, Military HQ locations)</td>
<td>Economic Structures (banks, markets, storage facilities)</td>
<td>Social Structures (Churches, restaurants, bars, etc.)</td>
<td>Infrastructure Structures (roads, bridges, power lines, walls, dams)</td>
<td>Information Structures (Cellular/radio/television towers, print shops)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Structures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Capabilities</td>
<td>Military Capabilities</td>
<td>Economic Capabilities</td>
<td>Social Capabilities</td>
<td>Infrastructure Capabilities</td>
<td>Info Capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>(Dispute resolution, Insurgent capabilities)</td>
<td>(security posture, strengths and weaknesses)</td>
<td>(access to banks, ability to withstand natural disasters)</td>
<td>(Strength of local &amp; national ties)</td>
<td>(Ability to build / maintain roads, walls, dams)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Political Organizations (Political parties and other power brokers, UN,)</td>
<td>Military Organizations (What units of military, police, insurgent are present)</td>
<td>Economic Organizations (Banks, large land holders, big businesses)</td>
<td>Social Organizations (tribes, clans, families, youth groups, NGOs / international organizations)</td>
<td>Infrastructure Organizations (Government ministries, construction companies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Political People (Governors, councils, elders)</td>
<td>Military People (Leaders from coalition, local nation and insurgent forces)</td>
<td>Economic People (Bankers, landholders, merchants)</td>
<td>Social People (Religious leaders, influential families)</td>
<td>Infrastructure People (Builders, contractors, development councils)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Political Events (elections, council meetings)</td>
<td>Military Events (kinetic events, loss of leadership, operations)</td>
<td>Economic Events (drought, harvest, business open/close)</td>
<td>Social Events (holidays, weddings, religious days)</td>
<td>Infrastructure Events (road / bridge construction, well digging, scheduled maintenance)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:

CivCas - civilian casualty  IO- information

**Step 2:** Analyze the Civil Operating Environment. The focus of effort in this step is to analyze the information collected during Step 1. Analysis takes into consideration operational variables, operational culture, and instability/stability dynamics. The finished products include a civil environment factors and relevance matrix, operational culture matrix, instability/stability factors matrix.

**Conduct ASCOPE-PMESII analysis.** ASCOPE-PMESII analysis is used to examine civil considerations more closely as it relates to accomplishing the MAGTF mission. The initial effort in Step 2 is to carefully examine civil considerations using operational variables [PMESII] to ascertain factors relevant to MAGTF operations. Below is an example of analyzing “Areas” using the ASCOPE/PMESII construct and the application of relevant questions.
- **Areas / Political**—What is the political situation in the AO? What are the political boundaries? What is significant?

- **Areas / Military**—What military capabilities are in the AO? What are the military boundaries? What is significant?

- **Areas / Economic**—What are the key and decisive areas of economic activity?

- **Areas / Social**—What is the social climate in the AO? What are the key and decisive social factors that affect the AO - ethnic enclaves, crime districts, etc.?

- **Areas / Information**—How is information collected and / or disseminated in the AO? What are the key and decisive information requirements in the AO?

- **Areas / Infrastructure**—What are the key and decisive elements of infrastructure in the AO? Where are the key and decisive elements of infrastructure located?

The analysis is conducted for each component of ASCOPE individually and takes into account the MAGTF mission, commander’s intent and / or guidance.

Determining factors and relevance through the ASCOPE-PMESII analysis method encompasses more than populating or repopulating 36 blocks with general information. Civil affairs Marines must understand “mining” for relevant and key factors of civil information are a focused and continuous process. An approach to capturing the most relevant ASCOPE / PMESII factors is to compile the information into a matrix as seen in table A-2.

**Table A-2. Civil Environment Factors & Relevance Matrix Example – ”A” of ASCOPE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Considerations</th>
<th>Operational Variables</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AREAS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>What are the factors in the Civil Environment that will significantly affect friendly forces (positively and negatively)?</td>
<td>How will each factor affect the friendly forces?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political boundaries are manipulated</td>
<td>Boundaries are drawn to favor one political faction over another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Military districts overlap economic regions</td>
<td>Military ownership of industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Economic development areas</td>
<td>Key industries and supply chains are linked through geographic location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Municipalities, towns and villages are largely ethnically homogenous</td>
<td>Ethnic enclaves are prevalent with little intermingling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Telecommunication is widespread</td>
<td>Information is easily controlled by the government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Investment in infrastructure is uneven</td>
<td>Investment favors supporters of the regime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to operational variables, operational culture and instability/stability dynamics variables are also examined in conjunction with ASCOPE / PMESII information. This is done to determine relevant factors derived from two different perspectives important to achieving a thorough understanding of the civil environment. Application of operational culture and instability/stability dynamics will ensure the final civil environment factors and relevance matrix is sufficiently complete to be carried forward into Step 3.

**Apply a cultural lens.** Culture is the shared world view and social structures of a group of people that influences a person’s and a group’s actions and choices. All MAGTF operations impact the environment in which they are conducted. Similarly, the operational environment will have an impact on MAGTF operations. In order to better account for and anticipate civil impacts on MAGTF operations, CPB seeks to account for cultural considerations.

“Operational culture” consists of five (5) “dimensions” influencing operationally-relevant behavior, conduct and attitudes. These operational culture dimensions involve the physical environment, the economy of a culture, social structures, political structures, and the beliefs and symbols of a culture group.

In describing the operational environment, i.e., completing the ASCOPE-PMESII analysis method,” cultural dimensions may inadvertently be addressed. For example, the “A” of ASCOPE may account for the physical environment dimension. Similarly, the “E” of PMESII may account for the economy of a culture dimension. Each of the five dimensions of operational culture will be present in a thorough ASCOPE-PMESII method.

Oftentimes, the desire to populate data overcomes a systematic approach to collecting data making an ASCOPE - PMESII incomplete. Knowledge of the local culture group allows Marines
to frame planning and execution in order to create conditions facilitating conduct by indigenous people commensurate with MAGTF tactical or operational goals. To ensure that culture is considered and accounted for goes beyond the ASCOPE-PMESII analysis method. The dimensions of operational culture should be applied to the ASCOPE / PMESII data to determine operationally relevant information.

There is no singular approach to applying a cultural lens to the data collected in step 1. Every situation will require careful consideration based on commander’s intent and guidance and the nature of the MAGTF’s operations. Civil affairs Marines should endeavor to apply cultural perspective-taking (to “see” and “feel” others’ behavior / actions in the frame of that person’s culture) and cultural interpretation (the process by which understanding and meaning is derived) to the information they have gathered. The point of this approach is to minimize “mirroring,” (i.e., viewing the information from a US Marine, Western mentality). Regardless of the approach taken, each of the five dimensions has factors that must be addressed:

**Physical Environment.** How do people in the culture use the environment? All cultures have developed a unique interdependent relationship with their physical environment. Operationally relevant features of the physical environment that must be considered are water, land, food, materials for shelter, climate / seasons, fuel / power and transportation and communications. Civil affairs Marines must determine what features of the physical environment are used by the populace in their daily effort to survive, because, HOW the MAGTF will use the ‘their’ physical environment during the course of its operation will affect / influence the ability of the indigenous people in the AO to survive. Likewise, how the people use and interact in their physical environment influences the range of options available to the MAGTF.

**Economy of Culture.** All cultures have a specific system for obtaining, producing and distributing the items that people need or want to survive in their society (food, water, cars, houses etc.). This system (which does not necessarily require money or banks) is the economy of a culture. What are the economic exchange systems and the formal and informal economies that the culture uses? Additionally, CA Marines must consider how the economy impacts the structuring of social relationships.
Social Structures. All cultures assign people different roles, status and power within the group. What is the way people organize themselves and distribute power and status? While there are many possible ways to categorize people, most societies around the world differentiate people on the basis of the following characteristics: Age, gender, kinship / tribal affiliation, class, ethnicity / race, religious membership / key social structures / traditional authorities, organizations /alliances. Civil affairs Marines must recognize the social structures of a culture group in order for the MAGTF to work effectively within local political, military, economic and social systems.

Political Structures. How do people in the culture determine authority and leadership? All cultures have a system that determines who leads the group and makes decisions about its welfare. How a group is ruled (and it may not be by a specific person or set of people) is referred to as the political structure of a culture. Considerations include formal (official recognition) versus informal leadership (respected members of a community) and / or authority vs power, organizations and alliances. Civil affairs Marines must understand the existing power and authority structure, how to work with the individuals within that structure and their influence on the economy and social structure.

Belief Systems. How do cultural beliefs shape people’s behavior? All cultures have a shared set of beliefs and symbols that unite the group. Beliefs are based on more than religion. Some examples include: ideologies (Communism, slavery), history and stories, education, family and tradition, religious beliefs (both formal religious systems and informal religious systems). It is important for CA Marines to grasp the local history, legends, sayings and religion of an area, as it may reflect local perceptions of your Marine’s behavior in the AO.

When applying a cultural filter to the information collected in step 1, a good approach is to consider the relevant questions posed in Appendix B of Operational Culture for the Warfighter. The operational culture matrix (see table A-3) illustrates some of these questions. Applying a cultural lens to the ASCOPE / PMESII data will result in a greater understanding of key and relevant cultural factors affecting MAGTF operations.
Operational culture factors derived from this effort are compiled and included into the Civil Environment Factors and Relevance Matrix to develop the most comprehensive list of relevant factors up until this point in the CPB process.

Table A-3. Operational Culture Matrix Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How do people in the culture use the environment?</th>
<th>What are the economic exchange systems and the formal and informal economies that the culture uses?</th>
<th>What is the way people organize themselves and distribute power and status?</th>
<th>How do people in the culture determine authority and leadership?</th>
<th>How do cultural beliefs shape people’s behavior?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Environment</td>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Social Structure</td>
<td>Political Structure</td>
<td>Belief Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What roles are expected of Marine personnel with respect to water use and provision?</td>
<td>• How will Marine operations affect the informal economy and the people in it?</td>
<td>• At what age is someone considered a child or adult?</td>
<td>• How is decision-making organized, and who gets to make decisions?</td>
<td>• What are the pivotal historical stories that all people in the community share?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What kinds of operational considerations are influenced by water, or override cultural aspects of water as a physical resource?</td>
<td>• How does the formal economy rely upon the informal economy, and what abuses of the AO’s population does this cause?</td>
<td>• How should Marines prepare to respond to children that act as soldiers in militaries or insurgencies, or participate in violent activities against US forces?</td>
<td>• Who do leaders have to consult, and to whom must they answer?</td>
<td>• How are these histories, folktales and sayings used to support propaganda for or against Marine and US activities in the region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What land in the AO is/is not appropriate for certain groups of people to use?</td>
<td>• How will Marine expenditure in the local informal economy, or employment of local informal economic actors, influence the socio-economic balance of power in the AO?</td>
<td>• What work, roles, activities and spaces are assigned predominantly to men and women?</td>
<td>• Who are formal leaders and what symbols indicate status?</td>
<td>• Are the heroes or villains compared to Marines or Americans?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cultural Factors Affecting MAGTF Operations

- Activities of life are centered on the seasons (dry and wet). Only life necessities occur during wet season.
- Goods and services are not traded across tribal lines. Most activity is informal.
- Society dominated by gender (male).
- Political power derived by loose confederation of tribal alliances.
- Muslims in the south feel oppressed by Christian majority.
**Consider Instability/Stability Dynamics.** ASCOPE- PMESII analysis method is a flexible tool that can be used to provide both a macro and micro civil view of an area of operations. Similarly, accounting for instability/stability dynamics can be scoped toward the macro and micro level. The key difference between macro or micro-focused views relates to the level of effort in gaining an awareness of local perceptions, i.e., it takes more effort to collate, assimilate and comprehend the meaning of multiple local perception data from multiple areas versus targeted singular efforts for specific local areas.

