

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE CORPS CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SCHOOL
WEAPONS TRAINING BATTALION
TRAINING COMMAND
2300 LOUIS ROAD (C478)
QUANTICO, VA 22134-5036

STUDENT OUTLINE

USMC IN SMALL WARS

0530-106

CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER COURSE

M020A3D

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LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE**. Given a mission, commander's intent, operations order, scenario, and CMO planning products (e.g. CMO staff estimate, CMO COA graphic and narrative, and a synch matrix, etc.), support stability operations planning, to enable the commander's decision making process by identifying instability and stability factors and to design activities to mitigate instability or reinforce stability factors within the operating environment in accordance with MCWP 3-33.1. (CACT-PLAN-2005)

ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES

(1) Without the aid of references, define small wars, in accordance with Small Wars Manual, Ch 1. (CACT-EXEC-2005a)

(2) Without the aid of references, define irregular warfare, in accordance with MCWP 3-33.5, Ch 1. (CACT-EXEC-2005b)

(3) Without the aid of references, identify irregular warfare primary activities, in accordance with the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Section 1. (CACT-EXEC-2005c)

(4) Without the aid of references, identify irregular warfare related capabilities, in accordance with the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Section 1. (CACT-EXEC-2005d)

(5) Without the aid of references, define stability operations, in accordance with JP 3-07, Executive Summary. (CACT-EXEC-2005e)

(6) Without the aid of references, identify stability operations functions, in accordance with JP 3-07, Ch 3. (CACT-EXEC-2005f)

1. **SMALL WARS**

a. **Small Wars**. Definition: "As applied to the United States, small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation." -*Small Wars Manual*-

b. **An Old Solution to New Problem**. The purpose of conducting small wars remains the same - establishing security though good governance and recognizing the criticality of the political dimension.

c. **Small Wars: Part of American Military History**. Small Wars are inherent to U.S. military history e.g. wars of westward expansion (Indian Wars 18th and 19th century), Post American Civil War, and Philippine-American War (1899-1902).

d. **Small Wars in the Caribbean**. The "Banana Wars" (1898-1934) were a consequence of the Spanish American War but shaped the way Marines were employed in small wars. The experiences during this period resulted in lessons learned being captured in the form of the *Small Wars Manual*.

e. **Why the Marine Corps...then?** Before the *Small Wars Manual* was written, the Marine Corps participated in over 180 small contingencies, and was the force of choice due to its expeditionary nature, small size, and rapidly deployable capabilities.

f. **Why the Marine Corps...now?** Recent Marine Corps history, beginning in the 1960s, shows that the preponderance of military operations fall into the small wars category and that future operations will most likely be the same, requiring expeditionary forces who can deploy rapidly and accomplish many missions.

g. **Small Wars Relevance**. Small wars is an accepted Marine Corps term that describes many types of joint operations, other than major war. The tenets of the *Small Wars Manual* is timeless and describes the nature of small war activities exactly how it is described in many Joint and Service Publications. Therefore, understanding the tenets described in the *Small Wars Manual* will lead to greater understanding of contemporary Civil Affairs doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).

h. **Civil Affairs Role in Small Wars.** The Civil Affairs core tasks are specifically designed to address many of the types of operations Marines will encounter in the future. Students will receive more in-depth training during this MOS course on CA core tasks. For now, keep these CA core task in mind as we discuss other important types of operations. You will see that the core tasks: Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Populace and Resources Control, Nation Assistance, Support to Civil Administration, and Civil Information Management are vital capabilities in accomplishing future MAGFT missions.

2. **IRREGULAR WARFARE**

a. **Global Uncertainty: The "New Normal" in the Interconnected World.** The interconnected nature of all countries throughout the world makes it reasonable to believe shared global interests will translate to shared global responsibilities in maintaining a decent modicum of security throughout the world. This view also projects that future security challenges will entail more than just preparing for conventional force-on-force warfare. Others forms of warfare i.e. cyber, economic and other forms of military operations i.e. Humanitarian Assistance, present unique challenges that the Service must be prepared for.

b. **Strategic Guidance: Challenges Complicated by Force Trade-Offs.** The Military designs capabilities based on strategic challenges identified in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Catastrophic, Traditional, and Disruptive threats are easier to comprehend and are easier to address from the perspective of conventionally trained and equipped forces. However, Irregular threats pose greater challenges due to their unconventional nature and association to insurgencies and terrorism. The Irregular threat spawned a new line of military logic that led to what is now called Irregular Warfare.

c. **Irregular Warfare.** Definition: "A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)" (JP 1). Irregular Warfare primary activities consist of: Stability Operations, Counterinsurgency, Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare, and Counter Terrorism. Irregular Warfare related capabilities consist of: Civil-Military Operations, Information Operations, Counterintelligence, and Law enforcement activities. Of the aforementioned activities, COIN, STABOPS, CMO are particularly important to CA Marines due to the relationship of CA core tasks to mission accomplishment.

d. **"Warfare" is a mix of both irregular and traditional.**

Whether we agree or disagree, warfare has been categorized as either irregular or "traditional". Rather than try and break down warfare into neat bins we should consider the approach of Irregular Warfare **and** Traditional Warfare. Future conflict is projected to be "mixed" so the Marine Corps must be prepared to deal with the mix of warfare with personnel and equipment simultaneously executing across a range of challenges or missions. As you can see in the slide, CA capabilities are inherently important to any mission in the future.

3. **STABILITY OPERATIONS**

a. **Stability Operations.** Definition: "Stability Operations encompasses various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief." JP 3-07

Another important point to consider with stability operations is that, "They are a core U.S. military mission that DoD shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations." DoDI 3000.05

b. **Whole of Government Approach.** The 'whole of government' approach integrates collaborative efforts of the interagency to achieve unity of effort towards a shared goal. The Department of State (DoS) is charged with the responsibility for leading a whole-of-government approach to stabilization that includes the array of U.S. Government (USG) departments and agencies, including DoD and component services and agencies. Within this broad approach, the primary military contribution to stabilization is to protect and defend the population, facilitate the personal security of the people and thus, create a platform for political, economic, and human security.

c. **U.S. Institute of Peace Guiding Principles.** The accomplishment of stability requires unity of effort as civilian organizations have separate and distinct chains of command. The principles highlight complexities associated with conducting interagency and coalition operations and are found in the U.S. Institute of Peace Guiding Principles of Stabilization and Reconstruction:

(1) Host Nation [HN] Ownership and Capacity. The affected country must drive its own development needs and priorities even if transitional authority is in the hands of outsiders.

(2) Political Primacy. A political settlement is the cornerstone of a sustainable peace. Every decision and every action has an impact on the possibility of forging political agreement.

(3) Legitimacy. Legitimacy has three facets: the degree to which the HN population accepts the mission and its mandate or the government and its actions; the degree the government is accountable to its people; and the degree that regional neighbors and the broader international community accept the mission and the HN government.

(4) Unity of Effort. Unity of effort begins with a shared understanding of the environment. It refers to cooperation toward common objectives over the short and long term, even when the participants come from different organizations with diverse operating cultures.

(5) Security. Security is a cross-cutting prerequisite for peace. The lack of security is what prompts stabilization efforts. Security creates the enabling environment for development.

(6) Conflict Transformation. Conflict transformation guides the strategy to transform resolution of conflict from violent to peaceful means. It requires reducing drivers of conflict and strengthening resiliencies across political, security, rule of law, economic, and social spheres, while building HN capacity to manage political and economic competition through peaceful means.