In most cases CA Marines will be looking to understand instability and stability dynamics at a micro level. This includes understanding the grievances (instability) and resiliencies (stability) of the local population, identifying key influences and identifying events that could affect stability and instability. Key influences are selected individuals, groups, assets, infrastructure and socio-cultural belief sets or factors, which could have a significant influence on friendly mission accomplishment, and should be considered in operational planning and execution.

Civil preparation of the battlespace deals primarily with understanding the civil dimension of the operational environment. To that end, population surveys (perception data) focused on instability/stability dynamics are very important endeavors, requiring careful consideration and even more vigilant planning when operating in remote areas where little or no information exists on local perceptions. However, in many instances perception data can be obtained through a variety of sources; for example, unit situation reports, US embassy sources (embassy reporting, USAID, etc.), UN sources, civil engagements, US Army human terrain team reports and tactical conflict surveys (TCSs). Perception data is then compiled and ordered with events and key influences (see table A-4) where events are initially considered neutral until acted upon by key influences, which determine whether events are perceived as grievances or resiliencies.

Analysis of instability/stability factors is an iterative process. During CPB, the CA Marine should populate the instability/stability factors matrix to the best of their ability. Analysis continues during course of action development where further analysis of instability/stability factors are considered such as described below:
Instability results when factors fostering instability (grievances) overwhelm societal resiliencies and/or the ability of the government to mitigate these factors. Civil affairs Marines should consider the following to assist in assessing grievances within the AO. What factors:

- Decrease support for the government?
- Increase support for “malign actors?”
- Disrupt the normal functioning of society?

Too often, efforts to alleviate instability obscure and actually undermine existing societal resiliencies. The analysis of resiliencies must compliment overall stability assessments and be strongly considered in planning MAGTF operations. Civil affairs Marines should consider the following to assist in assessing stability (resiliencies) within the AO. What factors:

- Increase support for the government?
- Decrease support for “malign actors?”
- Increase societal and institutional capacity and capabilities?

The information derived in instability/stability analysis are compiled similar to operational culture and included into the Civil Environment Factors and Relevance Matrix to develop the most comprehensive list possible before proceeding to step 3 of the CPB process.

**Table A-4. Instability/Stability Factors Matrix Example**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grievances:</th>
<th>Events:</th>
<th>Key influences: Means and Motivations:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the core grievances and societal vulnerabilities identified in your civil considerations (From perception data)?</td>
<td>Potential situations that could contribute to an increase in instability (From ASCOPE / PMESII)?</td>
<td>What are the influencers, the means and motivations that contribute to an increase of instability (From ASCOPE / PMESII)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local people feel neglected</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>Lack of representation in government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resiliencies:</th>
<th>Events:</th>
<th>Key influences: Means and Motivations:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What processes, relationships, or institutions enable the society to function normally and peacefully? Are there any previous resiliencies that have</td>
<td>What potential or anticipated future situations could create an opening for key influences to further reinforce stability (From ASCOPE / PMESII)?</td>
<td>What key influences in the society preserve and strengthen stability? What means do they possess, what are the motives, and what</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Step 3: Develop a Civil Environment Model. During this step, you will evaluate the civil component and produce a Civil Environment Model similar to the technique used in producing a civil-modified combined obstacle overlay.

A Civil Environment Model depicts a system of key influences. A Civil Environment Model includes: (1) A narrative describing the civil environment that is specific to the area of operations. (2) A key influences matrix produced from analytical methods such as stakeholder and geospatial analysis and (3) A civil “picture” or series of graphics depicting the civil environment and key influences.

Describe the Civil Environment. In describing a stable civil environment, the purpose is to model “normal” civilian life and activities. The stable environment and civil / social norms are described in narrative form following an outline similar to the matrix provided in table A-5.

Table A-5: Stable Civil Environment Narrative Outline Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Describe Stable Civil Environment:</th>
<th>Describe Civil/Social Norms:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Processes, relationships, and institutions that keep a society stable.</td>
<td>Customs and Practices often reflect deeper aspects of the culture. It is the lens which people perceive the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example:</td>
<td>Example:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Legitimate judicial system</td>
<td>▪ Family /tribal affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Political persuasions</td>
<td>▪ Greetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Livelihood</td>
<td>▪ Concept of time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Acceptable violence levels</td>
<td>▪ Historical / mythical events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Acceptable corruption levels</td>
<td>▪ Gift / taboos / honor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ “Normal” civil activities</td>
<td>▪ “Abnormal” civil activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The exact content of the narrative should be derived from previous analysis but should consist of all relevant civil factors that may extend beyond items outlined in table A-5.

**Identify key influences.** Use previously developed products such as; the Civil Environment Factors & Relevance Matrix, the Operational Culture Matrix and the Instability/Stability Factors Matrix as starting points. Key influences can be determined by asking the following questions:

- What are the sources and nature of the key influences that can affect friendly operations?
- By what manner/means can the key influences apply its influence on friendly operations?
- How quickly can the key influences impact be applied to affect friendly operations?
- What is magnitude (width, depth, number of people/groups, how much, how far) of the key influences’ effect?

If answers to the above questions indicate the key influences could significantly impact friendly operations, then that influence should be included in the Civil Environment Model.

**For People or Groups, Determine Key Influence’s Motivations and Goals.** For individuals and groups this may be difficult to determine and an analytical “best guess” may have to suffice until the key Influence can be further developed. In a dynamic environment, motivations and goals may shift; therefore, a key influence may have both short and long term goals and distinguishing between the two sets may be important for determining how the key influence might enhance or degrade friendly operations. For intangible factors, there may not be any inherent motivations and goals. Techniques which could be used to determine motivations and goals include:

- Identify relationships/dynamics between key influence and their environment (people, places, things).
- Identify key influence conflicts and their sources, to include grievances, ethnic/religious tension, competition for natural resources, etc.
- Identify sources of resiliency - what structures, assets, means, etc., sustain the key influence and are used to retain position/power/legitimacy.
- Determine Key Influence desired end states - friendly, rival/threat, environment. Look at both short and longer term goals.

For People/Groups or Things, Determine Key Influence’s Abilities, Capabilities, and Means. Information used to identify key influence can be used and paired with a description of preferred actions and options. Determining “means” includes identifying tangible assets (e.g., people, places, things) that the key influence can employ, as well as intangible assets that give the key influence “means” (e.g., religious legitimacy, etc.)—the sources of resiliency and relationships/dynamics for the key influence identified above may translate into critical “means” in this step.

For People/Groups, Places or Things, Evaluate Key Influences’ Potential Impact on Friendly Operations / Objectives. This is an assessment of key influences’ potential COA: Why, how, what, when and where the key influence can degrade or enhance friendly operations, and to what extent. During COA development of MCPP, this information will help to develop specific actions/tasks to either mitigate or take advantage of key influence effects on friendly operations and the civil environment. Table A-6 illustrates how to compile key influence information in a matrix format so that it can be used in the Civil Environment Model.

**Table A-6. Key Influences Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Influences</th>
<th>Motivations and Goals</th>
<th>Abilities, Capabilities, Means</th>
<th>Potential Impact on Friendly Ops / Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Political and economic power</td>
<td>Viewed as legitimate and popular by the populace / logistical support.</td>
<td>Will be instrumental in relief efforts/activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cathedral</td>
<td>Religious symbol</td>
<td>Highly regarded by population.</td>
<td>No fire area. Potential sanctuary for friend or foe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code of honor</td>
<td>Used to resolve petty offenses and theft in affected communities</td>
<td>Temporary resolution without police or government official support.</td>
<td>Its negative impact on local communities will decrease unity of effort during the relief efforts/activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan/family structure</td>
<td>Bloodline loyalty and trust to maintain their perceived prominence.</td>
<td>Resource, security, and community/political support through group consensus.</td>
<td>Could be used in support of peaceful relief activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Produce Graphic Depiction of the Civil Environment and Key Influences.** Produce products that depict important aspects of the civil environment based on the stable civil environment.
narrative and key influence analysis. The civil depiction may require multiple civil overlays that typically depict key terrain/infrastructure (e.g., churches/mosques, market centers, hospitals, government centers (to include political boundaries), ports, airfields, movement corridors (time and distance between towns/villages), population centers/clan-family boundaries, DC camps and significant artifacts / monuments within the AO. Figures A-1 through A-4 are examples.

Figure A-1. Macro Level Civil Physical Environment Depiction Example
Figure A-2. Macro Level Civil Population Depiction Example

Jolo City is politically subdivided into eight Barangays. A Barangay (Filipino) is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines and is the native Filipino term for a village, district or ward. Barangays are closely tied to Family/Clan affiliation.

Barangay Family/Clan
Affiliation:
Bus-Bus: Rgduan Undug
Walled City: Alsid Gonzales
Chinese Pier: Hussein Hassan
Takut-Takut: Jamhali Serajani
Tulay: Salip Hairai
Alat: Nuria Tabib
San Raymundo: Ameli Tan
Astuias: Mashier Tan

Figure A-3. Micro Level Civil Population Depiction Example
**Step 4:** Determine Civil Actions. The focus of this step is to utilize the information and analysis from previous steps to determine potential civil actions with respect to MAGTF operations within the AO. Civil actions are meant to model the independent will of the population and key influence relating to friendly and malign actions within the AO. Civil-military operations planners and CA Marines develop an initial assessment of possible civil actions in a particular area within the MAGTF battlespace. This assessment is further refined by the green cell and used during COA wargaming. The green cell is a working group which assists the commander, staff and the Operational Planning Team in understanding the effect of the civil environment on both friendly and threat forces. The cell articulates the actions and dynamics of selected individuals, groups, tangible assets, and societal-cultural factors in the civil environment which may significantly impact friendly operations. Similar to the red cell modeling adversary actions, the green cell is used throughout the entire planning process, but with a focus on testing, improving, and modifying friendly courses of action to enhance the desired friendly effects on the civil environment, and to mitigate potential negative effects. Determining potential civil actions serve to paint a more complete picture of the operating environment focused on indigenous people and
their leadership, but also on international organizations/NGOs or other stakeholders in the area of operation (e.g., battlespace, village, district, and province).

During this step, CMO planners and CA Marines validate their assumptions and provide updates to the existing CPB products as necessary. Lastly, during deliberate planning, civil actions are accounted for by being depicted as most likely/most disadvantageous civil actions similar to the way ‘threat” is depicted as most likely / most dangerous COAs.

The examples below are some of the considerations applied to determine civil actions:

- Historical patterns of the populace.
- What condition is the populace trying to achieve?
- Agendas or objectives of key influences.

These civil actions may influence or alter a decision maker’s approach to mission accomplishment. Step 4 results in a graphic and narrative depicting Most Likely/Most Disadvantageous civil actions as depicted in figure A-5.
Legend:

MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front

**Figure A-5. Civil Actions Graphic / Narrative Example**
APPENDIX B

Green Cell Function

What we need is cultural intelligence. What I need to understand is how these societies function. What makes them tick? Who makes the decisions? What is it about their society that’s so remarkably different in their values, in the way they think compared to my values and the way I think in my western, white-man mentality?

General Anthony Zinni
Capital “W” War: A Case for Strategic Principles of War

Green Cell Fundamentals

The green cell is a working group which assists the commander, staff and the OPT in understanding the effect of the civil environment on both friendly and threat forces. The cell articulates the actions and dynamics of selected individuals, groups, tangible assets, and societal-cultural factors in the civil environment which may significantly impact friendly operations. Like the red cell, the green cell is used throughout the entire planning process, but with a focus on testing, improving, and modifying friendly courses of action to enhance the desired friendly effects on the civil environment, and to mitigate potential negative effects.

Staff Cognizance and Leadership of the Green Cell

Whenever practicable, the green Cell is under staff cognizance of the senior civil affairs staff member (G-9) in the command. When this is not feasible, staff cognizance of the green cell should belong to a staff member in the G-3/S-3 (Operations) section, G-5/S-5 (Plans) section, or even under the OPT leader. In any case, the green cell should have a clearly designated staff cognizance relationship in order to ensure effective advocacy for resourcing, staffing, and other issues.