(7) Regional Engagement. Regional engagement entails encouraging the HN, its neighboring countries, and other key States in the region to partner in promoting both the HN's and the region's security and economic and political development. It has three components: comprehensive regional diplomacy, a shared regional vision, and cooperation.

d. **Range of Military Operations**. The term 'Range of Military Operations' (ROMO) applies to the joint force. The foundations for MAGTF operations conducted outside the United States and its territories are reflected across the ROMO:

continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks.

e. **Joint Campaign Construct**. Military operations are the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. These combinations are manifested in operations designed to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative using the mutually supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities. Offensive and defensive tasks focus on the lethal effects of combat power; stability tasks emphasize non-lethal effects.

f. **Elements of a Stable State**. Human security, economic and infrastructure development, governance and rule of law are elements of a stable state. While these elements can be analyzed individually, it is better to view them as a whole system. The stability of the state depends upon how well these elements are performed, the manner in which they interact, and the commitment of key members of that society in maintaining or promoting a standard acceptable to the populace.

g. **Stability Operations Functions**. Stability operations function as a framework; they are a tool to help visualize the conduct of an operation, sequence necessary activities within an operation, and develop appropriate priorities for those activities and resource allocation. Individually, the functions encompass the distinct yet interrelated tasks that constitute stability activities in a functional sector. The stability functions are:

(1) **Security**. Security activities seek to protect and control civil populations, property and territory. They may be performed as part of a military occupation during or after combat, to help defeat an insurgency or in response to a humanitarian disaster. They seek ultimately to reassure rather than compel. Security activities conclude successfully when civil violence is reduced to a level manageable by HN law enforcement authorities.

(2) **Humanitarian Assistance**. Includes programs conducted to meet basic human needs to ensure the social well-being of the population. Social well-being is characterized by access to and delivery of basic needs and services (water, food, shelter, sanitation and health services), provision of education, return or voluntary resettlement of those displaced by violent conflict and restoration of a social fabric and community life.

(3) Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure. Includes programs conducted to ensure an economy in which people can pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a predictable system of economic governance bound by law. A sustainable economy is characterized by market-based macroeconomic stability, control over the illicit (black market) economy and economic-based threats to the peace, development of a market economy, and employment generation.

(4) Rule of Law. Refers to programs conducted to ensure all individuals and institutions, public and private, and the state itself are held accountable to the law, which is supreme. The rule of law in a country is characterized by just legal frameworks, public order, accountability to the law, access to justice, and a culture of lawfulness. Rule of law requires laws that are publicly disseminated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles.

(5) Governance & Participation. Governance and participation refers to programs conducted to help the people to share, access or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state. Stable governance is characterized by a government that provides essential services and serves as a responsible steward of public resources; government officials who are held accountable through political and legal processes; and a population that can participate in governance through civil society organizations, an independent media, and political parties. Stable governance is the mechanism through which basic human needs of the population are largely met, respect for minority rights is assured, conflicts are managed peacefully through inclusive political processes, and competition for power occurs nonviolently.

4. COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Insurgency definition: The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (MCWP 3-33.5)

Counterinsurgency definition: Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency. (MCWP 3-33.5)

b. **Insurgency Prerequisites.** A population is vulnerable if the people have real or perceived grievances that insurgents can exploit. Moreover, there must be an insurgent leadership element that can direct the frustrations of a vulnerable population. The insurgency must act on real or perceived lack of governmental control, which can allow insurgents to operate with little or no interference from security forces or other agencies. This means that the government is not providing for the people. This may refer to inadequate services or an overly harsh and repressive government. When all three exist in an area, an insurgency can operate with increased freedom of movement, gain the support of the people, and become entrenched over time. When commanders and staffs desire an additional method of analysis other than opportunity, motive, and means, the prerequisites of an insurgency can be represented as a vulnerable population, leadership for direction, and a lack of government control.

c. **Ideology.** The insurgents must have a problem that justifies their actions in relation to the population's grievances and explains what is wrong with the status quo. Insurgents use a narrative to connect a population's grievances with its actions and demands. When an insurgency uses a narrative to mobilize a population, these grievances become root causes. An essential part of the ability of an insurgency to mobilize a population is an insurgency's ideology. An ideology is the integrated assertions, theories, and aims that constitute a socio-political program. Not all insurgencies are ideological, but an ideology provides an insurgency with a message of change that is normally coherent and logical, based upon the insurgency's underlying assumptions. The insurgency appeals to popular causes and beliefs. Examples of these causes/beliefs include: frustration with the Government, frustration with the Coalition, Xenophobia, threat to belief systems, fear of change.