“Staff Cognizance is the term used to describe the broad coordinating responsibilities over special staff sections assigned to a general/executive staff officer in his area of primary interest. These responsibilities are intended to facilitate coordination within related areas of staff functioning and to ensure the systematic channeling of information and documents.”
The cognizant staff officer, in close coordination with the OPT leader, will direct standup of the green cell and designate the green cell OIC. The OIC will direct and oversee the detailed work of the green cell, coordinate Green Cell efforts with other command and external planning organizations (G-2/S-2 section, red cell, higher and adjacent green cell equivalent organizations, etc.), and serve as the primary “voice” and “face” of the green cell to the command and the OPT. The OIC can be a foreign area officer, regional affairs officer, or expert in a CMO functional area relevant to the command’s battlespace (such as public works or governance) - but above all the green cell OIC should be an experienced MAGTF professional who can synthesize, apply and effectively articulate relevant green cell input to the command planning process.

**Green Cell Composition**

Composition of the green cell should reflect the most significant aspects of the civil environment that the cell will represent. Ideally, the first two steps of the CPB process (“defining” and “analyzing” the operational environment) and the intelligence section’s IPB process will help identify these significant aspects. In practice, the green cell will often be formed while the IPB and CPB processes are in their early stages - this will require the CA staff, green cell OIC, OPT lead, etc., to make their best professional assessment on green cell composition. However, once the CPB process is well underway, the identification of “key influences” that the green cell will portray can be used to refine cell composition, determine expertise shortfalls in the cell, and develop shortfall mitigation measures (such as SME reach back). SME “near real time” or even “time delayed” reach back can be a viable and valuable resource and having “virtual cell members” should be actively considered to access unique expertise that is not locally available.

Other factors influencing cell composition include the security classification level of the planning evolution, “high demand-low density” SME availability (in some cases, the green cell may “share” a SME with another planning organization (intelligence section, red cell, combat engineer section, etc.), and in the case of non-DOD/US interagency organizations, the
willingness of those organizations to participate in a US military planning evolution - by the very nature of the civil environment, the green cell will often require “non-traditional” cell membership - to include interorganizational, coalition/host nation civil officials, cultural/academic SMEs, and in some cases members of the civil population in the battlespace - this “non-traditional” membership requires creative ways to physically integrate members into the cell and to integrate their intellectual input and products into the process. Additionally, non-DOD personnel may only be available on a limited or part time basis. Despite these challenges, the green cell OIC should make the necessary effort to integrate “non-traditional” member expertise and input because it is often critical to understanding the civil environment and the character of the population with whom we must interact.

The Green Cell and Other Planning Stakeholders

The green cell OIC sets the tone and establishes the coordinating relationships and division of labor between his cell and other planning stakeholders. Likewise, cell members should establish professional relationships with their planning counterparts. The following provides an overview and considerations for the most common stakeholders the green cell interacts with during planning:

G-9. Normally having staff cognizance over the green cell, the G-9 should also review and approve information and products that the cell will provide as inputs to the planning process. As the senior CA professional in the command, the G-9 also serves as a sounding board to ensure the cell understands and implements commander’s guidance (“top down planning”) and integrates its efforts across the battlespace (“single battle” and “integrated planning”). The G-9 is typically the reserve component Civil Affairs Group CO as the senior CA/CMO subject matter expert.

Civil-Military Operations Working Group. As “owners” of the CPB process, the CMOWG and green cell should be in close, continuous coordination - and may be physically collocated. There should be tight integration between designated green cell members and the CMOWG, especially during the initial stages of CPB, and the two groups will often share SMEs and “divide” the CPB labor. The green cell may also be reliant on CMOWG support to develop
planning products; the group OICs should make an early determination/agreement on the amount and type of support that the CMOWG can provide to the green cell (and vice versa). It is critical to ensure a common understanding of the civil environment among members of both organizations throughout planning. Where there is analytical disagreement on aspects of the environment, the leaders of both organizations should discuss and identify disagreements to the G-9 and CA OPT representative for resolution.

**Civil Affairs Representative to the Operational Planning Team.** The CA representative is the CMO SME to the OPT, and the green cell OIC should ensure that he keeps him informed of green cell activities, significant civil factors uncovered in the course of the cell’s work, and any other information that may help the CA representative in his OPT responsibilities. It is critical for these two individuals to clearly define division of labor and internal procedures for presenting the picture of the civil environment to the OPT. If this is not done properly, planning friction and confusion will likely result. As a general rule, the CA representative will be responsible for presenting friendly (“blue”) aspects of CMO to the OPT, which may include US interagency/non-DOD entities, and the green cell will be responsible for presenting designated aspects of the civil environment to the OPT - but both representatives must have a shared understanding of the civil environment. The green cell should not “surprise” the CA representative during the planning process, and the green cell objective is not to “defeat” the friendly CA concept of support - the cell assists the CA representative in refining and improving CMO actions and the CMO Concept of Support.

**Intelligence Section and the Intelligence Representative to the Operational Planning Team.** The intelligence section will develop and present the picture of the environment (physical and information) and the threat, framing their work using the IPB process. Civil affairs and intelligence initially rely on many of the same databases and source information for the physical environment, and in this area it is crucial that there is coordination between these two staff sections. While much of the CA coordination will be done by the CMOWG, the green cell should take part in this process whenever feasible to ensure that the “basics” of the physical environment (to include ethnic boundaries, etc.) are uniformly portrayed to the command. Throughout the planning process, there should be sharing of information between civil affairs
and intelligence whenever practicable—in some cases the CMOWG may have an embedded intelligence analyst, or there may be a cell within the intelligence section providing “direct support” to civil information requirements. When specific intelligence section support is desired by the green cell, it should be coordinated with the CMOWG to avoid requesting / tasking conflicts with the intelligence section.

**Red Cell.** The red cell will assist the commander and OPT in a better understanding of how the threat will attempt to achieve its objectives, and in assessing, refining and improving the plan with respect to the threat. Because the threat is typically operating in the same civil environment as friendly forces, it is good practice for the green cell and red cell to discuss their analysis prior to COA wargaming - friendly and threat forces will have similar objectives in regard to the civil environment (i.e., “influence the population”), but use different means to reach those objectives. During the COA wargaming, the green cell will provide reaction to both friendly and enemy actions - the green cell should have a good understanding of how the red cell will portray the designated threat COA. Likewise, the red cell should have some understanding of the “key influences” that the green cell will portray during wargaming.

**Operational Planning Team Leader.** The commander’s representative leading the planning process, the OPT leader directs the overall effort - and the green cell OIC should have a good working relationship with this individual, keep him updated on green cell activities and not deliberately “surprise” the OPT leader with aspects of the civil environment that will impact friendly planning. Key areas where the OPT leader should have some role / input include the designation of the green cell OIC, determination of the “key influences” that the green cell will portray, and the decision to “stand down” the green cell.

**The Green Cell and Execution of the Planning Process**

MAGTF OPTs normally use the MCPP as their framework, and MCPP is used below to describe green cell considerations in planning. However, other service, joint, interagency or even coalition planning models may be used by a planning group. In most cases, the processes are similar to MCPP and the below considerations still apply.
**Green Cell Membership.** Green cell members, particularly the green cell OIC, should be familiar with the contents of Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, MAGTF Staff Training Program Pamphlet 2-0.1, *Red Cell-Green Cell*, and MAGTF Staff Training Program Pamphlet 5-0.2, *Operational Planning Team Leader’s Guide*. These resources provide doctrinal framework, process descriptions, and valuable techniques and procedures that can be used by the cell throughout the planning process.

**Problem Framing.** This step is used to gain an enhanced understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem. During problem framing, a critical function of the green cell will be the development and approval of the Civil Environment Model concept. As early as possible in this step, the green cell OIC should brief his staff cognizant officer and the OPT leader / selected OPT members on the key influences that the cell intends to portray in the planning process. The key influences the cell portrays will determine the direction and scope of green cell activities for the remainder of the process and drive the commander, staff, and OPT understanding of the civil environment and its effects on friendly planning/operations.

The cell will work in conjunction with the CMOWG and in coordination with the intelligence section in the CPB / IPB processes. During the early stages of problem framing, the green cell in coordination with the CMOWG, should provide the OPT with a civil environment orientation (similar to the intelligence section threat orientation) based on the CPB effort up to that point.

Other activities during this step include cell members gaining situational awareness, providing civil environment input to the commander / OPT “design dialogue,” and ensuring that aspects of the Civil Environment Model are applied to center of gravity analysis, suggested commander’s intent, proposed commander’s critical information requirements, assumptions, task analysis, and the other staff actions performed during the problem framing step.

The cell will also coordinate with the CMOWG to provide relevant input for the OPT problem framing brief, which at a minimum should include a summary of significant aspects of the civil environment (Individuals, groups, infrastructure, and belief sets/intangibles) as well as associated potential friendly planning considerations.
**Course of Action Development.** During this step, the OPT develops one or more options for how the mission and commander’s intent might be accomplished. As options are developed, the green cell, in coordination with the CMOWG and CA OPT representative, ensures that the OPT considers the civil environment: The cell assesses how friendly actions might affect the civil environment, provides the OPT with feedback on these effects, and suggests possible enhancement or mitigation measures that can be built into COAs. In addition, the green cell begins COA wargaming preparation, and continues to refine the Civil Environment Model.

The Civil Environment Model can be used to provide specific recommendations to COA development. Examples include:

- **Identification of Key Influences:** Key influences (individuals, groups, tangible assets and societal-cultural factors) become potential engagement targets for friendly leadership, units, and organizations - in particular, the command effects and assessment cells may identify key influences for further information collection and nonlethal shaping. Key influence engagements will often translate into COA tasks for subordinate elements.

- **Identification of Grievances.** By identifying grievances of specific groups or influential leaders, the OPT can generate tasks to subordinate elements, along with intermediate objectives, that address grievances that need to be mitigated for friendly success. Likewise, grievances associated with threat actions can be used to friendly advantage in a COA.

- **Identification of “windows of opportunity” and “windows of vulnerability.”** Key events (e.g., holidays, elections, etc.) may create opportunity or vulnerability for friendly force COAs, and influence the timing, scope and location of friendly actions. Likewise, civil events may be windows of opportunity or vulnerability for threat forces.

- **In addition to aiding friendly COA development, during this step the green cell supports the CMOWG and CA OPT representative in developing the CMO portion of the synchronization matrix, the CMO staff estimate/supporting concepts and in providing CMO input to the OPT course of action brief. Finally, via the CA OPT representative, the green cell provides input from the civil environment perspective to assist the commander in the development of his wargaming Guidance and Evaluation Criteria, which may be given to the OPT at the conclusion of the COA development step.**
Course of Action Wargaming. The COA wargaming is used to improve the plan by examining and refining options (COAs) in relation to adversary capabilities and actions, as well as in relation to the physical and civil environments. In this step, the green cell “brings the civil environment to life” in the form of key influence wargaming actions that describe how friendly COAs, threat actions and the civil environment will affect one another.

The importance of a well-developed Civil Environment Model and the proper selection of key influences will become readily apparent during the COA wargaming. If the model does not have sufficient detail and/or if too many, too few, or the “wrong” key influences have been selected, then the ability of the green cell to assist the OPT in assessing, refining, and modifying friendly COAs will be degraded.

Course of action wargaming can take many forms, from a quick tabletop discussion at the small unit level to a complex multi-day event at higher echelons. In most cases, a normal war game “turn” consists of a friendly action portion (friendly force representatives brief actions along warfighting function or line of operation (LOO) which is then followed by a threat reaction portion (red cell briefs reactions in response to friendly actions). Following the red cell reaction, the green cell should brief civil environment reactions by key influences - a significant point is that civil environment reactions are in response to both the friendly action AND the threat reaction within that turn. The “reaction” portions of the turn are then followed by a “counteraction” portion- based on the outcome of “action / reaction,” the friendly initial action may be “modified” based on the results of the turn. Note that this modification is an improvement / enhancement to the initial friendly COA action and not an additional friendly “turn” within the wargaming turn. Note also that, while the red cell may have created its own undesired effects in the civil environment due to its “reaction” during that turn, the red cell will not normally modify (counteraction) the threat COA - it is worth discussing in the OPT, but the purpose of the COA wargaming is not to “improve” the threat COA.
From a civil environment perspective, the green cell helps improve the friendly COA by realistic and well-developed green cell Reactions portraying key influences, as well as by providing feedback to the OPT on opportunities / risks in the friendly COA and identification of 2nd and 3rd order effects of friendly actions that may impact the mission.

The green cell continues to work with the CMOWG and CA OPT representative in developing the CMO staff estimate, concept of support, etc. The cell also provides relevant input to the CA OPT representative for the COA wargaming brief, with emphasis on advantages / disadvantages of COAs from a civil environment perspective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Green Cell COA Wargaming Reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective turn portions are concise, complete and capture actions that are significant in evaluating the friendly COA. Because the green cell will represent multiple and diverse “key influences” in the reaction portion of the turn, organization and clear presentation are important to smooth wargaming and conveying understanding of civil environment factors to the OPT. A technique to achieve this is to structure the green cell reactions and present them during the turn using this format:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Key Influence”: Identification of the individual, group, place/asset, or intangible factor (“who”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Actions”: Concise description of “what”, “how”, “where” and “when”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Objective”: Rationale and purpose of the actions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Example reactions:

“Sheik Abdul withholds his participation in the Ramtha City Governance Council beginning immediately due to his anger at insufficient project funding in his tribal area compared to neighboring tribal area funding. He does this in order to pressure coalition forces into increasing funding in his area.

The Ramtha City Merchants association agrees to cooperate with the coalition project plan due to potential economic benefits / contract awards to their businesses, and in order to encourage continued coalition funding that will benefit them.

The Shia population in the Irbil neighborhood of Ramtha will not actively participate in the coalition project plan in their area due to intimidation by the Black August radical

Course of Action Comparison and Decision. The commander evaluates war gamed friendly COA(s) against established criteria, compares COAs to each other, and then selects a COA, sometimes directing modifications to the selected COA.
The green cell should be prepared to provide input to this process by explaining how the wargamed COA(s) affected the civil environment and key influences and, if COAs are compared, which COAs were most/least effective in achieving friendly objectives/end states in the civil environment.

Once a COA is approved, the cell will support the CMOWG and CA OPT representative in refining the staff estimate / CMO Concept of Support, providing input to any warning order updates, and the development of any branch planning directed by the commander.

**Orders Development.** The purpose of this step is to translate the commander’s COA decision into communications media (e.g., written, oral, graphic, etc.) that is sufficient to guide implementation of the plan (COA) and to promote initiative by subordinates executing the plan.

During this step, the decision could be made to stand down the green cell. This should be a mutual decision involving the G-9 and OPT leader. A recommended technique is that the green cell OIC remains with the G-9 section to support orders development and serve as a resource to other staff sections as they develop their portion of the orders. The cell OIC should have communication means established with former cell members in order to clarify / answer requirements in their specific areas of expertise.

**Transition.** This step is a wide range of activities conducted to ensure a successful shift by the force from “planning” to “execution of the plan.” From the CMO perspective, this often involves transitioning planning products and orders to CA tactical asset leaders and their personnel.

Similar to the orders development step, having the green cell OIC available during transition can greatly facilitate translating the products and rationale of planning to the assets that will execute the CMO Concept of Support.
Appendix C

Planner Template (ANNEX G)

(Note: This example of an Annex G is to give an example of a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief or Stability operation involving a battlespace framework of Lines of Operation to categorize the MAGTF actions over time.)

ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) (U)
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

(a) List map, publications, documents or references applicable to the operation

(U) TIME ZONE:

(U) TASK ORGANIZATION: Can be described here but usually found in the Annex A (Task Organization), in most cases just refer the reader to “See Annex A.”

(U) Situation

a. (U) General

(1) (U) Overview. Discuss the pertinent areas of the situation that affect the civil dimension for the upcoming operation. This could include the USG’s purpose and endstate, the makeup of the US forces and the strategic desires of partnered nations and other stakeholders.

(2) (U) Host Nation Government. Discuss the federal and subordinate government structure. Who makes decisions, where are decisions made, does it have the capability to help the population recover; are a few questions to answer here.

(3) (U) Population. Discuss the general condition of the population the force will interface with. Highlight those key aspects that the Marine should know before they encounter the local population. Items could be cultural norms, capabilities, economy, perceptions of the USG, perceptions of their government and support systems. For example, this is a foot mobile culture and will need support to relocate. Refer the reader to the CPB Appendix for detailed information.
(4) **Economics.** Discuss the economics of the operating area and what will be affected by the upcoming operation. What are the short term and long term effects of the military actions on the economy – can it recover quickly, does the host nation have the resources to rebuild or restart, are there some limiting actions needed in order not to create a bigger problem than necessary.

(5) **Other necessary civil categories.** Discuss any and all areas that are important to relay to the reader as it relates to the civil dimension and the upcoming operation. Refer the reader to associated appendices for a more detailed discussion if needed.

b. **Adversary.** Annotate negative actors here (e.g., criminality). Answers: “Who is our competition in time and space?” Going back to the staff estimate, civil most likely reactions should be captured in paragraph 1. Especially the reactions that the execution of the plan is based.

c. **Friendly**

(1) **Higher.** Describe the relationship to higher and guidance related to CMO operations.

(2) **Adjacent.** Describe the relationship to adjacent CA forces and their mission or area of responsibility.

(3) **Other Civil Affairs Forces.** Describe the CA forces that are neither higher nor adjacent, applicable command relationships and liaison responsibilities.

(4) **Host Nation Support.** Describe the relationship with the host nation. Identify host nation capabilities, organization and goals in the area of responsibility. Identify capabilities, organizations and goals in order to better identify areas of common ground and mutual operation. Identify key players and points of contact information.  
**Note: This information may be included in a separate appendix to the Annex G depending on the scale and scope of host nation support.

(5) **International and nongovernmental organizations.** Describe the relationship with the host nation and US forces to include NGOs which may be reluctant to support or engage with the USG, as operations progress. Identify organization in the area of responsibility. Identify NGO/ international organization capabilities, organizations, activities and goals in order to better identify areas of common ground and mutual operation. Consider how Marine Corps actions will impact the NGO/international organization structure and activities. Identify key players and points of contact information.

(U) **Mission.** Can be rewritten here verbatim from the basic order. In most cases just write “See basic order.”

(U) **Execution.** CMO are supporting operations to the MAGTF’s scheme of maneuver. As such, CMO can be categorized as nonlethal fires, a subset of the Fires warfighting function or
CMO can be a stand-alone, additive operation to the warfighting functions. Discuss the MAGTF’s scheme of maneuver broadly and use subsequent paragraphs to spell out the details of CMO.

a. (U) **Civil-Military Operations Problem Statement.** A narrative that describes the problem that needs to be solved as viewed through the CMO lens.

b. (U) **Concept of CMO.** The written description of the CMO concept of support. The disposition of organic CA units should be discussed here. Civil-military operation enablers, such as Marine CA capabilities, nonorganic units or organizations can be broadly described here. If included in the basic order the CMO concept of support paragraph can be restated here. In most cases, the basic order paragraph 3 “Supporting Concepts” will refer the reader to the Annex G. Describe the functions of CMO that will support the specific operation (e.g., FHA, PRC, CIM).

(1) (U) Describe the CMO core tasks that will support the specific operation. (e.g., nation assistance, FHA, PRC, CIM). These core tasks may be described here in general terms or direct the reader to an appendix for a more detailed discussion.

   a. (U) **Populace and Resources Control.** Discuss the definition as it applies to the operation. In a lethal operation, PRC will likely be of great importance to secure noncombatants and isolate them from decisive actions in the battlespace along with the identification of CMO resources necessary to reconstruct and support the population in the post hostility environment.

   (2) (U) **Battlespace Framework.** The battlespace framework will be established by the command element OPT. The two main ways the commander does this is by organization of the force and organization of the battlespace. The commander organizes the force by main effort, supporting efforts, reserve and security. The commander organizes the battlespace in one of three ways, spatially (deep, close, rear), functionally (decisive, shaping, and sustaining actions), LOO.

   (3) (Example) **Lines of Operation.** Based on the battlespace construct, defines or describes how the battlespace is organized. Must support the construct described in the basic order. The graphic and narrative should be captured in Appendix 18 of Annex C. As a fall back, the CMO graphic and narrative should be captured in a supporting Appendix to Annex G.

   a. (U) (Example) **Provide Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Definition.** Define each LOO to tell others “what you mean by....” Civil-military operations actions are not specific to a single LOO; CMO supports all the LOOs determined by the commander.

1 (U) **Civil-Military Operations Objectives.** Discuss the CMO objectives for this stage of the operation. Objectives may be specific by each portion of the phasing construct or may be overarching and apply to the phase as a whole.

2 (U) **Civil-Military Operations Desired Effects.** Discuss the associated desired effects as results of actions within the phasing construct. As with objectives, desired effects may be detailed to each portion of the phasing construct or may apply to a phase as a whole.
(4) (U) **Phase 1**. Describe the CMO actions within each phase (and stage) as required.

(a) (U) **Stage A**

(b) (U) **Stage B**

c. (U) **Tasks**. Specify tasks by the major subordinate command, unit or element responsible for accomplishing them. These tasks should be included in the basic order for these units.

(1) (U) **Command Element**. Encompassed in the command element are the staff sections, the commander, the Marine CA staff and other associated capabilities that need to support CMO. The Annex A is a good place to review those capabilities attached to the command element. Elements such as military information support operations, combat camera and public affairs, may be included here or may need to be called out specifically to be assigned pertinent tasks.

(a) (U)

(2) (U) **Ground Combat Element** (e.g., RLT-X)

(a) (U)

(3) (U) **Logistics Combat Element** (e.g., CLR-X)

(a) (U)

(4) (U) **Aviation Combat Element** (e.g., MAG-XX)

(a) (U)

d. (U) **Coordinating Instructions**. Contains instructions common to two or more units or elements that outline coordinating details, possible control measures applicable to the command as a whole, and time or conditions when the plans are to be executed. These should also be included in the basic order. Some key CMO coordinating instructions include: CIM requirements and the assessment plan. Refer the reader to appropriate appendices for further information as necessary. Ensure these appendices have been written and are part of the order.

e. (U) **Civil-Military Operations Priority Information Requirements**. Discuss those CMO information requirements that may be tied to decision points, named areas of interest or even CMO-specific CCIRs.

(U) **Administration and Logistics**

a. (U) **Administration**. Administrative control is not an inherent command relationship for operational control, tactical control or for supporting relationships; therefore, these topics need to be addressed in the order. Examples are: discuss situation reports, morning reports, accountability, awards and fitness report responsibilities for the Marine CA units attached to the MAGTF that may be re-allocated throughout the MAGTF. You may want to include non-
standard reporting procedures to international organizations/NGOs and GS requirements to these organizations. Also consider referencing any letters of agreement or status-of-forces agreements which may detail modalities between US forces and host nation or international organization/NGOs.

b. (U) **Logistics.** An extension of administrative control is the logistical support for CA units. Outline the types of logistical and classes of supply needed to be provided by supported units for the supporting CA units.

(U) **Command and Control**

a. (U) **Command Relationships.** Contains guidance on command relationships as designated by higher for the operation. It is important to spell out the command relationships of CA forces with their respective supported units. This information needs to be included in Annex J as well.

b. (U) **Signal.** Can be described here but usually can be found in the Annex K (Communications System Support), in most case just refer the reader to “See Annex K.”

**ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT**

BY COMMAND OF XXX

I.M. Marine
Colonel, USMC
Chief of Staff

**APPENDICIES (Example Appendices listed for consideration)**
1. Civil Preparation of the Battlespace
2. Populace and Resources Control
3. Protected Target List
4. Host Nation Support
5. International organizations/NGOs
6. Civil Information Management
7. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center Procedures
8. Dislocated Civilian Operations
9. Civil-Military Operations Funding Policies
10. Reintegration
11. Graphics and or Overlays

**OFFICIAL:**
XXX XXXX
Colonel, USMC
AC/S G-3
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS STAFF ESTIMATE NUMBER:

REFERENCES:

1. Supported Command Mission Statement. From the commander or the OPT.


3. Situation and Considerations
   
   a. Characteristics of the Area of Operation
      
      (1) Weather. Focus on short term and long term weather concerns for the population – rainy season, planting season, harvest, and festivals. What are the effects of the weather on population and culture – freedom of movement, livelihood. How do weather and terrain impact the culture – isolation, restricted economics, and resource allocation?

      (2) Terrain. How does terrain affect the population? How will terrain and land use impact expected military operations?

      (3) Civil Considerations. Analyze political, military (security forces), economic, sociological, infrastructure and information domains combined with psychological factors to form networks and develop cultural relationships as they relate to expected military operations.

      Note: As you look at the AO, consideration must be given to the area of interest. In certain CMO or stability operations the area of interest may include areas of extended family/clan/tribal connections, refugee camps and traditional lines of communication all which may have influence on the MAGTF’s operations.

   b. Enemy Forces
      
      (1). Adversary disposition, composition, strengths, capabilities and COA(s) as they affect specific CMO areas of concern.

      Note: Focus on those items that would compete with CMO – adversary’s ability to provide essential services, rule of law, etc.

      (2) High value individuals with adversary ties or networks.

   c. Friendly Forces
(1) Civil affairs organic— to include capabilities and current locations

1. Staffing and training levels

2. Military occupational specialty mix (Most CA forces possess an additional MOS)

3. Professional experience (Reserve Component Marines have other skill sets worth highlighting such as health specialists, civil engineers, law enforcement)

(2) Civil affairs external – Units, capabilities, and current locations of forces external to the MAGTF or chain of command.

(3) Civil-military operations military enablers – Capabilities and current location (information operations, PA, legal, combat camera…)

(4) US Government enablers – capabilities and current and proposed locations. (e.g., USAID, OFDA, DOS)

(5) Current status of resources (e.g., humanitarian, relief, transportation)

(6) Host nation

1. Military forces to include capabilities and current and anticipated locations

2. Government services

3. Private organizations (e.g., NGOs, church groups, civic groups, etc.)

4. International organizations (e.g., World Health Organization, UNICEF, Red Crescent, Red Cross…)

(7) Coalition forces to include capabilities and current and anticipated locations

(8) Current status of other resources

(9) Resources available (such as money and funding programs)

(10) Comparison of requirements versus capabilities and recommended solutions

(11) Key considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA supportability

d. Civilian Considerations.

(1) Describe additional personnel, groups, or associations (NGOs, international organizations, other government agencies) that cannot be categorized as either friendly or enemy. Discuss the possible impact these entities may have on CMO (noncombatant movement, and
noncombatant ability to influence or affect planned military operations and CMO). Capture points of contact and means of contact.

(2) Civil Planning Consideration. (CPB results)

(a) Instability/Stability Dynamics. (Note: Not always a consideration, however, the CMO planner needs to be aware of these dynamics in order to recommend planning considerations that reinforce Stability Dynamics and downplay Instability Dynamics)

(b) Cultural Environment.

(c) Local Perceptions.

(d) Civil-military operations assessment of the physical environment.

e. **Assumptions**: Those pieces of information necessary and needed for planning to continue. Information that is assumed to be true in order for planning to continue. (A planning assumption needs to have associated methods to continue to collect information to validate the assumption prior to execution of the plan: An associated RFI, decision point or possible CCIR).

4. **Course(s) of Action**

   a.

   b.

5. **Civil-Military Operations Course(s) of Action**

   a.

   b.

6. **Analysis of Course(s) of Action**. Analyze each selected COA using the commander’s evaluation criteria to determine advantages and disadvantages. (Note: As a result of wargaming)

   a. COA 1

   b. COA 2

7. **Course of Action Comparison**. Compare COA(s) using key considerations. Rank each COA(s) for each key consideration. Visually support each comparison with a decision matrix. (Note: This is done prior to the commander’s comparison and decision brief)

8. **Recommendations and Conclusions**
a. Recommended COA based on the comparison (most supportable from a CMO perspective).

b. Issues, deficiencies, and risks (associated with assumptions) with impact mitigations.
The Stability Assessment Framework (SAF) is an analytical, planning, and programming tool designed to support civil-military operations planning, the Civil Affairs (CA) methodology, and non-lethal targeting approaches during MAGTF operations. The SAF helps Marine and civilian planners determine stability dynamics within the MAGTF battlespace and to design programs and activities that address sources of instability (SOI) and reinforce sources of stability (SOS / resiliencies), and to measure their effect in fostering stability.

SAF focuses on the attributes of the operating environment and integrates multiple perspectives during planning and assessment. The SAF methodology has four basic components nested within both the CA methodology (represented by 6 steps—Assess, Decide, Develop & Detect, Deliver, Evaluate and Transition—AD3ET) and the Marine Corps Planning Process (Problem Framing, Course of Action Development, Course of Action War Game, Course of Action Comparison and Decision, Orders Development, Transition—MCPP). The SAF components [Civil Preparation of the Battlespace (CPB), Analysis, Design and Execution] complement and enhance existing planning and execution processes (e.g. Targeting Cycle) used during MAGTF operations. Figure D-1 depicts the overall SAF methodology, which will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.
Component one: Civil Preparation of the Battlespace

An understanding of the area of operations requires research on the physical and social characteristics of the MAGTF’s battlespace. The SAF CPB process closely examines the following three variables to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the battlespace: the operating environment, the cultural environment, and instability/stability dynamics.

Understanding the Operating Environment

Unlike a typical ASCOPE / PMESII research effort, SAF does not simply generate a list of facts about the operating environment; it provides a means to analyze instability/stability factors relevant to local population perceptions and the MAGTF mission. For example, CMO planners should not simply note there is a local government; they should note it is dominated by a certain tribal group, who undermine government legitimacy and resist any foreign intervention. This analytical effort is referred to as the ASCOPE-PMESII analysis method. The ASCOPE-PMESII analysis method facilitates the conduct of comprehensive research by organizing information into logical categories for civil information management and providing a framework for subsequent instability/stability analysis (see CPB Appendix A for detailed ASCOPE-PMESII...
analysis method explanation and example). Table D-1 illustrates how to capture relevant instability/stability factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Considerations</th>
<th>Operational Variables</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What are the factors in the Civil Environment that will significantly affect friendly forces? Consider population perception of the factor.</td>
<td>How will each factor affect the friendly forces? Consider stability aspects of the mission/operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Political boundaries are manipulated</td>
<td>Boundaries are drawn to favor one political faction over another</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Military districts overlap economic regions</td>
<td>Military ownership of industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Economic development areas</td>
<td>Key industries and supply chains are linked through geographic location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Municipalities, towns and villages are largely ethnically homogenous</td>
<td>Ethnic tensions are prevalent with little intermingling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Telecommunication is widespread</td>
<td>Information is easily controlled by the Gov't</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Investment in infrastructure is uneven</td>
<td>Investment favors supporters of the regime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table D-1. Relevant Factors Matrix Example – "A" of ASCOPE**

**Understanding the Cultural Environment**

The analysis of cultural information must consider Marine Corps operational culture tenets (i.e., the five dimensions of operational culture: physical environment, economy, social structure, political structure, and belief systems) to determine “normal” conditions and to ascertain the impacts of indigenous culture to MAGTF operations. This analysis is compared against the ASCOPE-PMESII Factors Matrix to further refine relevant factors to potential sources of instability or resiliencies. Table D-2 illustrates the SAF method of capturing relevant cultural factors.
Understanding Instability/Stability Dynamics

The SAF methodology identifies potential instability/stability factors in the local environment. For example, an instability factor may include grievances of the local population taken from research and local perception data sources and a stability factor may include societal resiliencies (institutions, mechanisms, personalities) that instill local confidence in the stability of their environment. Of note, events are considered neutral until they are affected by key influences that as a consequence make events grievances or resiliencies for the local population. Therefore, population surveys are very important endeavors that require careful consideration and even more vigilant planning when operating in remote areas where little or no information exists on local perceptions. In the absence of any formulated survey methodology or information, the TCS method is used to gather initial local perceptions and to validate the execution of proposed stability activities. The TCS is designed to facilitate initial discussions with local populations and
to gather local perceptions that will be further analyzed for root causes of instability/stability.
The tactical conflict survey’s four questions are as follows:

- Has the population in the village changed in the last year?
- What is the most important problem facing the village?
- Who do you believe can solve your problems?
- What should be done first to help the village?

All questions should be followed by asking: “why” for several iterations until a clear sight picture of local instability/stability dynamics can be determined. This data is compiled and processed for making subsequent targeting decisions but is also maintained in a CIM data base as baseline information needed for subsequent analysis on operational performance and effectiveness. The application of the TCS method should be practiced so that the questions are asked exactly as they are written. The TCS questions should be woven into a normal conversation so that the conduct of a survey is transparent to the audience. The questions are simple in design but its proper application supports a scientific research method and facilitates being employed by third parties i.e., interpreters. The initial TCS effort should be applied quickly and broadly throughout the area of operations to establish a solid baseline of perception data for subsequent SAF analysis and to inform future unit assessment efforts. It is important to note that subsequent survey questions related to SAF efforts will have to be modified as operations progress. This is due to the impact of military operations on the environment and local expectations evolving over a period of time. The employment of TCS questions in subsequent surveys should be adjusted to ascertain the impact of operations and should be conducted at logical intervals so that actual change can occur. The SAF method does not preclude conducting surveys beyond initial efforts because subsequent survey efforts become unique to each operation and actual activities conducted. However, subsequent survey efforts and questions should follow the same model of developing simple and exact questions that inform operations being conducted and can be easily employed by operating forces. Table D-3 illustrates the SAF method in compiling this information for subsequent sources of instability/stability analysis.
After gaining a more complete understanding of the operating environment through CPB, the second component of SAF methodology analyzes gathered information to identify sources of instability and/or stability and establishes desired objective(s) along with measures of effectiveness that define progress toward addressing each source of instability/stability.

Examining the three CPB variables typically result in producing an extensive list of factors that could be inciting instability or maintaining stability. The primary purpose of analysis is to narrow relevant factors to issues that are indeed actual sources of instability/stability. Analysis also evaluates and prioritizes the most relevant factors to determine possible MAGTF objectives that have the most potential for effectively creating stability. To begin narrowing down the list of relevant factors, the SAF employs a tactical form of root cause analysis to examine symptom-cause relationships.