d. **Networked Insurgencies.** While some insurgencies are hierarchical, it is also likely that an insurgency will be deeply networked into a society. While auxiliary, guerrillas, leadership, and underground elements are a means of viewing the basic functions of an insurgency; many insurgencies in the modern era are learning and adapting networks. An insurgency's members will often have connections to various resourcing means, such as the black markets. Moreover, there are normally connections to various parts of a society. Many insurgencies, especially modern insurgencies, have members that perform basic functions, but are also networked organizations that are

interwoven with their societies. While it is possible for a hierarchical style insurgency to exist, a networked structure is more likely today because of modern communications.

e. **Direct COIN Methods**. The direct method of using United States (U.S.) land, maritime, and air forces in a decisive action role is resource intensive when done on a large scale, but it is often necessary to fully support a counterinsurgency effort. A direct method may be used, for example, when the success of a host nation's counterinsurgency efforts is critical to U.S. interests. The U.S. can use a direct method after or during a major conflict or when U.S. interests necessitate stability in a failed or failing state. Leaders can also integrate land forces into a host nation's ongoing effort. Unfortunately, unintended consequences, such as increased tensions among segments of society or resistance to U.S. involvement, often accompany a direct approach. Leaders must carefully plan and execute operations before and during a direct response to avoid negative consequences. However, using direct capabilities remains a valid option and an important capability that the Army and Marine Corps provide the joint force.

(1) Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition. For a tactical and operational ground commander acting as the primary counterinsurgent commander, the shape-clear-hold build-transition framework provides a foundation for detailed planning. Moreover, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is well-suited to those commanders and staffs engaged in training, advising, or integrating capabilities into a host-nation effort. In many counterinsurgency efforts, a state will try to defeat insurgencies by performing a general operational approach that is similar to the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework at the tactical level. While this is certainly not a uniform rule, having some framework in understanding another counterinsurgent's actions provides a point of reference for understanding. This framework applies to all units involved in the counterinsurgency, including, for example, an infantry battalion directly performing actions, a member of a Special Forces team advising a host nation, or a member of a combatant command integrating and evaluating various security cooperation capabilities.

(2) Targeted Threat Infrastructure. Targeted threat infrastructure is a method that seeks to destroy an insurgent force's physical infrastructure. This is a method that will normally only work if another force is securing the population and building legitimacy. In other words, it is a method to

enable another force. This method seeks to destroy the necessary requirements of an insurgency to conduct combat operations. Targeted threat infrastructure proactively targets the physical and societal mechanisms that support and fuel the insurgency. It involves an aggressive spirit of the offense. When using this method, commanders and staffs must consider the law of war principle of proportionality. The anticipated injury or damage caused to civilians or civilian property must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by an attack on a military objective. Commanders and staffs using targeted threat infrastructure must also ensure it is not contributing to the recruitment of insurgent fighters by using too heavy a hand against elements of society that are not fully or willingly supporting the insurgency.

(3) Strike. A strike is an attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability (JP 3-0). A strike may be useful in disrupting an insurgency, especially in insurgent controlled areas. Strikes can be made on guerrilla bases, large, enclosed or isolated compounds, and training camps. Normally these operations are meant to disrupt an insurgency and allow for the success of other operations. Strike operations can be integrated into a host nation's operations to secure a population. Strikes can be conducted in support of shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework operations after guerrilla forces are initially driven out of an area during the clear phase. Strikes are often employed to assault objectives outside cleared areas to fix and destroy guerilla forces and prevent counterattacks against government and reconstruction personnel. Counterinsurgents conduct assaults in areas where guerrillas attempt to consolidate during the hold and build phases. Precision airpower weapons can be used to support other units conducting strike operations or to conduct strike operations on their own.

f. **Indirect COIN Methods**

(1) Nation Assistance and Security Cooperation. Nation assistance is assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations (JP 3-0). This is an essential element in counterinsurgency because the military lacks the expertise to build civil control over the population, perform economic reforms, or aid in other basic functions that a host nation may need to prevent or prevail against an insurgency. Using a whole-of-government approach is essential in conducting

nation assistance to prevent insurgencies from developing freedom of movement by exploiting the root causes of conflict within an operational environment.

Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 3-22)

(2) Generational Engagement. Generational engagement is a method that can be conducted in conjunction with other approaches that seeks to get the host nation to educate and empower the population to participate in legal methods of political discourse and dissent. This can be done in both high threat situations and situations where an insurgency is at its infancy and combat is less intense. It is best that the host nation undertake this method as soon as possible to affect the next generation. Generational engagement focuses on the population. Generational engagement focuses on building new constituents in the host-nation population to counter insurgent actions. Generational engagement is a method of political mobilization of the people. The purpose of the method is to get population groups to side with the host nation.

(3) Negotiation and Diplomacy. Negotiation and diplomacy are ways to resolve or defeat an insurgency. Counterinsurgents must influence the host-nation government and its subordinate elements (for example, the office of land reform) to remove the root causes that have led to acts of subversion and violence in order to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.

(4) Identify-Separate-Isolate-Influence-Reintegrate. Identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate is a method that combines several activities that affect relevant population groups. This can be done in both high threat situations and situations where the insurgency is at its infancy and combat is less intense. This method works by, with, and through the host nation; however, it may have some elements wherein soldiers and Marines are directly interacting with a local population. Identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate is a proactive method of addressing root causes before a full blown armed insurgency can develop. Its purpose is to identify and separate the insurgents from the population.

This is a primary requirement for forces conducting counterinsurgency. By identifying who is an insurgent and who is not, and then applying resources to separate insurgents from the population, commanders and planners can more effectively focus their efforts on making the insurgency feel isolated. Insurgents may then believe that their causes for conflict are not supported by the population. Once the insurgent leaders and members feel isolated from the population, peaceful efforts can be made to influence insurgents to surrender, return, and be reintegrated into society.

(5) Other Indirect Enablers. The U.S. can integrate enablers into a host nation's counterinsurgency efforts. These enablers can provide intelligence or prevent the flow of resources to a counterinsurgency. Various intelligence capabilities, such as signals intelligence, human intelligence, and geospatial intelligence, may be essential to a host nation's counterinsurgency. Sharing of information from these sources may enable a host nation to defeat an insurgency. Also, other enablers, such as airlift capabilities, might be important for counterinsurgency. Another capability that can be integrated into a counterinsurgency effort is counter threat finance. Counter threat finance works to detect, counter, contain, disrupt, deter, or dismantle the transitional financing of state and non-state enemies threatening the U.S. Counter threat finance can deny an insurgent access to vital funding streams by identifying the sources and conduits of funding. In counterinsurgency, this can play an important role because of the connection between insurgencies and black markets. It provides one means to prevent an insurgency from obtaining resources.

g. Vietnam: Combined Action Program. The Combined Action Platoon effort is illustrative of the type Civil Affairs activities and the type of indirect approach taken to defeat an insurgency. The CAP was very successful despite the outcome of the Vietnam War and the technique was used again recently in Afghanistan by Special Forces in a program called Village Stability Operations.

h. Tipping Points. Endeavors to build or reform institutions inherently take a long period of time. In a 2010 Rand Corporation study, 30 insurgencies spanning 1978-2008 were examined. The findings reveal most insurgencies reach a tipping point at the 10 year mark and favor counterinsurgents if their actions were deemed legitimate and on the aggregate did less harm than good.

REFERENCES:

DoDI 3000.05 Stability Operations
Joint Operating Concept, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular
Threats
JP 3-07 Stability Operations
JP 3-57 Civil-Military Operations
MCWP 3-33.5, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies
FMFRP 12-15, Small Wars Manual