Each source of instability/stability is examined using the Source of Instability/Stability analysis matrix (tables D-4 and D-5) and vetted against three instability/stability criteria to ascertain the potential for establishing effective stability activities. An instability/stability factor resulting in affirmative responses (i.e., yes responses) are considered viable issues for designing stability activities that address grievances or resiliencies. The relative weight of each response must be

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grievances: What are the core grievances and societal vulnerabilities identified in your civil considerations (From perception data)?</th>
<th>Events: Potential situations that could contribute to an increase in instability (From ASCOPE/PMESE)?</th>
<th>Key Influences - Means and Motivations: What are the influences, the means and motivations that contribute to an increase of instability (From ASCOPE/PMESE)?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resiliencies: What processes, relationships, or institutions enable the society to function normally and peacefully? Are there any previous resiliencies that have been or are being undermined (From perception data)?</td>
<td>Events: What potential or anticipated future situations could create an opening for key influences to further reinforce stability (From ASCOPE/PMESE)?</td>
<td>Key Influences - Means and Motivations: What key influences in the society preserve and strengthen stability? What needs do they possess, what are the motives, and what actions are taken (From ASCOPE/PMESE)?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table D-3. Instability/Stability Factors Matrix

Component Two: Analysis
carefully analyzed for greatest impact to stability in order to prioritize efforts later in activity
design. Generally, the more criteria met, the more likely the issue is creating instability or
supporting stability. The three instability/stability criteria questions are as follows:

For instability:

▪ Question one: Does this issue decrease support for the government or legitimate governance?
  Legitimate governance institutions refer to governmental and / or nongovernmental entities
  that help regulate normal functioning societies, such as: judicial system, village elders or
  tribal councils. These criteria can often be considered in two parts – first, whether locals are
  upset about the issue and second, if so, whether their expectations and displeasure are
  specifically directed toward the government / local leaders.

▪ Question two: Does this issue decrease support for the government or legitimate governance?
  Legitimate governance institutions refer to governmental and / or non-governmental entities
  that help regulate normal functioning societies, such as: judicial system, village elders or
  tribal councils. These criteria can often be considered in two parts – whether locals are upset
  about the issue and if so, whether their expectations and displeasure are specifically directed
  toward the government / local leaders.

▪ Question three: Does this issue disrupt the normal functioning of society? The emphasis is on
  local norms, which are usually based on what community members consider socially
  acceptable to local customs, quality of life, and acceptable levels of corruption or criminality.
  For example, if a community never had electricity, the continued lack of electricity can
  hardly be undermining the normal functioning of their society. If a community is exposed to
  certain levels of corruption, then it is important to understand acceptable levels of corruption.
Table D-4. Source of Instability Analysis Matrix Example

For stability:

- Does this issue increase support for the government or legitimate governance? The population’s acceptance and reliance on governmental and / or nongovernmental entities to maintain a stable social environment is a key factor. This does not solely equate to providing services, but rather, speaks more to the population’s confidence in entities protecting their equities and way of life.

- Does this issue decrease support for malign actors? This usually occurs when malign actors are exploiting the population beyond acceptable levels. Normally, this equates to seizing opportunities for reducing levels of violence, crime, or subjugation.

- Does this issue increase societal and institutional capacity and capabilities? This equates to improving conditions beyond what currently exists without creating artificial systems or process that are unnatural to the environment or local customs.
The next step is to prioritize the identified sources of instability/stability using local perception data. Information may be available through the TCS, independent surveys, polling data, information shared with international organization/non-governmental representatives, host nation officials, etc. It is important to note at this stage of SAF, CMO planners may have to make assumptions as to whether or not the source of instability is a priority grievance for the population and should seek to validate this assumption at the earliest opportunity through civil reconnaissance. A priority grievance is an issue a significant percentage of locals - not outside experts - identify as a priority for their community. Otherwise, locals may perceive the stabilization efforts as focusing on issues that do not really matter to them.

It is very important to note that the Source of Instability/Stability Analysis Matrix frames the potential sources of instability/stability such that responses make sense as they relate to evaluating grievances (i.e., sources of instability) or resiliencies (i.e., sources of stability). During the design process, activities are developed to mitigate sources of instability or protect sources of stability.

Civil-military operations planners should recognize that not every sources of instability can be mitigated or sources of stability protected through MAGTF organic capabilities or through nonlethal means. Certain sources of instability may be better mitigated or sources of stability protected through other approaches which may include referral to international
organization/nongovernmental-sponsored programs, host nation actions or in some cases, referred for prosecution by other MAGTF or joint targeting approaches. When these type issues arise, then CMO planners need to share the results of source of instability/stability analysis with other MAGTF entities and be prepared to collaborate in separate activities that are not related to SAF methodology but are important to achieving overall MAGTF objectives.

The final steps in stability analysis are: conducting root cause analysis, establishing an objective, and identifying MOEs and MOE data sources in order to complete the Instability/Stability Matrix part 1.

Root cause analysis seeks to identify and correct root causes, as opposed to simply addressing their symptoms. The “5 Whys” technique is a used to conduct root cause analysis because it does not require data segmentation, hypothesis testing, regression or other advanced statistical tools, and in many cases can be completed without a data collection plan. By repeatedly asking the question “Why” (five is a good rule of thumb), you peel away the layers of symptoms, which can lead to the root cause of a problem. Very often the apparent reason for a problem will lead you to asking another question. Although this technique is called “5 Whys,” you may find that you will need to ask the question fewer or more times than five before you find the issue related to a problem.

The establishment of objectives uses the same processes and principles used in the MCPP; therefore, no further elaboration will be provided other than to remind CMO planners the importance of collaborating with other MAGTF entities while developing courses of action and employing SAF methodology.

The establishment of MOEs measure signs of progress toward achieving the stated objective. MOEs measure impact and change to the environment and do not simply measure output or task accomplishment. Careful analysis must be place on deriving MOEs since it truly underpins achievement of objectives in a manner directly related to addressing root causes of instability or stability. Measure of effectiveness data sources are identified after MOEs indicators are established. These MOE data sources must provide accurate information to monitor MOE indicators based on simplicity, practicality, and affordability to maintain an enduring and
consistent monitoring and evaluation process throughout operations. Table D-6 provides a template for what will be refined further during the design phase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of (In)Stability</th>
<th>Cause (Perception)</th>
<th>Cause (Systemic)</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>MOE Indicators</th>
<th>MOE Data Sources</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Design MOP Indicators</th>
<th>MOP Data Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Take from SOI/SOS analysis</td>
<td>Population's perception (From a variety of polling data)</td>
<td>Root cause</td>
<td>Objective statement</td>
<td>Indicators reflecting measurable change as objective is achieved</td>
<td>Information sources allowing you to track indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table D-6. Instability/Stability Matrix Part 1

#### Component Three: Design

In the next component of SAF, CMO planners design, prioritize, and synchronize stabilization activities using an activity design worksheet (see table D-7) and complete the design section of the Instability/Stability Matrix part 2 (see table D-8). This process begins by identifying potential activities specifically related to issues captured during previous source of instability/stability analysis. Potential activities are then screened and refined using the three stability criteria. Note: The activity design worksheet frames the potential activities such that inherently positive aspects of the activity (the positive stability effect) are highlighted.
Table D-7. Activity Worksheet Template

The activity design worksheet facilitates designing stability activities predicated on previous source of instability/stability analysis. The source of instability/stability is captured in the header of the first column to ensure traceability. The proposed activity is entered into the first column. Subsequent rows, associated with each possible activity, are developed across the template addressing items identified in column headers. Explanation for the stability criteria questions remains the same. However, at this juncture, opportunity exists to reexamine data while fully explaining responses to stability criteria and exploring relative importance for prioritization. Proposed activities that meet any stability criteria are then refined using the following eight design principles:

1. Can activity be sustained by the local government or society?
2. Does activity maximize local involvement and create local ownership?
3. Does activity minimizes trade-off between short-term positive effects and potential long-term negative impacts (i.e., unintended consequences)?
4. Does activity leverage or support programs of other government agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and the host nation government?
5. Is activity appropriate to local political and cultural context?
6. Does activity strengthens government accountability and transparency?
(1) Does activity leverages and build upon existing societal resiliencies?

(2) Is activity flexible enough to adapt to change in circumstances?

It is important to note that activity design does not have to meet all design principles but the probability of executing a successful activity increases significantly when all design principles are met.

The next step is to screen each proposed activity against available resources (money, personnel, expertise, time) to validate whether the activity is realistic or even meets the parameters of the MAGTF’s mission. If the activity is deemed appropriate and feasible, then MOPs are determined. Measures of performance are quantitative measurements that only track output in the form of task accomplishment (e.g., if the security task is to conduct patrols, then the MOP is simply the number of patrols performed). The number of patrols conducted does not necessarily equate to improving the security environment but it may be an important criterion to evaluating overall stability. Measure of performance data sources are identified after MOP indicators are established. These MOP data sources provide accurate information to monitor MOP indicators based on specific tasks that are monitored and evaluated throughout operations.

If the activity meets acceptable parameters for final consideration, then part 2 of the instability/stability matrix (design section) is completed and processed for final validation as a legitimate nonlethal stability targeting package (table D-8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of (In)Stability</th>
<th>Analysis Cause (Perception)</th>
<th>Analysis Cause (Systemic)</th>
<th>MOE Objective</th>
<th>MOE Indicators</th>
<th>MOE Data Sources</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Design MOP Indicators</th>
<th>MOP Data Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Activity to achieve objective
Indicators that measure progress toward activity completion
Information sources that track activity completion

Table D-8. Instability/Stability Matrix Part 2 Template
The final step in design is to validate the activity identified in the completed instability/stability matrix part 2 as a viable stability nonlethal target. This validation occurs through civil reconnaissance and civil engagement. Civil reconnaissance and civil engagement examines actual local conditions to ensure planning assumptions were not corrupt or misguided. At this juncture, it is critical to implement stability nonlethal targeting efforts predicated on a thorough understanding of local conditions, local grievances, and local norms…not outsider assumptions. This understanding can be gained through civil reconnaissance or other mechanisms including population surveys, focus groups, civil engagements, input from local NGOs, etc.

During this final step prior to the execution phase, activities are validated, prioritized, and synchronized with overall MAGTF efforts. If an activity is not validated through civil reconnaissance or from any other circumstances, then the activity is deemed untenable and must be revalidated though CPB and the entire process again. If an activity is validated, the information in the instability/stability matrix is forwarded through the operations department as a nonlethal targeting package and the initial transition criteria are established until they are further refined during M&E efforts in the next phase.

**Component Four: Execution**

The execution phase consists of delivering the nonlethal targeting package (i.e., instability/stability matrix) to the operations department, M&E on an approved nonlethal targeting package, and conducting transition to competent authorities (event driven) or conducting closing actions at the conclusion of operations (time driven).

The first step of this phase is nominating the nonlethal target package so that it becomes part of the overall MAGTF operational effort. If approved and implemented, then activities are resourced and executed in accordance with MAGTF policies and procedures.

Next and most significant, it is the establishment of an iterative cycle of examination that eventually leads to accomplishing the objective or results in activity termination because of failure to achieve desired effect. Seldom are activities designed perfectly during initial planning; they will require adjustment during extended operations. Therefore, M&E efforts must be looked upon as the mechanism to ensure success and the key to mitigating unintended negative
consequences. Monitoring and evaluation is basically conducted on the following three levels: measures of performance, measures of effect, and overall stability.

Measures of performance simply track implementation of an activity. They answer the question, “Is the activity progressing?” and in the long run “Is the activity complete?” Examples might include the number of miles of road paved, or number of police trained. Measures of performance are monitored during the implementation of an activity until it is completed.

Measures of effectiveness measure an activity’s impact. Examples might be decreased travel time (for a road project) or decreased criminal activity (for a police training activity). They are generally a combination of qualitative and quantitative data point that are assessed together to provide a more comprehensive understanding of effectiveness.

Overall stability measures the effect of individual activities, it takes into account the effect of ALL the activities conducted over a longer period of time, as well as the influence of external factors. It asks, “Is stability increasing or decreasing?” Key to measuring overall stability is identifying good indicators, creating a baseline, and then tracking the indicators at regular intervals, starting as early as possible. The best overall stability indicators reflect local perceptions of stability, not perceptions or assumptions held by outsiders. They are based on the question, “What will local people do or say differently if they believe the environment is getting more stable?” Examples include:

1. Local government recognition; e.g., locals take their problems to local government officials for resolution—reflects trust and confidence.
2. Local-on-local violence—a direct measure of insecurity.

A single indicator is incapable of measuring overall stability. Stability indicators normally aggregate to build a complete sight picture. Therefore, stability planners must establish and track metrics methodically to inform progress but also to maintain an iterative process of stability activity refinement. The M&E matrix below in table D-9 provides a mechanism and tool for capturing progress and evaluating overall stability.
The final step of the entire SAF process is to transition operations and to redeploy MAGTF assets to other contingencies or back to the continental United States for retrofit and reassignment. As alluded to earlier, initial transition criteria are established when activities are submitted for implementation; however, more definitive transition criteria will be established as operations progress and the M&E process determines most realistic circumstances based on progress and overall MAGTF transition criteria.

### Table D-9. Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOI</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Measure of Performance</th>
<th>Measure of Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>MOP Indicator</strong></td>
<td><strong>MOE Indicator</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Baseline</strong></td>
<td><strong>Change</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td><strong>Data for MOE Indicator</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Selected activity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Identified on the Stability Worksheet</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taken from the Stability Worksheet</strong></td>
<td><strong>MOE Indicators related to selected activity on the Stability Worksheet</strong></td>
<td><strong>Baseline Data for MOE Indicator</strong></td>
<td><strong>Change in Baseline Data</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX E

Principles of Development and Reconstruction Assistance

These principles guide US development and reconstruction assistance. They are fundamental to the success of assistance as an instrument of US foreign policy and national security. The principles are not a checklist, but a summary of the characteristics of successful assistance to achieve development objectives including economic growth, democracy and governance, and social transition.

a. **Ownership.** Build on the leadership, participation and commitment of a country and its people.

b. **Capacity-Building.** Strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills and promote appropriate policies.

c. **Sustainability.** Design programs to ensure their impact endures.

d. **Selectivity.** Allocate resources based on need, local commitment and foreign policy interests.

e. **Assessment.** Conduct careful research, adapt best practices, and design for local conditions.

f. **Results.** Focus resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable and strategically-focused objectives.

g. **Partnership.** Collaborate closely with governments, communities, donors, NGOs, the private sector, international organizations, and universities.

h. **Flexibility.** Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities, and maximize efficiency.

i. **Accountability.** Design accountability and transparency into systems and build effective checks and balances to guard against corruption.
Chapter 6

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Request for Assistance for United States Military Assets in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Mission Tasking Matrix

Request for Assistance. The Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) process begins with an affected state request for assistance to the USAID/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA). Should the DOD possess a unique capability and assets are available to fulfill this need, then USAID/OFDA representatives will request DOD support. The USAID/OFDA representatives in coordination with the J-9 will develop the MITAM request. See figure F-1.

JTF MITAM Processing. The MITAM is processed by the JTF in five phases.

Phase 1 - MITAM Receipt. The JTF, typically the battle watch captain and orders officer, receives the MITAM from USAID/OFDA and staffs it with the MITAM working group. Then, the MITAM working group provides further analysis of the feasibility of the JTF’s to conduct the mission.

Phase 2 - Staffing. The MITAM working group is comprised of key JTF planners, unit representatives, and led by the J-9 in coordination with the J-3 (the J-3 is the tasking authority). The MITAM working group validates the MITAM, identifies units and resources capable of performing the mission, and issues a warning order. The battle watch captain develops a tracking mechanism for MITAMs and tracks them using their USAID/OFDA assigned number.

Phase 3 - Orders Development. The orders officer writes an execution order, identifying a list of corresponding tasks, including the MITAM number for tracking; the execution order is issued to the tasked unit.

Phase 4 - Mission Execution. The tasked unit executes the assigned mission and the battle watch captain tracks MITAM progress.
Phase 5 – Closure. This phase includes capturing resources requirements, i.e., personnel, equipment operational costs, and consumables associated with mission execution.

Figure F-1. Request for Assistance Process for US Military Assistance In Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
APPENDIX G

Recommended References for Civil-Military Operations

USAID OFDA Field Operations Guide:
http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/resources/pdf/fo
g_v4.pdf

USAID OFDA Guidance Cable on Disaster Planning and Response 2012:
http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/resources/pdf/f
g_v4.pdf

DoD Support to Foreign Disaster Assistance Handbook for JTF Commanders:

Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response:

Fund for Peace: Failed States Index:  http://global.fundforpeace.org/index.php

United States Institute of Peace:  http://www.usip.org//pubs/specialreports/srs/srs5.html

USIP Guide to Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations:
http://www.usip.org/publications/guide-participants-in-peace-stability-and-relief-operations-
web-version

World Bank: World Development Report 2011 – Conflict, Security and Development:

USIP Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction:
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/guiding_principles_full.pdf

Relief Web: OCHA’s global hub for time-critical humanitarian information on complex
emergencies and natural disasters:  http://www.reliefweb.int

International Committee of the Blue Shield: http://icom.museum/emergency.html

U.S. Committee of the Blue Shield: http://www.uscbs.org
GLOSSARY

SECTION I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AO .................................................................................. area of operations
AOR ................................................................................. area of responsibility
ASCOPE .......................................................... areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events

BPRM ................................................................. Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration

CA ....................................................................................... civil affairs
CAG ..................................................................................... civil affairs group
CAO .................................................................................... civil affairs operations
CAT ........................................................................................ civil affairs team
CCDR ................................................................................ combatant commander
CCIR ........................................................................ commander’s critical information requirement
CDCS ................................................................................ Country Development Cooperation Strategies
CIM ....................................................................................... civil information management
CMO .................................................................................. civil-military operations
CMOC ................................................................................ civil-military operations center
CMOWG ........................................................................... civil-military operations working group
COA .................................................................................... course of action
COM .................................................................................. chief of mission
CONOPS ........................................................................... concept of operations
COP .................................................................................. common operational picture
CPB ............................................................................................................ civil preparation of the battlespace
CSO ........................................................................................................... Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (DOS)

DART ........................................................................................................... disaster assistance response team
DATT ........................................................................................................... defense attaché
DC ............................................................................................................. dislocated civilian
DCHA ........................................... Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)
DEA ....................................................................................................... Drug Enforcement Administration
DOD ........................................................................................................ Department of Defense
DOJ ........................................................................................................ Department of Justice
DOS ........................................................................................................ Department of State

EAC ........................................................................................................ emergency action committee
FFP ....................................................................................................... Office of Food for Peace (USAID)
FHA ..................................................................................................... foreign humanitarian assistance
FID ........................................................................................................ foreign internal defense

G-2 ....................................................................................................... brigade or higher intelligence staff office
G-3 ....................................................................................................... brigade or higher operations staff office
G-5 ........................................................................................................ assistant chief of staff, plans
G-9 ...................................................................................................... brigade or higher civil-military operations staff officer
GCC ..................................................................................................... geographic combatant command
GCE .................................................................................................... ground combat element
HACC ........................................................................................................ humanitarian assistance coordination center

HOC ........................................................................................................ humanitarian operations center

ICITAP .................................................................................................. International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (DOJ)

ICRC .................................................................................................. International Committee of the Red Cross

IDAD .................................................................................................. internal defense and development

IPB .................................................................................................. intelligence preparation of the battlespace

IPI .................................................................................................. indigenous populations and institutions

ISR .................................................................................................. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

J-3 .................................................................................................. operations directorate of a joint staff; operations staff section

J-9 .................................................................................................. civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff; civil-military operations staff section

JP .................................................................................................. joint publication

JTF .................................................................................................. joint task force

LOO .................................................................................................. line of operation

M&E .................................................................................................. monitoring and evaluation

MAGTF .............................................................................................. Marine air-ground task force

MARFORCENT .................................................................................... United States Marine Corps Forces, Central Command

MCPP .................................................................................................. Marine Corps Planning Process

MDRO .................................................................................................. mission disaster relief officer

MEB .................................................................................................. Marine expeditionary brigade
MEF ......................................................................................................................Marine expeditionary force
METT-TC ....mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available
MEU ......................................................................................................................Marine expeditionary unit
MITAM ..............................................................................................................mission tasking matrix
MOE .....................................................................................................................measure of effectiveness
MOP .....................................................................................................................measure of performance
MOS .................................................................................................................... military occupational specialty

NEO .................................................................................................................... noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO ................................................................................................................... nongovernmental organization

OCHA ..........................................................Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OFDA .........................................................Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance
OIC ...................................................................................................................... officer in charge
OPT .................................................................................................................... operational planning team
OTI .................................................................Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID)

PIR ...................................................................................................................... priority intelligence requirement
PM ...................................................................................................................... Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DOS)
PMESII ...............................................political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
POLAD ..................................................political advisor (DOS)
PRC .................................................................................................................. populace and resources control
PRT .................................................................................................................. provincial reconstruction team
QDDR .............................................................. Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

RCT ........................................................................................................... regimental combat team

RFI ........................................................................................................... request for information

ROL ........................................................................................................... rule of law

RSO ........................................................................................................... regional security officer (DOS)

S-2 ........................................................................................................... battalion or regiment intelligence section

S-3 ........................................................................................................... battalion or regiment operations section

S-5 ........................................................................................................... battalion or regiment plans section

SAF ........................................................................................................... Stability Assessment Framework

SCA ........................................................................................................... support to civil administration

SCO ........................................................................................................... security cooperation office

SDO ........................................................................................................... senior defense official

SecDef ..................................................................................................... Secretary of Defense

SJA ........................................................................................................... staff judge advocate

SME ........................................................................................................... subject matter expert

TCS ........................................................................................................... tactical conflict survey

UN ............................................................................................................. United Nations

UNHCR ................................................................................................. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF ........................................................................................................... United Nations Children’s Fund

US ......................................................................................................................... United States

USAID ........................................................................................................ United States Agency for International Development

USCENTCOM .......................................................................................... United States Central Command

USDA ........................................................................................................ United States Department of Agriculture

USG ................................................................................................................... United States Government

USPACOM .................................................................................................. United States Pacific Command

Section II. Definitions

administrative control—Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support. (JP 1-02)

area of interest—That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1-02)

area of operations—An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 3-0)

area of responsibility—The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)

assessment—1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. 3. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity. 4. Judgment of the
motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective employees or “agents.” (JP 1-02)

chief of mission—The principal officer (the ambassador) in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation. The chief of mission is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all US Government executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a US area military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the chief of mission’s direct responsibility. Also called COM. (JP 1-02)

civil administration—An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs—Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. See also civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs group—A Reserve Component organization supporting the MAGTF commander with specially trained and organized personnel in order to facilitate the planning, coordination and execution of CMO and limited civil affairs operations. Also called CAG. (Note to terminologist: There is no Joint or Marine Corps definition of a CAG. Definition was derived from MCRP 5-12D and MCWP 3-33.1)

civil affairs operations—Actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called CAO. (JP 1-02)
**civil information management**—Process whereby data relating to the civil component of the operational environment is gathered, collated, processed, analyzed, produced into information products, and disseminated. Also called CIM. (JP 1-02) Marine Corps amplification—Process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other US Government and Department of Defense agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. Also called CIM. (MCRP 5-12C)

**civil-military operations**—Activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called CMO. See also civil affairs. (JP 1-02)

**civil-military operations center**—An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called CMOC. See also civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

**civil-military operations working group**—Task organized group made up primarily of civil affairs staff personnel and subject matter experts. The civil-military operations working group plans concurrent with the MAGTF OPT and provides input to the operational planning team as required, normally via the civil-military operations planner. The civil-military operations working group will conduct civil preparation of the battlespace, develop a civil-military operations problem statement, create the civil-military operations concept of support or concept of operations, develop the CMO staff estimate, and write the Civil-Military Operations Annex G. Also called CMOWG.
civil preparation of the battlespace—An analytical method used to examine civil considerations in support of mission analysis and the overall IPB process. Civil preparation of the battlespace is conducted through the framework of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations in order to focus on civil aspects as it relates to the overall operational environment and mission accomplishment. Civil preparation of the battlespace uses myriad methods to specifically analyze different aspects of civil information and assess the civil impact of friendly, adversary, external actors, as well as the local populace, on MAGTF operations and the achievement of objectives. Also called CPB. (Note to terminologist: in an effort to illustrate the difference in focus area between intelligence planners and CMO planners, the writers feel the introduction of the term civil preparation of the battlespace is warranted and should be included in this publication and the Marine Corps lexicon of terms.)

civil reconnaissance—A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events. (JP 1-02)

collaborative nonlethal targeting—An interorganizational and multidisciplinary effort to identify, pursue, and assess nonlethal civil activities that support the achievement of MAGTF CMO objectives. Nonlethal civil activities are described in the CMO purpose statement and CAO core tasks but also include anything designed to create support from within the indigenous population or to provide support to indigenous populations through the provision of other forms of assistance (expertise, information, health services, infrastructure, local capacity building, etc.).

combat camera—The acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of operational and planning requirements across the range of military operations and during joint exercises. (JP 1-02)

combatant command—A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1-02)
**combatant commander**—A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called **CCDR**. See also **combatant command**. (JP 1-02)

**commander’s critical information requirement**—See JP 1-02 for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows. Information regarding the enemy and friendly activities and the environment identified by the commander as critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decision-making. The two subcategories are priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements. Also called **CCIRs**. (MCRP 5-12C)

**common operational picture**—A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called **COP**. (JP 1-02)

**concept of operations**—A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. Also called **CONOPS**. (JP 1-02)

**concept plan**—In the context of joint operation planning level 3 planning detail, an operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or operation order. See also **operation plan**. (JP 1-02)

**country team**—The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

**course of action**—1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A scheme developed to accomplish a mission. 3. A product of the course-of-action development step of the joint operation planning process. Also called **COA**. (JP 1-02)

**disaster assistance response team**—A team of specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, rapidly deployed to assist US embassies and United States Agency for International
Development missions with the management of US Government response to disasters. Also called DART. (JP 1-02)

dislocated civilian—A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also called DC. See also refugee. (JP 1-02)

effect—1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 1-02)

emergency action committee—An organization established at a foreign service post by the chief of mission or principal officer for the purpose of directing and coordinating the post’s response to contingencies. It consists of consular representatives and members of other local US Government agencies in a foreign country who assist in the implementation of a Department of State emergency action plan. Also called EAC. (JP 1-02)

fires—See JP 1-02 for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows. Those means used to delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy capabilities, forces, or facilities as well as affect the enemy’s will to fight. Fires is one of the six warfighting functions. (MCRP 5-12C)

force protection—See JP 1-02 for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows. Actions or efforts used to safeguard own centers of gravity while protecting, concealing, reducing, or eliminating friendly critical vulnerabilities. Force protection is one of the six warfighting functions. (MCRP 5-12C)

foreign humanitarian assistance—Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called FHA. (JP 3-29)

foreign internal defense—See JP 1-02 for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows. Participation by civilian, military, and law enforcement agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and
protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (MCRP 512C)

**fragmentary order**—See JP 1-02 for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows. An abbreviated form of an operation order, usually issued on a day-to-day basis, that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may be issued in sections. (MCRP 5-12C)

**general support**—1. That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. 2. A tactical artillery mission. (JP 1-02)

**host nation**—A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 1-02)

**humanitarian assistance coordination center**—A temporary center established by a geographic combatant commander to assist with interagency coordination and planning during the early planning and coordination stages of foreign humanitarian assistance operations. Also called HACC. See also foreign humanitarian assistance. (JP 1-02)

**humanitarian operations center**—An international and interagency body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation. Also called HOC. (JP 1-02)

**indigenous populations and institutions**—The societal framework of an operational environment including citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, dislocated civilians, and governmental, tribal, ethnic, religious, commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called IPI. (JP 1-02)

**information operations**—See JP 1-02 for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows. The integration, coordination, and synchronization of actions taken to affect a relevant decision maker in order to create an operational advantage for the commander. (MCRP 5-12C)
intelligence preparation of the battlespace—See JP 1-02 for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. Also called IPB. (MCRP 5-12C)

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. Also called ISR. (JP 1-02)

interagency—Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination—Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02)

international organization—An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. (JP 3-08)

internal defense and development—The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called IDAD. See also foreign internal defense. (JP 1-02)

internally displaced person—Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. (JP 1-02)

interorganizational coordination—The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; engaged United States Government agencies; state, territorial, local, and
tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (JP 1-02)

**Joint task force**—A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

**Key influences**—Selected individuals, groups, assets, infrastructure and socio-cultural belief sets or factors, which could have a significant influence on friendly mission accomplishment, and should be considered in operational planning and execution.

**Line of operation**—A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). Also called LOO. (JP 1-02)

**Marine air-ground task force**—The Marine Corps’ principal organization for all missions across a range of military operations, composed of forces task-organized under a single commander capable of responding rapidly to a contingency anywhere in the world. The types of forces in the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) are functionally grouped into four core elements: a command element, an aviation combat element, a ground combat element, and a logistics combat element. The four core elements are categories of forces, not formal commands. The basic structure of the MAGTF never varies, though the number, size, and type of Marine Corps units comprising each of its four elements will always be mission dependent. The flexibility of the organizational structure allows for one or more subordinate MAGTFs to be assigned. In a joint or multinational environment, other Service or multinational forces may be assigned or attached. Also called MAGTF. (MCRP 5-12C)

**Marine Corps Planning Process**—A six-step methodology which helps organize the thought processes of the commander and staff throughout the planning and execution of military operations. It focuses on the mission and the threat and is based on the Marine Corps philosophy of maneuver warfare. It capitalizes on the principle of unity of command and supports the establishment and maintenance of tempo. The six steps consist of problem framing, course of
action development, course of action war game, course of action comparison and decision, orders development, and transition. Also called MCPP. *(Note: Tenets of the MCPP include top-down planning, single-battle concept, and integrated planning.)* (MCRP 5-12C)

**Marine expeditionary brigade**—A Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is constructed around an infantry regiment reinforced, a composite Marine aircraft group, and a combat logistics regiment. The Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), commanded by a general officer, is task-organized to meet the requirements of a specific situation. It can function as part of a joint task force, as the lead echelon of the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), or alone. It varies in size and composition and is larger than a Marine expeditionary unit but smaller than a MEF. The MEB is capable of conducting missions across a range of military operations. In a joint or multinational environment, it may also contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. Also called MEB. (MCRP 5-12C)

**Marine Expeditionary Force**—The largest Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and the Marine Corps’ principal warfighting organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a permanent command element and normally contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraft wings, and Marine logistics groups. The Marine expeditionary force is capable of missions across a range of military operations, including amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore in any environment. It can operate from a sea base, a land base, or both. In a joint or multinational environment, it may also contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. Also called MEF. (MCRP 5-12C)

**Marine Expeditionary Unit**—A Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) that is constructed around an infantry battalion reinforced, a composite squadron reinforced, and a task-organized logistics combat element. It normally fulfills Marine Corps’ forward sea-based deployment requirements. The Marine expeditionary unit provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis response and is capable of limited combat operations. In a joint or multinational environment, it may contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. Also called MEU. (MCRP 5-12C)
measure of effectiveness—A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. (JP 1-02)

measure of performance—A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (JP 1-02)

military information support operations—Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. (JP 1-02)

multinational force—A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. (JP 1-02)

nation assistance—Assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 1-02)

natural disaster—An emergency situation posing significant danger to life and property that results from a natural cause. (JP 1-02)

noncombatant evacuation operations—Operations directed by the Department of State or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens as designated by the Department of State. Also called NEOs. (JP 1-02)

noncombatant evacuees—1. US citizens who may be ordered to evacuate by competent authority include: a. civilian employees of all agencies of the US Government and their dependents, except as noted in 2a below; b. military personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants; and c. dependents of members of the Armed Forces of the United States. 2. US (and non-US) citizens who may be authorized or assisted (but not necessarily ordered to evacuate) by competent authority include: a. civilian
employees of US Government agencies and their dependents, who are residents in the country concerned on their own volition, but express the willingness to be evacuated; b. private US citizens and their dependents; c. military personnel and dependents of members of the Armed Forces of the United States outlined in 1c above, short of an ordered evacuation; and d. designated personnel, including dependents of persons listed in 1a through 1c above, as prescribed by the Department of State. See also noncombatant evacuation operations. (JP 1-02)

nongovernmental organization—A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02)

operation plan—1. Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. 2. A complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. (JP 1-02)

operational control—The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. See also combatant command. (JP 1-02)

operational planning team—A group built around the future operations section which integrates the staff representatives and resources. The operational planning team may have representatives or augmentation from each of the standard staff sections, the six warfighting functions, staff liaisons, and/or subject matter experts. Also called OPT. (MCRP 5-12C)

peacekeeping—Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other
such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 3-07.3)

**populace and resources control**—Control measures that assist host nation governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder joint mission accomplishment. Populace and resources control measures seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or otherwise threaten joint operation success. Also called PRC. (MCRP 5-12C)

**priority intelligence requirement**—See JP 1-02 for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows. An intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will critically affect the overall success of the command’s mission. Also called PIR. (MCRP 5-12C)

**private sector**—An umbrella term that may be applied to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations. (JP 1-02)

**provincial reconstruction team**—A civil-military team designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a host nation local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services. Also called PRT. (JP 1-02)

**refugee**—A person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. See also dislocated civilian. (JP 1-02)

**regional security officer**—A security officer responsible to the chief of mission (ambassador), for security functions of all United States embassies and consulates in a given country or group of adjacent countries. Also called RSO. (JP 1-02)

**request for information**—1. Any specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to
standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. 2. A term used by the National Security Agency/Central Security Service to state ad hoc signals intelligence requirements. Also called RFI. (JP 1-02)

**Reserve Component**—The Armed Forces of the United States Reserve Component consists of the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. (JP 1-02)

**rule of law**—A principle of governance in which all persons and institutions, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly announced, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and consistent with international human rights norms and standards. The drafting of laws must be transparent, and they must be applied fairly and without arbitrariness. In addition, all persons must have access to justice—the ability to seek and obtain a remedy through informal or formal institutions of justice. Also called ROL. (Note to terminologist: ROL is not defined in Joint or USMC doctrine. The Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform, published 13 June 2011, discusses this on pg I-3. The above definition is derived from the Joint Handbook)

**security assistance**—Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. See also security cooperation. (JP 1-02)

**security cooperation**—All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. See also security assistance. (JP 1-02)
**security sector reform**—A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken to improve the way a host nation provides safety, security, and justice. (JP 1-02)

**solatium**—Monetary compensation given in areas where it is culturally appropriate to alleviate grief, suffering, and anxiety resulting from injuries, death, and property loss with a monetary payment. (JP 1-02)

**stability operations**—An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02)

**staff judge advocate**—A judge advocate so designated in the Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps, and the principal legal advisor of a Navy, Coast Guard, or joint force command who is a judge advocate. Also called SJA. (JP 1-02)

**support to civil administration**—Actions that helps continue or stabilize management by a governing body of a FN’s civil structure by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. Support to civil administration consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting with those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives. Also called SCA. (MCRP 5-12C)

**tactical control**—The authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. See also combatant command; operational control. (JP 1-02)

**United States**—Includes the land area, internal waters, territorial sea, and airspace of the United States, including a. United States territories; and b. Other areas over which the United States Government has complete jurisdiction and control or has exclusive authority or defense responsibility. (JP 1-02)
**unity of effort**—Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. (JP 1-02)

**weapons of mass destruction**—Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, and excluding the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. (JP 1-02)
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2-0 Joint Intelligence

3-0 Joint Operations

3-06 Joint Urban Operations

3-07 Stability

3-07.3 Peace Operations

3-08 Interorganizational Cooperation

3-22 Foreign Internal Defense

3-28 Civil Support

3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

4-0 Joint Logistics

3-57 Civil-Military Operations

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3-61 Public Affairs

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